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ConservatiSnl, once at the periphery of An1erican politics. nO\V occupies 
a central and strategtc position in the seat of political pO\VCr. The 1994 
election confinned a realignn1ent ot Atnerican politics along conserva-
tive lines In the general electorate, but in the halls of ac.1den1e conserva-
tisnl ren1ains a neglected subject, on the fringes of the curriculun1 and 
outside the door of the f.1culty lounge Man\ acadenllC\ <1re politically 
liberal, and fe\v scholars u1 the social suence disuplines t.1ke conservative 
intellectual poc;itions senously. 1 
Students 1n the classroon1, bv contrast. are very interested and sup-
portive of conservative Idea~:., Cnfortunately. their enthusi.l'\111 is often 
keener than the1r acquaintance \Vith the thought to \Vhich the\ ha\·e 
such a fervent devotion. Many pre,ent-dav converts to Atnencan con-
servatisrn are astonished to discover that it has a long htstory that pre<.htes 
the election of I~onald I~eagan in 1980 
We have wntten this book priinanl} for our students and colleague 
and also for anyone Interested in .1 surve) of the Ide.ls .1nd traditions 
of An1erican conservative political thought. Not stnce the 1950~:.,, \vhen 
Clinton R.osstter's Conseruatt5111 111 America appeared, has a cotnparable 
survey of conservative thought been published. Our survey approach 
necessarily n1eans that itnportant Ideas are gtven bnefer attention than 
the reader, or the authors for that nutter, would hke. Each of the sections 
of this book could be greatly expanded and still not do JUStice to the 
ideas associated with the topic. We have included an expanded bibliog-
raphy in the hope that the serious reader will independently pursue re-
lated books on subjects of interest. 
We have found conservatisn1 to be a con1plex subject. Although conl-
tnonly considered an ideology, tnany of its best-kno\vn adherents do not 
believe it is; conservatisn1 is not easily defined, and its pnnciples often 
appear in conflict. Its evolution tn Atnerican history has been long and 
\'111 PREFACF 
rnt.>andering .1nd is likdv to rt.>n1am so g~ven tht.> present dtalogue 1n 
\V.1sh ington. 
Today, son1t.> conservative .1<.ihert.>nts \VOuld 5.1\ that there IS no <)lg-
nific.lnt const.>rvativt.> tradition in Atnt.>rica. Here \Ve \VIII argue other-
\Vise, believing that the ideas of conservatism \Vere forged in the cnictble 
of history and experience in reaction to hostile ideas and unfortunate 
events. 
Unlike conll11llllisnl. \Vith its Ccm11111111isr J\fa11ij£·sto, conservat1sn1 ha 
no coherent ton1c of principle : it did not spring-fresh and sparkhng-
froJn the ch.1n1ber of the hunun 111ind. Hetero rcneitv, rather than ho-, 
1110gentity. typifies it history. .,.,onservatisnl i cotnposed of a dtverstty 
of groups and a con1plex1ty of ideas. Its futurL' is hotly debated; sorne 
.1rgue th.lt it h.1s tini hed its course, \Vhile others belit.>VL' its be'\t (Ontnbu-
tions lie .1he.1d. 
In the first chapter, .. he En1ergt.>nce of ontetnpor.ll) Atnencan 
on erv. ti Ill ' ' \Ve examin" the re.1sons \vhy conservatisn1 Inoved fron1 
back rage to cent<: r tage on the AnH:rican politic.1l sct.>nt.>. We urvey 
rnajor currents of con t rvative thought sin ct.> World W.1r I I Ch.1pter 2, 
"The Problen1 of Defining .,.,onservatisnl," discusses variou\ definitions 
of con t:rvatisrn, noting hc1\v they .1re alike and diflerent. Con5ervat1sn1 
is defined and placed in the context of Atnerican poht1calculture. "The 
Ten Most Irnportant Beliefs of onservan~nl," the third ch.1pter, sets 
forth the fundanh::nt.d principles of con\ervansm as .1ccepted by n1ost of 
its advocates. The next t\VO chapters explore the tradtt1on of An1encan 
conservatisnl. Chapter 4, "The CLl'\siG11 I~oots of Conservative 
Thought,'' exatnines the non-Arnencan roots ot Arnencan conserva-
tisnl, covering such subjects as classical and rnodern political thought, 
the Enlightentnent, and utopian ideologies. Chapter 5, "The Historical 
Developn1ent of Arnerican Conservatisn1," sho\vs ho\v conservat1sn1 de-
veloped since Atnerica 's foundtng. The stxth c.h.1pter, entitled "The 
Con1peting Conservative Traditions In An1enca," presents the political, 
e(onornic, and religiouc; past of An1encan conservatisn1. The final chap-
ter, "'The Dtrect1ons of Contetnporary Atnencan Conservati 111," con-
ternplates the present state of conservatisn1 and Its prospects in light of 
changtng conditions. 
Our work IS a sun1n1ary of conservative thought; the hsts of canons, 
principles, and definitions are not advanced as an Ideological blueprint. 
Many individual (Onservatives rnight \Vtsh to add to the infonnation \Ve 
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present here, and son1e might well take exception to some of our state-
ments. We accept responsibility for any errors in our presentation and 
invite constructive criticism. Conservatives argue among themselves as 
to the proper ranking of their values and will disagree on the practical 
application of their principles. One need not adhere to every conserva-
tive idea to be known by that label. These qualifications aside, we be-
lieve that the ideas in this book constitute the core meaning of 
conservative thought. 
Note 
1. Stanley Rothman, "Academics on the Left," Society, Vol. 23, No.3., March/ April 
1986, pp. 44-49. For a conservative analysis of this problem see T. Kenneth Cribb, 
"Conservatism and the American Academy: Prospects for the 1990s," (Washington, 
D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1989). See also: Everett Carl Ladd, Jr. and Seymour 




The Emergence of Contemporary 
American Conservatism 
In the United States at this time {19 50}, liberalism is not 
only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition. For 
it is the plain fact that nowadays there are no conservative ... 
ideas in general circulation. 
LIONEL TRILLING • 
A s World War II ended, liberalisn1 stood as the foremost ideology in American politics. Louis Hartz wrote that "America represents the 
liberal mechanism of Europe functioning without the European social 
antagonisms. " 2 A fluid class structure, unbounded opportunity, and ac-
quisitive individualism stood out as hallmarks of Hartz's analysis ofliber-
alism's dominance. Conservative emphasis on community, authority, 
deference, and the sanctity of tradition appeared out of place. 
Acknowledgment of a large role for the national government in 
American life became a widely accepted truism after the New Deal. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced in his 1932 inaugural ad-
dress that "the money changers [have J fled from their high seats in the 
temple of civilization. " 3 The ostensible creators of the Great Depression, 
finance capitalists and advocates of private markets, relinquished their 
position to the priests of a new order, government officials with a vision 
for management. 
An entire generation, marked by the unforgettable collapse of the 
national economy and the successful mobilization against German and 
Japanese aggression, accepted the idea that government should set the 
economic agenda and care for the welfare and security needs of society. 
Conservatism's "last rites," pronounced by Lionel Trilling in 1950, 
') CIIA PTER ONI· 
'\l'l'I11Cd .lppropriate for ,111 l'l":l of optimis111 ,lbout ,1 /litt<?rin._r .111d bounti-
ful hberal future. 
But th1c; \\ J<., not to be \\\ ee ping cultur.1l ch.u1~--res, .1 \Vorscning cco-
nonllc cond1t1011, :1nd the n.llion.ll tr.1u111.1s of Vietn.un .1nd W.1tcrg:1tc 
eroded thl' ltber.1J conficknce in a stJ 011,' 11,ltl011.1i r()Vl:'ll1111l'llt in Jess 
tlun thrl'l' dcc1d<:s. The"' rc ulb <. the 1 <. <. t nlldtenll de<. ti< n concluded 
,l trend tlut b<:gJn \Vith the ek-tion c f l( nal I Re •• 111 111 It 81 .1nd 
continu<:d \Vith a con <?f\".1tive tnunll h 111 • rc1u 1 ll n < hher.1l post-
\V:lr expc t.Htons. 
Tod.1v, Jibe r.1li-..n1 i 111 retreat· Hl c 1\ tl 111 utll\ c i lt L t ntcs. tcr 
' 
tht· election of Ron.1ld Re.1g. n 111 1 , 0, no th u htful p >huc.1l le.ltkr 
could profit .11n<. ng voter b) \vtlltn .rl ' ~l u·1 nng the l.1l el o "ltbcr.1l." 
Thl' 19<J4 tnidtenn elt t:lOJl ll: ult c:l cl ben h111.lt"k (L' tinloni.ll 
to the defc.ll of Nc\V I >eel bbet.11t 111. <. n el\, tl\C .111d l(el ublic.111. 
ynonyrnou \\ irh vi lc I) 111 th. t de uon, tgn. lc i the. cept. n c >f the 
tr:Iditiona]J leas of~ e )Jl, 1 re l n tb!lH n a 111, ller n, t1 n.il 7 vern-
mt.?nt. J=or the first rirne 111 fort e. rs ( rH:\\ oltn . I l , rt \Von in 
tht: l1ou t: of l~epn.: en taU\ e . ere un :r the p lCntl. I (; r rc h.~ 111 7 the 
American legi I. ti ve , genda < r the next qu. rtt:r cciltU I). 
Causes of Conservative Resurgence 
Why did tht• libcr.11 sulution t: II out r i:\V )J" \\ Hh the elect r.Ht' .md 
allo\v conservati 111 to t~tkt: center t~•ge 111 J\men<., n Jt illi .II It e? Olllt' 
~ay tlut liber.1l ick(1 l.1cked \Vi le .1 cept.lnte: l thct believe thclt f:1ikd 
policies led to a rejection ofhbl"r,dt 111 •• gtlldt f()r tnltuc.l cl uon: ~till 
others think that tht: interruption in hber.1l le.tder htp 1 tCnlpor.lf)'. 
Here \\'l' \Vant to explore this dr.un,ltJC tut n.1round in poliric.1l outlook 
and cultural attitudes by prc~t: 11 ti ng the conserv.ltt ve pol i tic.1l vic\\ of 
the good society. 'rhc conserv.Hive ,tscenti.lncy is best understood by 
ex~unining its n1ajor pre1nises, the incidents th.lt changed Atnerican cul-
ture, and the ideas of protninent \Vritcrs as~oci.Hed \Vith the con:-;t'rvatl\'l' 
n1ove1nent. 
Most \Vriters agree that the genesis of the conserv.1tive rcn.1issance 1 
found in the events of the 1 <J60s. The Kennedy and Johnson adnlint\tra-
tions raised hopes that poverty, racistn, and chronic unen1ployn1<.'nt tlsso-
ciated \Vith business cycles \vould disappear through bbcr.1l lq.;1\lation 
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and Supreme Court decisions. Some groups, disappointed that govern-
ment action did not bring immediate and far-reaching results, resorted 
to street protests and violent confrontations. 
On college campuses, middle-class youths became outspoken critics 
of American life, protesting the war in Vietnam, parading for civil rights, 
and seizing campus buildings to demand changes in university rules and 
policies. The youth revolt took the form of unconventional clothing, 
socially conscious rock music, the widespread use of illegal drugs, and 
uninhibited sexuality. 
Black Americans, seen as special victims of American society, received 
much sympathy with their plight from artists and intellectuals in the best 
of circles. "Radical chic" was in style. Tom Wolfe chronicled the new 
fashion, typified by "the [Black] Panther women trucking on into the 
Bernsteins' Chinese yellow duplex, amid the sconces, silver bowls full 
of white and lavender anemones, and uniformed servants serving 
drinks. " 4 One writer commented at the time, "Should these various 
people have their way, society as we know it, in all its imperfections but 
also in all its glories, would be replaced by a desert inhabited by the 
nihilistic and the bored rich. " 5 Conservatives had an alternative vision 
of the postwar world. 
The idea of conservatism is distinctive: it emphasizes political stability 
as the forces of change slowly become integrated into time-tested insti-
tutions. During the liberal ascendance of the postwar era, the themes of 
state rather than federal action, fiscal responsibility, decreased govern-
ment spending, and a reduction in governmental regulation of the econ-
omy sounded anachronistic. The New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, 
and Great Society endorsed government as the positive force that amel-
iorated wrongs and expanded the freedom of the individual. When free-
dom became indistinguishable from anarchy, many people who 
supported the liberal emphasis on individual rights looked for an alterna-
tive vision for society. Even as the liberal ethic flowered, the conserva-
tive alternative blossomed. 
The intellectual and philosophical resurrection of contemporary con-
servatism began in the 1940s with the publication of several books. First, 
Friedrich von Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (1944) presented a bulwark 
for conservative economics against the high tide of state-managed eco-
nomic policies. Milton Friedman later incorporated competitive free-
market principles and government noninterference in the economy in 
4 CIIJ\PTER 01\.l 
hts popular book Free ro Choose (lc 7 )) . \ct ond. Univer!'ity of ~hicago 
profes or R.tchard Weaver's Ideas I {,we Con equcnru ( 1948) tr.tced the 
dechne of Western culture since n1edieval timL's .1nd foresh.ldO\VL'd a 
Lner University of Chictgo professor'$ best-seller. t\ll.ln Bloon1 's ri11e 
Clo.\111,~ <?frhc A111erirm1 1\lind (19~7). \vhich crniqued hber.tl culturalcx-
ce<;.;,es in .1C1ckn1e .1nd the so icty .ll l.u·ge. Third \V, Peter Viereck's 
Conservati.'m Rct·isircd (1 c 49). fe.ttured tn .. !7, T1111e f Lc ndon ,1s "the 
n1ost intcllie;ent sunlJll,trV o t )n erv.HJ m. l a c 1 elf on tht principks 
.... ; 
of British st,lttS111.111 E bnund Burke."() 
Btt\Vl'tn 1 <.SO and 1 53, etght l o<. k ( J 1 e.1rc l th, t h. i thetne conl-
p.nibk \Virh the \VOrks o l I yek. \Ve. ver, , n i Vacre k . ~hey mdudL:d 
R.ussell Kirk"s 71lc Co11.ullati11e li11d n " in It eventh e ltttCHl~ Eri 
Voegeli n 's ·nil f\lt w '.cienc of I>< litic~; \V dlJa 111 E Buckley, Jr.' Jod and 
fall at )~de: Certrude I hmnltlf.lrh · Lmd I ton; I t'l tr.tu~ i\clfWcll 
Right and I li~tmy: John I Llllt \Veil' '"f7ze \!oral l .. ormthtion of /)u1lo mcy: 
Whittaker h.unber r Vztllt ~ : ani 1Z. l Crt l 11 bet' ( >ue t Jot Comnw-
11ity. Each of tht.:sL' bock dt cu t:d the; r k ultural tradan n pl.1 ' in the 
t.thilitv of a o ietv. 
J ; 
r 1) 1 <JSS Clinton R Iter! Cot1SC111a/IS11J i11 lmencn: 17ze "ThmzkltS Per-
Sllasion won rhe harle 1\. lk.1rd kan n . 1 i>nzc , n I (tnrll un td to 
the.; acadtnlic \Vorld th. t l ein to the n 7 ht of enter \V~l tnttllc.;cttt.llly 
n:spectabl .7 \Xlhen rde.1sed, Ro Her' 1 k L rL:. te ur: ome cnttcs 
considered it .1 defc:nse o the lll.tin rre.tnl >r tnodtr.ltc c ·ntt r uf /\rneri-
ca n politic. rather t h.1n . st.llt'Jl1e n t of pure I y t nser v .It i vc p ri n ci p ll's. 
R.~:gan.llt: " s of this deb,tte , thl" book contnbutcd to the.; ~nnving .lttention 
bri ve n to the ideolot,ric. 1 origin of public I oltcy. 
e\V con~ervative journ.d c f ot inion. such .1 the ~ati(lnal I<er•it.w. 
1\!odcm .)1.~e. and tht: Inren:olle,giate Ur11iew arnvcd on the I itt r. ry !'Cenc 
during the 195()s. Con ervative think t.tnk . indudin,., the Am<?ri ,111 En-
terprise Institute, the Center for tr.ltl'bric Studies ,lt rCOJ"/L'l0\\'11 Uni-
versity, the An1enc.u1 Security ouncil. tht I Ioover Institution .. 1nd thL· 
Foreign Policy R.csearch Institute at tht Univer~ity of Penn-.vh·.u11a, 
began to offer alternative visions for the An1eric.1n experience. Pnor to 
the creation of such center:-;, ne\v ideas in An1erican pollllt'> rern.uncd 
aln1ost exclusively the dotnain of hber,ds in ~uch places as the l3rooktngs 
Institution. 
R.evived interest in t\VO classics also occurred. Akxis de Tocquevtlle 's 
Denwcracy in America and Edtnund Burke\ Rcficctwns on the f<cllolllttOII in 
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France emphasized custom and order as the protectors of social morality 
and fit the needs of a nation wondering about its values after achieving 
economic abundance. 8 The themes of respect for cultural tradition and 
fear ofhuman tinkering with proven institutions permeated these works. 
Collectively they had much to say about current problems. Viereck and 
Kirk applied Burkean principles to the contemporary debate on the 
Cold War, comparing Communist excesses to the revolutionary indul-
gences in France that had alarmed Edmund Burke. Conservatives later 
used the same logic to draw parallels between the excesses of the New 
Left of the 1960s and those of the Jacobins of the 1790s. The depravity 
of human reason unchecked by tradition, conservatives argued, pro-
duced such dictatorial monsters as Stalin and Napoleon. 
Richard Weaver and Leo Strauss traced conservative thought back to 
the classical ideal of Plato's "ordered society," with its sense of noblesse 
oblige. To conservatives, American society placed too much emphasis 
on rights and not enough on responsibilities. They argued that change 
had to be gradual and consistent with society's foundations. Classical 
scholars, such as Weaver, Strauss, and, later, Allan Bloon1, contended 
that America's hurricanelike changes in civil rights for minorities, the 
women's revolution, and the street confrontations with government au-
thorities that characterized the 1960s and early 1970s caused the nation 
to lose its cultural anchor and drift in a sea of relative values. 
Political seeds of conservatism budded alongside these intellectual 
works. In the postwar years a consistent chorus in the Congress rejected 
the liberal themes. Senator Everett Dirksen's regular bickering with 
presidential social welfare legislation made him a national figure. Senator 
Barry Goldwater's The Conscience of a ConseJVative (1961), which frontally 
challenged American liberalism, sold millions of copies.9 Also on drug-
store shelves were the writings of William F. Buckley, Jr., James J. Kil-
patrick, and M. Stanton Evans, which contributed to the discussion of 
conservative ideas in the general populace. Buckley's Up From Liberalism 
(1959), Kilpatrick's The Sovereign States (1957), and Evans's The Liberal 
Establishment (1965) added to the philosophical resurgence of contempo-
rary conservatism. 10 Their commentary in news magazines and newspa-
pers and on television formed a cornerstone for the conservatism of the 
1980s and 1990s. 
6 CHAPTER ONE 
Conservative Cycles 
According to Arthur .rvL 'chlcsingl·r. Jr., tht f olit1 .11 c rde is .1 ·ontinu-
tng struggle bet\veen co!1'\L'lV.ltivc v.1lue ~uch :1" the .. tnctity of priv.lte 
property, the tn:txitniz.Hion of profit. .md the free 111arket .1nd liber.1l 
v.1lues uch :ts equ.1lity. frecdon1. oci.l re 1 nsibilit:y. and public rl'gula-
tion of property :.1nd pro It. Schle 1ngcr conten l , ' 'The r ot of this 
cyclic:.11 ~d -sufficit ncy foul tie ltc deep 111 the n. tural l1fe of hu-
lll:.lnit r." 11 
The cv le of liberalt 111 \vhi h bt: n \Vtth l r. nkhn R .. < evdt in 
; 
1932, do1ninat~d t\n1cncan pohtic , nd publt pohc) even dunng Re-
public.ln c1d1njni tr.uion . J>rc tdent l:1 t:nh~ \ver, ~ rex. rnple. nl.ll e little 
ctTon to revc r e the ude t f l1 bet. I l 1e\V I eal pohcte ctnd Pn: I dent 
Ntxon h.1d linle ucce s in ch. ngtn the ) 1. 1 \'. el . re . gend. of the 
Cont,rn:~ . Before 1 < , the Rcpul he, n P. rty rcner lly repre en ted 
\Vhite-collar VOtt and the I )erne J' t1 P. rt ', lue-colL r VOte.; en 
years later the p:1rtie re~ rc cnte i t"\VO 1 leolog~ , ll d1't;rt:nt e · of 
upp<."r tniddlc-cla " vote : •·'"r he 1 e1 ubb n 1ne to rCJ rt: t:nt the 
n1ore con crv. tive \V1ng of the tra HI On. 1 n11 the I t tno-
crats the tnore leftist \ving of the hber I JnJddle l r tht: 'ne\v 
class.' '' 12 
The politic:.1l succe of Ron. ld Reag n ur pl.n1te the libcr.1l .1nd 
Den1ocraric ethic of public ·u1 t rvt ion \Vith Hlt en1ph.1 i-zing priv,He 
and loc:.1l initiatt\'es. 'T'he 19< 4 tni ltenn clct tll)ll btnu hr the e ide.1s to 
the legislative h:.1ll of ongre but the jury reTnaul n1t Hl thL·ir con-
tinued do1ninancc of public policy over ever. I ie de ,1 Roosevelt·~ 
l'.:e\V Dt:al did. Both Pre ident Ron, ld Re( g. n 111 the 19 , n l ptaker 
of the U.S. House of R.eprt ent.nive Ne\Vt ,ingri h in the I c 9Us 
quoted R.oosevclt bee. u e they s,l\V then1 elves .1s the s,une kind of har-
binger for a ne\v political er.1. 
Should the conserv:.ltivt: cycle be abbreviated, its intc rn.tl tensions n1:.1y 
be a 111a.JOr c1use. Sotne conservatives \Vho \vandcred for forty ye.lf\ tn 
the postwar \vildcmess resent freshtnen conbrressn1cn, upstart acaden1tcs, 
and th1nk-tank activists. Longtin1c philosophic:.1l conserv.1tives tnay also 
resent the populan7ers who write \Veekly ne\VS colun1ns and host radto 
talk shows. 
For son1e, the term conservatisn1 conjures up a unity of ide:.1s satd not 
to exist in fact. To dlustrate, consH.ier that Barry Gold\vater dtd not even 
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merit a mention in the index of the seventh edition of Russell Kirk's 
The Conservative Mind. 13 Even after Ronald Reagan's election in 1980, 
some conservatives criticized his administration because it failed to ad-
here to a strict agenda of economic, social, and foreign policy items. 
They targeted "moderates," such as senior advisors James Baker in 
Reagan's first administration and Howard Baker in his second. 
With no master plan to guide and unify American conservatism, hap-
hazard developn1ent and setbacks marred its progress. The low point 
came in the 1964 presidential campaign of Senator Barry Goldwater, 
when the outspoken conservative carried only six states in the electoral 
college; yet even this defeat had a silver lining. The Goldwater campaign 
demonstrated that: (1) a significant segment of the American public re-
acted favorably to the conservative message; (2) conservatives could or-
ganize and capture control of one of the two major political parties; and 
(3) the political infrastructure built by conservatives in the early 1960s 
could be used as a launching pad for political success. Ronald Reagan 
first gained national political notice when he spoke for Goldwater in 
1964, an appearance in which he seemed a more reasonable conservative 
advocate than the Republican presidential candidate. 
Shared traditional values held conservatism together during the turbu-
lent postwar era. These values emphasized local control, a sense of mo-
rality, and respect for tradition. The disposition toward religion among 
many conservatives caused them to adopt an emphasis on the limits of 
man's power of reason. "We know," wrote Edmund Burke, "and it is 
our pride to know, that man is by his constitution a religious animal ... 
religion is the basis of civil society." 14 At the tum of the century, main-
line Protestant religious establishment figures appeared as "the Republi-
can Party at prayer." Eighty years later religious leaders, such as Jerry 
Falwell and Pat Robertson, worshipped at the Republican altar. In the 
years after World War I the rise of the Social Gospel movement and the 
response by fundamentalists to the attack on the traditional authority of 
the Bible led to a split in American Protestantism. 15 
By the 1970s the debate over abortion, "together with a number of 
other issues that divide the public along much the same lines-
pornography, homosexuality, school prayer-the question of public mo-
rality and its relation to government policy has provided a continuing 
source of tension between religious liberals and religious conserva-
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tJYes. " 16 The dec~de ~fter the sixties \Vitn "'ssed .1 nst 111 publi · concern 
~bout cultural V,1lues ~nd the future or Arneric.ln ociety. 
R.on.1ld H .. c.1g;1n \ landid.tc r in Jt l"! I \VOn endorsernent frorn rnany 
conserv.1tive relig1ous groups, inLiuding the ·1nr,ll ·L1j Hity, tht: E.1gle 
Fon1111. and the Rc.:·lrgtous Roundt.1hle. The ( hristi,tn C n,tlition .md 
other conserv.1tive religiou t,rt'Olll s unLk r 'lrdcd Repuhlr ,111 vi tories in 
the 1990s. PL·opk '"h > hcbt ve l the Bible to l c C, )lr '" >rei .111 II itt r.tlly 
true usu.11ly .1vored mrre .. 1 ed L <?fen e pen ling, , t ugher J >hey \Vith 
Ru,si .. oppt sition to aboruc n ... n l r.:t) er rn pubh h l .17 Fron1 
conservative ideologJ .I Clr le , n1e llJl rte o 1. te I \Vith the 
An1eric.1n Enterprise In nnne. the I l ver In tlllltl n. an tht: I lerit, c: 
Found.Hion. 1.tny . dH he , b. n i nc i the1r t • htr 11.11 
I L~nlocr.Hic l>.uty to embr.t e the R.epubhc n pl. t~ nn. 
plank opposmg .lbortlon . \Vhrte cv. ngelr . I .. rh \VIlltC h.tvt· 
been rnoving a\va r ron1 the I en1o ran Pc1rt) rncc the [ 
According to con c-rv. uve the rnergcz 1 le I '"1 . l , n 
trand of thought reveal . truth . b ut nlenc, n l ht1 
con ervative , fedc.::rally funde I ex e u , t10n I. e . h 111 exu.d rights. 
abortion the E }ll.l R1gh An1en ln1ent . .: n the l hu n 
pr~yc.:: r viol.Hc l ,1crcd l nncr pic len\ c fr rn the J u e - ( hn tl. n ht ri-
t.lge of the \Ve ter11 den1 cr:-t 1c . C ne \\ ntcr ununc 1 Uj the theolo~tc.ll 
differences thi \vay: ·· on erv,ltrvc ten lt) l clrcve, ltber.l t d )Ubt." 19 
When the s<.:'a oft1ith recule. u>rl etV.llJVe , r :rue, the bl>d r p >liti f.tct·s 
nihilisnl in .111 its tark de,p.lll . rot quevrl]c rec >glllzed the ltnport,\IH 
.lffinity bl't\Veen religion ,111d de1110 r. cy 111 lllCrJCcl \Vhell he \\'rOll' or 
the role that churcht .md other 1 riv, te \'( luruary or r,uti7., til ns play in 
affinning tht comn1unity tit:s on \vhich An1enc. n derllO r.l 1 dept nds. 
Traditional values 'l'rved , .111 urnbrdL un kr \vhi h v.trinu religrous 
group ~ could unite. and religion pl.tyed .111 11nport,1r1t role in the rn,Hur.l-
tion of political n1oven1ent . 
R.eligious conservatives took for gr.uHcd school pr.tyer ,a .lthktic 
events and pastoral serrnons at baccalaure.lte sl'rvice · until thev ... uddL'nly 
had the rug of religious security pulled fi·onl bene.Hh thern S1nce rn.1ny 
of these people believed in An1erica's hristian origins, they ~.l\V these 
actions as hostile to the very core of their national c:xperience. In the 
1970s the debate on the: origin and purposes of An1eric.1 heated up. \Vlth 
n1ost liberals arguing that the nation had only a notninal ~hristian hen-
tage that had been superceded by a respectful tolerance for social and 
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religious pluralism. Conservatives contended that the distinctive charac-
ter of the Judeo-Christian tradition explains why the American republic 
developed as it did. They believed that liberal social policies erode the 
very foundation of the country. 
The 1963 Supreme Court decision against official prayers in public 
schools kindled the fire of debate on religion in public life. Subsequent 
cases asked whether creation science could be taught alongside evolu-
tionary theory in the public school classroom. Could the Ten Com-
mandments be posted on public school classroom walls? Is secular 
humanism a religion that denies God and holds to relative, rather than 
absolute, moral standards? Could it be taught in textbooks and public 
school classrooms in place of Christianity? Could public school students 
meet for religious purposes in public school buildings if the meetings did 
not interfere with school activities? Could the Catholic Church have its 
tax-exempt status revoked because of alleged lobbying activities against 
abortion? Could a religious school have its tax-exempt status revoked 
because its religious convictions forbid interracial dating and marriage? 
These, and a long list of other religious issues, made their way into the 
courts between the 1970s and 1990s. Millions of An1ericans, influenced 
by these debates, petitioned the judicial, legislative, and executive 
branches of government for differing interpretations of the Constitution. 
In 1964, while campaigning for the presidency, Lyndon Johnson said, 
"We're in favor of a lot of things, and we're against mighty few." Sup-
port for Great Society programs, including Medicare, Medicaid, the 
food stamp program, legal assistance for the indigent, economic revital-
ization for distressed areas, and medical research, rested on the belief that 
economic growth facilitates funding. Such illusions, no less than the 
programs they spawned, became the first casualties of the Vietnam War. 
In the decade of the seventies public confidence in government as 
an equitable economic arbitrator shook when the economy languished. 
Running against Gerald Ford in 1976, Jimmy Carter devised the "mis-
ery index," defined as the addition of rates of inflation and unemploy-
ment. In 1976 the misery index stood at 12.5 percent; by 1980, when 
Ronald Reagan ran against Carter, it had reached nearly 20 percent. 
Reagan cited this poor economic performance as evidence of Carter's 
lack of leadership: "In Reagan's campaign and presidency, the principal 
accusation against Democratic predecessors and rivals [was] that they 
were guilty of pessimism. " 20 
10 CHAPT'ER ONE 
Libec:ll public policies, once .lCcl'pted uncritic.1ll '· t:1ccd nl'\V chal-
lenge". Do not publtc housing projects .uHi higll\v, y construction pro-
granls de"trov the comrnunity :1nd the integrit' oflo(al ncighborhoods? 
The Great Socicty progr.1111s not only .1tlcd tho <.: to be h<.:·lped, they abo 
turned thl' 1ntended bendici.HH:.'s .1g.11nst thl' pro,rr,lllls. School busing 
aJ,o outr.lgt·d the people it \V.ls de ignell to ht.:lf . In the cvcntie busing 
tor purpo~c~ of integrati n bee. n1c the 111 t ntr vers1.1I polni -.1! issue 
in the COUntry. Ill' of the b . rtbc.lt nscrv. tlVC th ught is lts , s-
Sl1111ption that the c 011111 n1 ntt y ts l'll t r .d to t ht defi m tt on o the Ill d i vid-
ual. African An1cri c.111 , nd othc • t~ kel the JllJU tl e o ht u ing 
prot-rr.uns . nd hu 1ng dec1 1 n , l ccau c such , ll n for 1 bl · evicted 
thenl from th<.: ir ncighl or h o l t • h1cve rac1. I b l.m e. 1 I he c un-
troversie JUhlicized hl er.d ,1s un1J tl< n . n eX!. n ie I lternc nvc pnli-
cil's that Ctvored con er-v,Htvc value . 
Both .1 n.l an l, 11 c t n n11c 11111 ul c un crgir e I R.c. n ' VI rory 
in t 98( . \' l11lt:: uppl r- 1 k: e on 1111 c UJIC the he. Uu1c the oci.1l 
agenda r,dv.lm'Zcd ind1v1 lu I , llqp.u1 e t Re g. n .m I the Republi ,m 
!'arty: .uHi-~tbortion , )r hool pr. ycr .. 1'. 1n t ho )I hu 111 '· nppu ed 
to pon1ogr .tphy, .1g.1in t govcrmnent regulau< n f I n v. tc .tnd r II rio us 
schools. ho ulc to unployrnent qu< t. , nd npJ edt the Equal R1ghrs 
A1nendment. Repubh .111 i vorc l tllltl n t. ~· credit r 1 ,ucnt of chtl-
dren in priv. te .tn i rdtgiou cho >1 • nd rn t ho >l its tplin ·. Su-
pren1e Court decisions 111 the I ~60s ,tnd ll 7t I .tdded I11tlll1C'1Hlllll to this 
agt:nda. The ourt' oppo ition to t hool pr. ycr. n i upport for .lbor-
tion, for CX,l!npll". ~lrOU ed ,1 J.trge .tnd V< ,d ppt ill )I) ,lfllOllg the COn-
Servative public. 
To conservatives, th~ equ.tl rights itnpul <.:: .1nd the honH>sexu.llnlOVL'-
Inent undennined traditional cultur.d v,due th.tt h.td stood the tl'st of 
tin1c. Many An1ericans bcli eved tlut ~oci.d e.xpen men t.tti on \Votdd dl'-
stroy proven values. An appeal to .1 in1pkr pa t, \Vhcn Anleric:llls h.1d 
confidence in then1sdves .tnd \Vhat they stood for, l1.1d iJninedi.ltL' .H.cep-
tance during the 1980s. Entenng the dcL.llk ofthL· ninetiL'\, the .lcbntm~­
tration of President Gl'orge Bush either openly supported R.e.1gan 
adn11nistration policies or only quietly dL'I11urred fi·o111 tht'I1L Contmuity 
rather than conflict was the non11. 
Neoconservati<;J11 cldded 11l011len tUI11 to the right- \\'tng re'IU rgence. It 
IS a moverncnt nude up, 111 the phrase of I rv1ng Knstol, of "hber.ll\ \vho 
had been 1nugged by reahty. " 2 } M.1ny of it~ adhercnts \Verl' oncl' active 
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supporters of the New Deal; some even thought of themselves as liberals 
until they reacted against the events of the 1960s and the overextension 
of liberal public policies that characterized the time. They number 
among their ranks Irving Kristol, who helped found the highly regarded 
journal The Public Interest; Jeane Kirkpatrick, who became ambassador to 
the United Nations under President Reagan; Harvard University profes-
sor Edward Banfield, author of The Unheavenly City (197 4); and former 
Harvard, and later UCLA, professor James Q. Wilson, author of numer-
ous works critical of liberal public policies. 
Some prominent intellectuals also shifted from ardent advocacy of 
liberal politics to conservative values, such as anticommunism and a 
smaller role for the federal government. The most dramatic example of 
such conversion from liberalism to conservatism was Norman Podhor-
etz, whose book Breaking Ranks typified the shift to new values. Podhor-
etz would subsequently edit the highly regarded neoconservative journal 
Commentary. 23 
Aside from being disenchanted with employment quotas, affirmative 
action, pornography, and other perceived excesses ofliberal public poli-
cies, neoconservatives reacted to the weak position of modem liberalism 
on communism. The staunch anticommunist position, of course, was 
not new to conservatism. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, several 
writers developed the conservative position of strident opposition to 
communism. Among the most prominent works were Whittaker 
Chambers's Witness (1953) and James Burnhatn's Containment or Libera-
tion (1953).24 Anticommunism had immediate appeal to Catholic intel-
lectuals from Eastern Europe, whose homelands were under communist 
domination. 
Neoconservatives want to reverse the agenda of government, tum 
away from grand governmental schemes, and reform America by relying 
on the private sector, the market mechanism, and traditional institutions, 
such as the family and local community. They argue that efforts to pro-
mote equality in the sixties threatened individual freedoms in the eight-
ies. Neoconservatives also decry the oppressive encroachment of 
government bureaucracies on the spontaneous exercise of free-market 
capitalism. They prefer that local communities solve their own problems 
without national government interference. 
Conversion from liberalism to conservatism is the distinctive mark of 
neoconservatives. The failed idealism ofliberalism preceded their accep-
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tance of conc;erY.ltive c;oci.tl theory. tv1any neoconserv:1tives are college-
educated adultc; \Vho \Vere raised in libt:r.tl hon1es, . ttended f.1shionablc 
Institution of htghcr karning. ,1nd s~unpled the v.1lucs of the sixties. 
Thetr attitude ren1ains antic t. blishmcnt, but the v.1lut~ tlut the ' reject 
arc liberaL not con\crvative. 
The New Conservatism 
By the 1 <Jl s conserv. tJ 111 un envent a n1e 111 rph 1 111 df-in1age. 
I uring the 1 < 4 s and 1 :JS , n I even 1n the 1 It h.lt .1 rnorc 
negative tone. c.trping ab ut g vermncn~d 1 oltc1c but o cr ing fc:\V .tl-
tcrnatives. The.:: consen'.lllVe I okcd .H h11n df .1 the I. t c nll)' o s,1nit' 
against the m;~ority Vle\V ( r l.lte donHn( I) <:. Sull. Il crv.lttves offen::d 
fc\v spc.::citics to contr.- dtct the ptcv"" tim ltbt .. I ·ltn1. tc tlVIsll1. 
cultural pluralisrn .• u1 I eyual nrrh . 
The conservative: ren( 1 ance rc tc I on belle th, t the trsr t., k of 
govermnent should be the 1 r te t1 n of n non. I life. onsc lll( ntly. 
con crv;nivc policyn1ake ur J'C th.H nltht ry progr. 111 re eive rre.ttcr 
funding priority th. n .H .1ny t1n1e 111 e the Vldll. 111 \V. r. Stron rer n.l-
tional defense. a prionty o con erv.tuve pol !C) rn. kers 111 the decatk of 
the 1980s, assisted the demi c of S< VJC'l c OllH1Hllll rn • nd provu.i neces-
sary for the \Var ~1ga i nst ... tddam 11ussci n in I l) 1 . ons r v,HI \'l's etn pha-
S17e defense for S<.::VCr.tl rc.::a Oil. f::j , t, it \\',lS bditVtd thclt the ~OVil't 
Ur11on had gained an adv.tnt.l 't.: over the Unitc.::d St.H<.: 1n the seventie . 
The United )Utes \V.l rhe "second 1110 t pO\\'Crful n11ltt.try n.Hion," 
according to R.onald l~eagan in the 198 de non. he de e.tts the Pen-
tagon suffered in Vietnam \Vere but .1 p1eludc to kepticisn1 .1bout ne\V 
vveapons systcn1s and tht clCCu .ttion of. n exaggc:r.ttc:d Ru~si.tn tlueat 
that greeted n1ilitary plannc.::rs on apitol I Iill. Second, the United St.ltL'S 
rnilitary enjoyed a technological advantage-becter b01nbs and r.1cbr, 
faster planes and 1nissiles; but the seventies rc.::vc:alcd an erosion of tech-
nological don1inancc that ttvored Japan and other P.tcttic Run nanons. 
To rcrnain a vvorld leader, the: United States needed .1 n:newed con1n11t-
n1ent to research and developrnent of high-tc:ch \vcaponry. 
Early in the I~eagan ad1ninistration attc:ntion to Pentagon prOJects 
gained f:1vor, but when a nun1bt:r of t:xpcnditures for iten1s \Uch .1s coffee 
pots and hamJners becanH! su bjt:C ts of u1vesttgattve n1t:d1.1 stones, the 
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military realized that priority funding came at a price. These stories 
seemed to discredit the newfound fascination with exotic military weap-
ons, until the 1991 Iraqi war confirmed the conservative devotion to the 
military. The Patriot and Cruise missiles and laser-guided bombs proved 
that the American military remained the standard for comparison in the 
world. Since Iraqi weapons came from the Soviet Union, their destruc-
tion by American technology was especially sweet. President Bush 
basked in the sunlight of Reagan administration defense initiatives as he 
led the nation in defeating Iraq, then the world's fourth largest military 
power. The long shadow of Vietnam-era pessimism about the military 
receded in the bright sunshine of a Bush-led victory in the Gulf War. 
Gradually, conservatism took on a more positive cast with an agenda 
of reducing social spending, emphasizing traditional values, reshaping 
the tax code, and rebuilding national defense. Through the 1970s and 
1980s more Americans characterized themselves as moderates than either 
liberals or conservatives, but whereas in the early 1970s liberal and con-
servative responses to survey questions were given in equal numbers, by 
the end of the eighties, "conservative responses outstrip [ ed] liberal ones 
by a ratio of about 4 to 3. " 25 The conservative view shifted to a positive 
and majority conviction as it became energized to fight within the polit-
ical realm. For example, rather than just being against Keynesian New 
Deal economics and big government budgets, conservatives gradually 
developed constructive policies of their own that emphasized supply-
side solutions and market alternatives. 
In the Reagan administration implementing these conservative ideas 
had the highest priority. The 1980 Republican Party platform declared 
that "the family, the neighborhood, the conununity, and the workplace 
[were] vital alternatives in our national life to ever- expanding federal 
power. " 26 The policies emerging from such conservative think tanks as 
the Heritage Foundation and the Manhattan Institute found widespread 
acceptance in mainstream America. They confirmed the rhetoric Ron-
ald Reagan had preached for years-an enhanced, vital free market, un-
inhibited by government intrusion, excessive taxes, or regulatory 
burdens. The economic results of such an approach were spectacular: 
the 1980s "have seen the longest, or perhaps second-longest, expansion 
in the entire history of the American business cycle. " 27 
At the end of the Reagan administration, even some liberals embraced 
conservative capitalistic ideas. The era of national renewal emphasized 
14 C II 1\ PTE R 0 • f· 
traditional values, the dignny of \vork. love tor t~11nily and neighbor-
hood, t1ith in God, a belief 111 pe.1Cl' through strcn.rth, .111d .1 con11nit-
rnent to protect fn.::edon1 .1s .1 unique kg.1cy of t\n1eric.1. ,eorgc Bush 
<;atd 111 ht" Jn.lut,·,-ural address. "V./e know lH '" to c urt' .1 more just and 
prosperous ltfe fC.1r 111.111 on l'.lrth: th1 ough ti·ee lll,lrkets ti·et· speech. fn:e 
dectton,, .1nd the e.xer i =- o ree \Viii unh.1111pered b ' the st.lte." 
c n >ll1JC Indicators. 
ut 1de 1 s philo-
nc\\ nd ) n1bol . The 
g.1ve t nergy t n en. ll\ e lcgt n . hortJon. 
b.1nning chool Jr. ver. lenten<.) 1n h n ling cnn11n. I . J l jU t,ls. riots 
.l!H.i vi olen e on c. tnpu e "n 111 1t1e , por rH r ph), . rh.l the Equ.1l 
l~ights 1\nH: ndmt'rH ndd be '1 U.lll7.c I !lHckl • n l c le. rly by the 
n1.1sses. In the m.1l.u c- ot the ( . rter c- • R n. II IZ.c.1 :T.l.Jl a1d, "I .un 
deeply conctrncd \Vith the ''. ve hedt 111 rn, the hurnc rH t philosophy 
o prev,1lent to L y, . n] l eheve tl11 n. tt n rnu t h.\ e , Jlntu.tl rebtrth . 
• 1 rededication to (he n1oral pre CJ l \\ h1 h f,Ttll le i u or o n1u h of our 
pa t .1nd \\ e rnust have u h • rcbtrth 'el) oon. ,. R.cc: g.u'l ''' th(: 
.. Great ... ornnHmicat r'' bee. u c he re. he I . nd o the the .111xictic~ 
of AnH;rican concerned b{ ut the uture. I e flere I. n .. ltcrn. tlVe vie\v 
of to1norro'v b. ~ed on the \ lue that '' rkcd 'c tcr L). 
The R.c-. g. n pre tdenly lu::ply JnHuen ed the J\n1t'n • n <. nscil'ncl'. 
To rnany i\Jneri ·an~, iclenti 1 • uon \Vllh tht Rc .• n pre 11..len y \V,ls like 
marrying .1 popul.u .lllsl', >ne th.1t ch.u1ged the ''"Y p )pic thought 
about their government ,md it rolt· m the1r ltvt . llltz hi11C}Wt1 Po.'r poll 
in July 1 <. HR found th.1t 111 re than h.1l - S2 J ercent- o the-re pondent' 
believed th,tt the COU!ltry \V,l better of bee, U C ) l~e.l r,trl' pre idency: 
only one-third said tht:y were wo c ot , and I 1 ~ er ent ,1i his tenure 
n1ade no ditTerence. 1 ontinuing to foliO\\' .1 general! , const•rv.uive 
agenda, Prcsidt:nt Bu h l'njoyt I .1 kvt 1 of popul:1r· supp H t higher dun 
that of hi:-~ predect:ssor .tnd the hight· t of ,1ny presidt·nt .It cornpar.1ble 
tin1e~ m his prt: idcncy. Both Rc~1g.u1 ,1nd Bu!-~h helped ch.1ngt' tht• way 
n1ost AnH.:ricans thought ,lboul the fl'deral govcrn111ent, the ]~epubhcan 
Party, and the conservati vt: politic a I ideology. 
The 1990s 
The intem1ption in this generally conservative rt:nai-;sance can1e 111 1992 
when Bill Clinton won the presidency as a "New Den1ocr.H," pron11S1ng 
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an administration consistent with popular conservative themes. Within 
four months of his inauguration the disapproval rating of the new presi-
dent soared and there emerged an almost visceral level of mistrust and 
dislike for him, a rejection not just of him as a leader or politician, but 
as a person. Much of the aversion seemed to be based on cultural issues, 
such as homosexuals in the military, abortion, and doubts about the 
president's character. These controversies, breaking early in his adminis-
tration, set the tone for his first two years in office. Then the 1994 
midterm election delivered an enormous setback to the ideals ofliberal-
ism and the Democratic Party. 
Conservative radio talk shows, popularized by irreverent hosts such as 
Rush Limbaugh, prospered during Bill Clinton's presidency in the 
1990s. President Clinton's positions on abortion, feminism, homosexu-
ality, and other moral issues became their cannon fodder. No liberal talk 
show even came close to rivaling Rush Limbaugh's audience ratings. 
While conservatives often decried liberal dominance of the print and 
electronic media, they reigned aln1ost unchallenged on radio both na-
tionally and locally. 
From the 1940s into the new millennium, conservative authors wove 
a common thread into the conservative quilt, undergirding and strength-
ening its fabric. The list of books in Table 1-1 docun1ents the growing 
influence of conservatism. Three books, among many, illustrate this 
common thread during these decades. 
First, Compassionate Conservatism: What It Is, What It Does, and How It 
Can Transform America3 1 by Marvin Olasky, which significantly influ-
enced the 2000 presidential campaign of George W. Bush, provided an 
antidote to the charge that conservatives lack compassion for the less 
fortunate in society. Not only did "compassionate conservatism" serve 
as the centerpiece of the Bush campaign, but the President's policy 
agenda also reflected its influence on such issues as education. "Compas-
sionate Conservatism" offset the historic advantage of liberal and Demo-
cratic presidential campaign slogans and policy agendas, such as New 
Deal, Fair Deal, and Great Society. 
Second, William ]. Bennett's best-seller, The Book of Virtues, un-
earthed a gold mine of great moral stories in the conservative tradition. 32 
Covering such subjects as self-discipline, compassion, responsibility, 
friendship, work, courage, perseverance, honesty, loyalty and faith, his 
book reveals the quality of character that conservatives claim n1ust be 
restored in the personal lives of Americans. Moral education, Bennett 
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TABLE 1-1 (Continued) 
Selected Books Molding Contemporary American Conservatism 
Decade Year Author Title 
1987 Allan Bloom The Closing of the American Mind 
E. D. Hirsch Cultural Literacy 
1990s 1991 Shelby Steele The Content of Our Character 
1992 Dinesh D'Souza flliberal Education 
1993 William Bennett The Book of Virtues 
1994 M. Stanton Evans The Theme Is Freedom 
2000 Marvin 0 lasky Compassionate Conservatism 
argues, is the key to restoring not only personal character but also to 
reviving national greatness. 
Third, The Theme Is Freedom, by M. Stanton Evans, presents a com-
pelling case for America's Christian heritage, arguing that no society 
can survive without a solid religious foundation that provides absolute 
standards for moral and educational development. 33 Evans argues that 
the historical record refutes two liberal myths: (1) that our liberties stem 
from secular doctrines and (2) that religious absolutes endanger freedom. 
No discussion of the 1990s would be complete without noting con-
gressional and constitutional changes. The Contract with America, 
which defined public policy debates during and after the 1994 midterm 
election, offered a positive conservative prescription for America's policy 
ills in the Congress. Reforming welfare, balancing the budget, reducing 
the size of the national government, and returning power to state and 
local governments highlighted this agenda. The Supreme Court, domi-
nated by a narrow conservative majority, attacked such liberal icons as 
affirmative action, separation of church and state, and national control 
of public policy through the commerce clause of the Constitution, incit-
ing long-awaited cheers from a previously silent conservative audience. 
Conclusion 
American conservatism emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as a viable alter-
native to post- World War II liberalism; it was not an isolated event. The 
popularity of the New Deal and Keynesian economic policies began to 
wane in the seventies when government policies triggered stagflation. 
Federal initiatives in education, health, and employment raised the stan-
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dard of living for tno t An1ericans but led to bureaucratic stupor and the 
specter of ocialized regulation. 
Conservati n1, donnant during the postwar years, flowered when lib-
eralism began to wilt in the heat of the soctal and economic turmoil 
during the sixtie and even tie~. In 1979 the Reagan can1paign commis-
sioned a poll about the value and a ptratton of the electorate and found 
that An1ericans regretted the lo of value tn octety, parncularly tho e 
associated with bu ine etluc and tradtttonal n1eantngs. The next year 
the Connecticut Mutual Ltfe In uran e otnpany found that the values 
of the nation's leaders- In bu Inc , the new n1edta, government, ci-
ence, education, and la\v---confltcted \Vtth tho c hared by the public. 
The gap between rank-and-file Arnencan and thetr leadershtp elites was 
as n1uch a 30 percent on uch fundan1cntalt ue ~ aboroon, pornogra-
phy, and hon1osexuahty. \4 The on ervattve lteagan revoluoon trategi-
cally appealed to value ernphastztng an "era of national renewal." one 
that would "revttahze the value of fanul), work and netghborhood. "'5 
A diverstty of econonuc, poltocal, rehgtou , and octal optnton resur-
rected tradtttonal con ervatt 111. The cause of Its rebtrth were Interre-
lated, but con ervatt n1' tun1around u1 the 198( and 1990s would have 
been itnpo ible without the philo opht al foundation provided in the 
forty years after World War I I. The turbulent change of the txties has-
tened the appeal and vt tbtltty of con ervatl 111 111 the general public. The 
neoconservative itnpul e contnbuted an e enttal n1ornentun1 to pu h 
society to con tder the tradtttonal con ervatlve agenda. 
Five conclu tons about con ervan 111 are evtdent fron1 thi review of 
the literature. First, phtlo oplucal and Intellectual dt course on conser-
vatism preceded popular and political treati e . econd, a wide variety 
of political, econornic, octal, and religiou wnttng contributed to its 
developn1ent. Third, political ucce required everal decades of matu-
ration as various philosophical ideas gradually penetrated the public 
n1ind. Fourth, no rnaster plan directed the rise of con ervatisn1. Contem-
porary Arnerican conservatisn1 is heterogenous, not hon1ogenous. No 
one strand of thought and no single writer, leader, or group presided 
over the resurrection of conservatisn1 fron1 the dead. Fifth, to achieve 
political success in the future, candidates vying for conservative support 
must carefully walk through disparate conservative ideas. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Problem of Defining 
Conservatism 
What is conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, 
against the new and untried? 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN ' 
A political C\.llture is a patterned way of thinking about politics and government. The American political system is supported by a cul-
ture that fosters a sense of civic duty, takes pride in the nation's constitu-
tional arrangements and provides support for the exercise of essential 
civil liberties. Although Jesse Jackson and Ronald Reagan, Ted Kennedy 
and William F. Buckley, Jr., Paul Simon and Jesse Helms differ on spe-
cific issues of public policy, they still have much in common. Even these 
political adversaries agree that the two-party system is important, that 
there should be free speech and the competition of ideas, and that one 
should respect the opinions of others. A political culture consists of the 
fundamental assumptions citizens have about how the political process 
should operate. It is the "rules of the political game" for the social order. 
A political ideology differs from political culture by en1phasizing what 
the political process should accomplish or do. How government and 
politics should function may find conservatives and liberals agreeing, but 
what government and politics should do customarily finds them differ-
ing. Their respective goals and desired results lead one to want to ban 
abortion, the other to support it; one to oppose passage of the Equal 
Rights Amendment, the other to desire its adoption; one to oppose new 
taxes, the other to support them. For political scientists, liberalism and 
conservatism are ideologies, meaning that they provide a guide for how 
the government should function. Not always are the differences between 
the two as crystal-clear as the examples above, but the tendency an1ong 
ideologues is to disagree on major public policy questions. 
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In um, political culture is the general agreement on the means to 
achieve political ends, while ideology IS the reftecaon of differences on 
the ends to be achieved. Poliacal culture IS the common ground for 
conservatives and liberals bile poliacal tdeology lS most often their 
fighting ground: "The dimension of the diVJSton between liberalism and 
conservatism today refers to atatud about government role ... m the 
protection of order and certam moral valu and commuruty standards. "2 
To define political conservaasm, e must exanune tt m context with 
liberalism. Both liberals and conservaav accept the e tmg political 
order. Both ant to use tablished tnsatuaons of Amencan government 
with theu guaranteed procedures and prmcapl , but they want to use 
them to achieve different resul . ne difference between liberals and 
conservaaves IS that each one plac a different emph lS upon key points 
in the Amencan poliacal culture. Amencan conservaa have looked 
to Tocqueville' Democracy'" Ammt41 and Russell Kirk' 1M Roots oftht 
Amtriaua Ortkr as the best defiruaons of the original Amencan political 
culture. These works the uruque aspec of the Am ncan social 
order and the differences between the ne ly fonned naaon and Its older 
ancestors m Europe. 
For most of 1ts history the Uruted tat of Amenca has been an 
excepaon to the history and octal fabnc of Europe. It founded in 
oppostaon to European adeals and tradiaon , and from the beginning 
the guiding rule of Amencan foreagn policy was to keep out ofEuropean 
affiairs. Thomas Patne wd that the Old orld naaons had theu origin 
in conquest and tyranny, but the "Independence of America [ ] ac-
companied by a Revoluaon tn the prmaples and pracac of Go em-
ment. "3 To conservaaves those tandards of government tnvolved 
agreement on certain ideals which defined the character of the new 
nation. To explain the American culture associated with ho conserva-
tism will be defined, we begm by examining elements of the "national 
character" of the country, as viewed by conservatives: 
• Liberty-the importance of freedom to allow individuals to seek 
"life, liberty and the pursuit ofhappiness" with limited restraints. 
• Property granting individuals the right to own property, recog-
nizing it is a primary means for individuals to find their place in 
society, and to determine what they want to do with their lives. 
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• Community--substantial deference to the role of the community 
in defining society's standards and providing stability and continuity 
from generation to generation. 
• Theology-recognition of and respect for the important role reli-
gion plays in defining American values. 
• Democracy-often called the "rule of law," meaning that govern-
mental power must be exercised within constitutional limitations. 
• Equality-of citizens before the law, allowing each American to 
compete for jobs, income, status and education on an equal basis 
with others. 
• Opportunity-or "rugged individualism" referring to rewarding 
personal effort and achievement rather than a person's social class, 
family standing or some other arbitrary privilege that has not been 
personally earned. 
• Duty-encouraging Americans to fulfill their civic duty to partici-
pate in politics and community affairs by voting and being tolerant 
of opposing views. 
• Efficacy-the belief that each individual has the privilege of trying 
to influence the political system and American society. 
According to conservatives, these nine beliefs blend together to 
form the unique "national character" of America. In such a system each 
trait is related, for example, with liberty necessitating property, and 
equality requiring opportunity. Conservatives give unique definitions to 
the terms in the list above. For example, equality is defined by them as 
opportunity to compete, not a guaranteed quota or insured result. Simi-
larly, democracy is rule limited by the Constitution, it does not imply 
a license to political power for each disaffected group or interest. For 
conservatives the value of duty implies patriotism and allegiance to com-
munity; such loyalties dictate a rejection of government expansion. 
Conservatism is about cultural traditions and values which defy simple 
definition. In America, the status quo which conservatism defends is a 
complex amalgamation of beliefs and values not easily summarized. A 
good way to begin the definition of conservatism is with an explanation 
of the cultural legacy so important to its premises. 
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The vital tdeas and faith Wtthin conservatiSm are best undentood by 
examming the moral foundations of tern culture. Leo trauss, a lead-
ing conservative scholar, argued that the oul of the histoncal 
rooted in an understanding of tts tntellectual tradibon. For tra and 
numerous other conservauves, tern culture on the classical 
Greek and btblical hentages, hat h called the "G Tradition" of 
Western poliucs. The belief that classtcal poliucal philosophy being 
neglected and replaced by utoptan 1deologt like , &scism and 
ocialism as the core of the cnsu tra m estern thought. 
For much of Its history, the stud of polib mvol ed about the 
immutable pnnapl of JUSbce history and natural ngh for atiZenS. 
The ne poliucal SCtence developed r orld ar II changed this 
focus. According to tra , ho condemns poliucal ence for reject-
ing the tradiuonal approach: "[For] them (modem political en ], 
all human thought 1S histoncal and bene unable ev r to grasp anything 
eternal. " 4 Allan Bloom descnbes polibcal SCience a disc1pline that "re-
sembles a rather haphazard bazaar hop kept by a nuxed populabon. " 5 
On the one hand, Bloom contends that the discipline contact th 
its past as the only social SCience that till has a gnificant branch m 
philosophy; on the other hand 1 modem pseudosctentific methods ub-
vert the discussion of larger u of democracy, Ia and JUSbce. 
The Greek tradibon of poliucal philosophy began th , ho 
pursued knowledge of the hole, and at the sam bm ·th 
wonder and ptety the compleXIty of nature. The Gt~ recognized the 
hierarchy of being tn nature as pomung to a transcendent Truth or 
Good: "To know the Truth, to go out of the Platonic cave and to kno 
fully the essence of the sun, would be 1nexpresstbly exhilarating and 
would be the ultimate 1n attainment and satis&cbon. ''6 The logtc of uch 
a discovery would show that man was not self-produced, that there as 
such a thing as human knowledge and an unchangeable human nature. 
The best politics was that which recognized order m society, with the 
cornerstone of the state being the character of the individual citizen. In 
classical Greek thought neither institubons, nor ctence, nor environ-
ment could make men good; it was up to the individual to develop the 
intellectual and moral character necessary to improve the state. 
The premise of traditional political philosophy was that men were by 
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING CONSERVATISM 25 
nature different and of unequal rank. You could have no virtue in a 
society until such differences were recognized. The classical philoso-
phers knew the linutations of n1an. Their idealism was tempered by a 
realization that evil could not be eradicated-it could only be ten1pered 
with wisdon1. The best political order entailed government by "good 
men," defined as ones "who are willing, and able, to prefer the con1n1on 
interest to their private interest and to the objects of their passions. " 7 
The Judeo-Christian heritage was the second part of the "Great Tra-
dition" of Western culture. Christianity teaches that there is a divine 
intent to history and a supren1e God who holds subjects accountable for 
their behavior on earth. Man is not an accidental product of a blind 
evolutionary process; rather he is the capstone of creation. The Bible 
sets forth the demands of n1orality and religion in a way which stresses 
n1an's fulfillment in surrender to God's call. Obedience asks for a love 
of God with all one's heart, with all one's soul, and with all one's n1ight 
before it is possible to see society as an assembly of brothers and sisters 
to be loved like oneself. In an insightful observation, Leo Strauss wrote, 
"One can create obstinacy by virtue of some great villainy, but one 
needs religion for creating hope. " 8 The conservative belief is that only 
an appeal to transcendent virtues can n1ake men wise. 
Christianity gave a purpose and direction to nullions of its followers 
since the first century. In contrast to the n1aterialistic Greek concepts, 
man in the image of God gave a distinctively different humanness to 
society. Were it not for man's propensity to do evil, there would be no 
need for a state, but that san1e sinfulness tneant that the political order 
had lin1its. The apostle Paul in Ron1ans 13 instructed the Christians to 
be "subject to the governing authorities," which in his case were pagan 
Ron1an bureaucrats whom he called "n1inisters of God." But even the 
obedience injunction found a limitation in Peter's declaration in Acts 
5:29 that "We must obey God rather than n1an." In any well-conceived 
community, matters such as marriage, vocation, and domestic life would 
properly fall under the jurisdiction of the church, not the state. 
To know Western culture was to know the traditions ofbothJerusa-
lem and Athens. Augustine wrote, "We rate the Platonists above the rest 
of the philosophers. " 9 Plato taught, as did the Bible, that heaven and 
earth were created by an invisible God who set in place the natural order 
of creation. Justice was compliance with this natural order, and it was 
man who adapted to the arrangement of nature, not vice versa. The 
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common ground between Christian and Jew was the belief that the 
God of Abraham, I aac, and Jacob revealed ht character and nature in 
the Ten Con1mandn1ents and that the e rule were vahd tn all circum-
stance . 
It wa the Renai ance ptnt whtch evered the clas teal tradition of 
Western pohttcal thought from Its roo and erted the role of man. 
Machiavelh broke w1th the cia teal tradtnon and dented that pohttcal 
power was a rnean tn the erv1ce of htgher ends uch JU nee, the 
good life freedom, and erv1ce to God. Instead, Machtavelh assumes 
that power 1 an end tn ttself; he eparates power fron1 morahty and ets 
up the tate as an autonon1ou y ten1 of values Independent of any other 
ource. Con equently, Leo trau noted, "He [Machtavelh] 1 notonous 
as the cia tc of the evil way of pohncal thtnktng and pohncal acttng. " 1 
By ignonng God Machtavelh ~en bed all rehgton to a human rather 
than a dtv1ne ongtn . To hnn pohn al virtue w the pursutt of worldly 
power and honor. Gone were the cia teal valu of elf-den1al and tru t 
tn God. 
The practlcal unphcatlon of Mach1avelh' work w to lower n1an to 
the level of the bea ts. Defore h1n1, all pohncal wnnng-fron1 Plato and 
Aristotle through the Middle Age to the Renai an e-had the goal of 
Inlproving the ends of the tate. After Machtavelh, pohttcal power was 
assun1ed to be an end tn Itself. and the htgher value of JUStice, the good 
life, freedorn and God were nnportant only to the extent that they 
helped JU nfy that end. In Machtavelh' The Pri"ce, trau ob erved, 
"The characten ttc feature of the work 1 prec1 ely that tt make no 
dtstinction between pnnce and tyrant; It u e the tem1 'pnnce to de Ig-
nate pnnce and tyrant ahke. " 11 
A remnant of the cia teal tradttton urv1ved tn the Protestant Refor-
nlation and the traditton of the Catholic Church. They extolled the 
"Natural Law" which carne fron1 God and was not drawn up by man. 
It was handed down to us by Christianity, Ron1an law, and Teutonic 
culture and was knowable by revelation and ''right reason." Edmund 
Burke wrote that we all con1e into thts world "in subjection to one 
great, immutable, pre-extsting law, a law ... paramount to our feelings, 
by which we are connected in the eternal frame of reference. " 12 The 
freedoms enjoyed by An1ericans and Europeans today blosson1ed gradu-
ally over the centuries for a people in tune with "the eternal frames of 
reference." 
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Of course, Protestants and Catholics could not agree on matters of 
the faith, and both were passionately religious. Protestants assailed the 
papacy for losing the original ideals of the Christian faith and for having 
adopted the worldly ambitions of lust, wealth, and power. Catholics, in 
tum, invoked the natural law tradition of their medieval past in an effort 
to remain the dominant force in European affairs. In the end, both the 
Renaissance and the Reformation were overshadowed by an en1erging 
new faith in science, which threatened any belief in the supernatural. 
The modem ideologies of Marxism, utopian socialism, and secular hu-
manism warred against the nature of things and attempted to superim-
pose a new design of solely human origin. In the end, both Catholics 
and Protestants agreed that natural law n1iraculously came from God and 
not from man. 
The American Tradition of Conservatism 
In the eighteenth century the Western world faced the twin phenomena 
of Scientific Rationalism and the Enlightenn1ent. French writers of the 
period believed that human reason was the absolute standard by which 
political conduct and social institutions were to be measured. The 
French Revolution began with a call for the "rights of man." There was 
much talk about reason and the will of the people. Voltaire's adn1iration 
for English progress in science was such that ''whenever he thought of 
God, [he] tended to think ofNewton at the same time." 13 In the 1750s 
the intellectuals of the time were captured by the idealistic view of man 
which emboldened the French Enlightenment. The accent was on free-
dom of form and spirit, on feeling and originality, with a sympathy for 
primitive nature. Gone were such traditional religious doctrines as man 
born in sin facing judgment before an omnipotent God. 
Modem American conservatism and liberalism trace their roots to the 
writings of this time. The Frenchman Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-
1778) and the Englishman Edmund Burke (1729-1797) presented dif-
fering conceptions of the nature of God, n1an, and the state. Rousseau 
believed that truth was derived from human reason, while Burke found 
inspiration from the tested traditions of nature and Holy Scripture. 
Burke approached the problems of society in the knowledge that "we 
owe an implicit reverence to all the institutions of our ancestors," and 
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that "1de.1'\ of religion .1nd govc: r111ncnt .1rc closl'l 'connected." I k railed 
at the rdonner. in France: "All 'Our ophi~ter .uu1ot 1 roducc anything 
better adapted to presc.: rve .1 rati )J1 I nd n1anly fn:.:edon1 th,ln the: course 
that \Vt' h.1ve pur. ucd . " 14 
Con'\t rvatJvt nHc: Rou e.n1 as the ph do )I her 111 t re pon ible for 
the problen1s of rn dernH '· He 1 1d to have unlea hed the roinantic 
rnoral clin1. tt \Vhi h ~ chara lenze the \\/c l t) t '· In h1 person. 1 life 
R.ous e.nr \V~l v.llll ,md . 1 ·cl, nng hun1. n p. 
the center and Inca ure over runent he l elieved the 
·rate? \Vas so on tituted th t ''rn. n • n be.: rce I tl be fret.,. 'Through 
Rou~seau' eneral \\'Ill there 1 the VI the 111 iern 1 I of collec-
tive 111. n. Burke ''n. tura) nght ' b. e i on , 
"state of n ure .. , I , \\ r 1ng t) Burke 
and \V<?re cont. 111el 111 the ''n, tur 11.\\ '' t 
7 he Co11. t tvatille Cultun: 
The ten IOn benvccn 13urke ll u e. u \ c: terd, \, • n benvet n , 
ltberal and con erv nve t d \, I , 'er the Cllll ha 1 n cert. 111 cultur.d 
values .lt the cxpen c Jf orhe . I c t le Jnttion )f 
the rlt'W nanon \Vhen he \VfOte th. t " he UnHC St .. lC /\znenca Illcl r 
be said to be the r nly coun t I) 111 the '' orl i "h1 h \\. n1n ed in ex-
plicit oppo nion to 1aclH. velh.tn 1 nn IJIC . ' 1 pp Itt )I) to 1. chi.t-
vellian principle n1e. n that Ul tead of era d -1ntere t • n l rreed. rhe 
expn:~ e i pnnciple oi the Arneri .ul rei ubh \Vere • en e of Hnrnu-
nity partiCipation, ,m .tpJ re iation o n. tural r1rrhts, .1 re pect for <.:Stab-
lished n:ligJou v.tlue . ,111 a degree bben; unkno\vn Jrt Europt. \uch 
are the valut con ervarivcs cheri h. 
As tht: nation devtlopecl ti un1 the truth in tht· I )ecl.lr,ttion of Inde-
pendence, con~erv:nive believe.: it took on a dt tin rivc:: ch.lr.Ktt•r \ h1ch 
n1crits respect and protection. In · r.m c1s \Vt! on's 'lite _, 1 ej~>r ... onsenm-
llS111 (1951 ), conservatisn1 is defined .1s ".1 philo ophy of socialcvoluuon. 
1n \vhich certain lasting v.1lue~ are de t•ndc.:d within the· fi-.lnlc\vork of 
'--' 
the tension of political conflict." his philosophy is ''pritnarily .1 ..,p1rit 
anin1ating political behavior ... a \vay of life ... a n1.1nner ofjudbllng 
life." 16 Wilson views conscrvatisn1 as an ,lttitudc about governn1L'l1t that 
' 
is n1ore than a 1nere political ideology guiding day-to-d.1y pohticll deo-
s1ons. 
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Russell Kirk, who, like Wilson, does not believe that conservatism is 
an ideology, concludes: (1) that conservatism, unlike liberalism, offers 
no utopian agenda as the solution to society's problems; (2) that conser-
vatism is more a state of mind about life than a program for action; and 
(3) that change should arise out of experience, history and tradition 
rather than being imposed upon society from some prescriptive rule 
book. 17 The last tenet, a traditionally accepted one of conservatism, 
holds that change--econo1nic, political, religious, and social-should 
take place gradually and within the bounds of existing custom and local 
institutions rather than rapidly through expanding, centralized govem-
n1ental bureaucracies. Like Wilson, Kirk believes conservatism is more 
an attitude toward life than a plan for political action. 
While accepting much of what Wilson and Kirk have to say, Robert 
Nisbet disagrees with them about whether conservatism is an ideology. 
Nisbet defines an ideology as "any reasonably coherent body of moral, 
economic, social and cultural ideas that has a solid and well-known ref-
erence to politics and political power." Such a body of ideas serves as a 
"power base to make possible a victory for the body of ideas"; "remains 
alive for a considerable period of time"; "has major advocates and 
spokesmen"; and has "a respectable degree of institutionalization., Nis-
bet believes that conservatism is a viable political program that can be 
translated into specific policy proposals for consideration by voters. 18 
Willmoore Kendall critiques several definitions of conservatism em-
phasizing the uniqueness and specialness of the American experience. 
To Kendall, tradition by itself is not a sufficient guide for political action, 
especially if that tradition is rooted in relativism and positivism as it is in 
many European countries. These relative influences are found in con-
temporary society, even in the prescriptions of conservative thinkers. 
Kendall maintains that definitions of conservatism should be avoided 
until the criteria for judging the adequacy of such ideas can be specified. 
For him, government submits its ideas for scrutiny by the society as a 
whole and as a creature can never judge the truth in society. 
Definition 
Conservatives have been reluctant to define what they believe. The 
definitions by Nisbet, Kirk, Rossiter, and others have been subjected to 
unending scrutiny by peers, who find various flaws in need of correc-
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tion. The definition of con ervatt 111 u ed here emphasizes the moral 
constitutional tradition of the We t that produced a reasonable society 
able to judge the action of tts governn1ent. o characteri tic of Ameri-
can conservati n1 is n1ore prevalent than tts preoccupation with the pres-
ervation of thi unique cultural hentage. 
Con ervatisn1 as it 1 defined here 1 both an atntude about hfe charac-
terized by defendtng the tatu quo and a pectfic tdeology based on 
the law , cu ton1 and tradttton that have proven u eful tn the past. 
Con ervatives would agree that raptd change, even tn the direction of a 
desirable or noble goal, 1 dangerou . They would avotd change that did 
not ari e from the expenen e, ht tory, or tradttion of a octety. Con er-
vatives would defend the pohtical, octal and economic tn titution from 
all but the 1110 t gradual and ure alteration. Ftnally, con ervanve would 
agree that the expenence of the Untted tate tn government 1 untque 
and erve as a beacon for emergtng den1ocract around the world. We 
define conseroatrsm a a defen e of the polrtrcal, ecotlottuc, relrgrous, and social 
status quo from the forces of abnlpt claat~ge, that 1 based Otl a bel ref that estab-
lished customs, laws mad tradtttotts provrde contumrty at1d tabrlrty '" the guid-
ance of society. 
It i the conservative re pon tbthty to keep cultural tradttion tntact by 
reasserting con1n11tn1ents to the n1oral tradttion whtch gave tt btrth. Fig-
ure 2-1 presents a umrnary of con ervative behe~ , as contrasted with 
liberal tendencie . The hberal tradttton ernphastze hun1an reason, the 
developn1ent of the tndtvtdual free fron1 the re tra1nts of government, 
and governmental action tn the redre s of octal and economic tnequali-
ties. 
By contra t, conservatives tend to en1pha tze: (1) orthodox and tradi-
tional religious values; (2) les faith in the goodne , reason, and perfect-
ability of mankind; (3) belief tn less power for the centralized 
government; (4) more identification with state and local government in 
the federal system; (5) a nationalistic and patnotic ptrit; (6) the duties of 
the individual more than his or her rights; (7) a trust in the free markets 
of capitalism; and (8) a desire that econon1ic, political, religious, and 
social stability be n1aintained through gradual changes within existing 
institutions. 
Conservatives have always believed that the political structure of a 
state, if it is to be stable, must reflect the traditions and customs of that 
society. In the past two decades America has been undergoing a political 
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FIGURE 2-1 
Conservative and Liberal Beliefs: 
Contrasting Emphases and Tendencies 
Topic Liberal Conservative 
1. Government 
Primary Focus Indtvidual Community 
Preferred Government National State and Local 
Direction of Sentiment Internationalist Nationalist 
Method of Government Direct Indirect 
Influence 
Accountability of ToMan To God 
Government 
Rate/Type of Change Faster/ Utopian Slower / Prescriptive 
Relative Importance Equality Liberty 
Justice Achieved By Governmental Refonn Spiritual Regeneration 
2. Economy 
Source of Authority Central Government Markets 
Growth Sector Public Pnvate 
Government Function Regulation Competition 
Tendency Socialism Capitahsm 
3. Cultural and Religious Values 
Ultimate Source of Reason Nature/ Bible 
Knowledge 
Biblical Interpretation More Symbolic More Literal 
Moral Standards Relative/ Situational Absolute/ Orthodox 
Relative Emphasis Man God 
Moral Emphasis Social Personal 
Relative Importance to Rights Responsibilities 
Man 
Origin ofEvil Unjust Social Systems Original Sin 
crisis. Since the 1960s, the fear an1ong conservatives has been that the 
United States is adopting values similar to those of secular Europe. They 
saw the siren song of socialism capture 1nany intellectuals in the 1950s 
and 1960s, which led to an unhealthy experin1entation with both the 
economy and the social fabric of the nation. The fear an1ong conserva-
tives is that metaphysical values (belief in God, respect for order and 
belief in community) have been eroded by the liberal faith in n1aterialism 
and human reason. 
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At no place i thi ero ion n1ore apparent than in universities and 
college . Mo t universine tn the 1990 seek to promote pluralism and 
diversity by recrutttng nunontte for faculty position and setting up 
eparate course for the purpo e of dentgrattng alleged xenophobia, rac-
i m, and ext 111 1n Atnencan h1 tory. In tead of Inculcating the values of 
We tern culture, the new untverstty cumculum eek to "empower" 
tudents to political action. Lo t on the untverstty campus is the belief 
that cholarshtp can n1ove toward an tdeal of truth. "Although the revo-
lution first hook the hutnantne and the octal ctences, 1ts reverbera-
tions are now betng felt tn law chool , medtcal chool , and cience 
departn1ents, whtch long con tdered them elve largely exempt from 
campu agttanon.'' 1 
The con ervattve vtew 1 that there are dt tinct hnuts to human reason 
in general and tn the po tbthne of governmental action tn particular. 
The con ervanve believes that no one n1an or group of men has the 
capactty to fore ee all the con equenc of any tngle government policy. 
For tht reason the on ervattve favors caunon, humthty and the broad-
e t base of den1ocrattc upport the first requuetnent for en tble gov-
ernnlent. Order 1 better than octal expenmentanon, and everyone has 
a take tn pre ervtng order. In Ftgure 2-l the con ervatlve emphasi 
1 on gradual change, obedten e to God, personal re pon tbtlity, and 
con1n1un1ty value . 
Five Contemporary Types of Conse"'atr m 
After World War II con ervanve offered theu values as an alternative 




Representative Types of Conservative a Defined by 
Conservative cholar 
English Harbour Lora ash Rossiter 
Insuncuve Authonun:m Ps) chologtcal 1 L1ben~man 1 Temperamental 
Econom1c 2. Econom1c 2 Posses 1ve 2 Trad1uonahst 2 Possess1ve 
Philosophical 3. Rehgtous 3 Philosophtcal 3 Anucommurust 3 Pracucal 
4 Philosoph1cal 
See: Raymond Enghsh, "Conservausm the Forb1dden Fa1th," Amtncan Scholar 21 (Autumn 1952}: 
pp. 393-412, Wilham R. Harbour, 11re Foundatrons of Conservative Thought (1982}, p. 103; Ronald 
Lora, Conservatwe Mrnds rn Amrnca (1976), p. 3; George H. Nash, Tirt Conservatwe lnttlltctual Move-
ment "' Amenca srnce 1945 (1976), pp. vm-1x; Chnton Rosmer, Conservatrsm rn Amtnca (1962}, pp. 
6-11. 
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and 1960s, the nation was n1ore interested in change than the preserva-
tion of traditional values. By the end of the 1970s the national mood 
was more somber, and conservative values seen1ed appropriate for the 
tin1e. 
Listed in Table 2-1 are five representative types of conservatisn1. Prob-
ably the most noticeable on1issions from the lists are the n1ovement neo-
conservatives and populist conservatives who will be discussed later. The 
emphasis of the table is on the various forms in which conservatism may 
be found. 
Raymond English sees conservatives as clinging to the known and 
the accustomed, defending econon1ic privilege, and adopting an attitude 
toward politics that stresses the value of tradition, habit, and authority. 
William R. Harbour pictures conservatives as longing for order in soci-
ety, valuing the leadership of elites, desiring freedom for business and 
industry to function, and placing great importance on virtue and moral-
ity in private life. Ronald Lora views conservatives as wanting to pre-
serve custom and opposing changes that would disrupt it. Lora also 
believes that conservatives understand virtue and will forego self-interest 
in the pursuit of philosophical convictions. The three types defined by 
George H. Nash include libertarians, traditionalists, and a new type, 
anticommunists. Libertarians defend free enterprise and oppose govern-
mental interference in any market activity, while anticomn1unists believe 
in the importance of a strong national defense to contain foreign threats 
abroad. Finally, Clinton Rossiter distinguishes four types of conserva-
tives: temperamental, possessive, practical, and philosophical. They, in-
dividually and collectively, oppose substantial change in society, seek to 
defend personal acquisitions, value comn1unity, and subscribe to princi-
ples designed to justify the established order. 
These types show that one can be of a conservative ten1peran1ent and 
not possess a philosophical or intellectual understanding of conservatism. 
In other words, it is possible to have the conservative "go-slow" state of 
mind, and at the same time favor an active role by the federal govern-
ment in, say, the prosecution of southern school districts for a failure to 
desegregate public schools in the 1960s. Comn1on to these types are a 
concern with property and the status quo on the individual level, an 
emphasis on community at the group level, and an intellectual defense 
of virtue on the societal level. Some types of conservatism are more 
concerned about preserving one's position in society, while other types 
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emphasize an aggre ive public stance toward life which i intellectual 
and philosophical. 
This dt tinctton. between "attitude-type" con ervattve who have 
traits \vithout nece anly thtnktng through the phtlo ophy, and " action-
type" conservaav ho have carefully constructed public philosophy, 
is m eVIdence m the poliacal proc . Poliactans may adopt aspects of 
conservaasm and then abandon the posture h n crws or tuatton 
changes. For example both chard on and onald built 




encan history o 
stanc polittcaltdeologa 
pie. Thomas Pam 
tmctJo and p en "~,,. 
ilton by con ad oca 
by an elite c . Th 
thetr tune, are exampl 
Ltberals and conservau 
to ard authonty, thetr o th econo 
~wes should play m odd poli 
trastmg tendenaes of liberalism and co . 
The first tendency, the authontanan na of tdeologa 
seen m the conflict between Thomas Pame and UeJtan1aer Hamilton. 
Pame, With his emphasis on the elimination of ngad c 
distmct contrast to Hamilton, ho &vored a leadenhip 
these men, and thetr tdeas, played an tmportant part m encan politi-
cal, social and econonuc history; but each had a difFerent e of ho 
the soaety should be structured and who hould be eligible to partiapate 
in political decisions. 
Paine, for example, was an authoritanan m the ns that he wanted 
to use government power to eradicate class distinctions and to achi e 
egalitananism. He did not believe in a leadership class like Hamilton 
TABLE 2-2 
Conservatism and Liberalism: Contrasting Dotninant Tendencies 
Authoritarian Economic International Political Populist 
Liberalism egalitarianism socialism idealism equality equity 
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did. Con ervatives believe that in any ocic ty son1c people \Viii be tnore 
dotnin.ult oci.1lly. cconon1ic.tlly and polittcally. Thcrr leadership and in-
fluence give t.1bility to ocicty and en urc an orderly tran ·fer of po\ver 
.1nd \Ve.llth. AutlH rity rightly re \Vith the1n, and the on crvative ethic 
i to recognize .1nd rc\\ .1rd ach1cvcn1cnt \vhencvc r it occurs in ociety. 
Elite are both inevltable and nece aT), but not every conservative 
\Vould \Vi h to recogn1ze chtt 111 the ''a) H. n11lton de 1red. 
econd. econon11c c n en. u 111 etnph. tze pnv. te propert) and the 
profit JHOOVt a t\\ 111 ba e f the An1en . n e on Ill) de Jgtled to en-
courage 1ndiv1dual 1111t1. tl\ e, \dule e non11 ltberah n1' ernpha i on 
ociali n1 ha hdped to bnng uno An1encan hfe u h adca and practice 
a ocial ecunt), Meda . re and Med1 . 1d. In I ra t1 c n1an) An1cncan , 
and rnany c n en'. tl\ e . upport b th the pr It 111 uvc and o ral e-
cunty. 
on enfatl\ e ha\ e . I\\ a\ l ecn de en de o the nght of property, 
recognJztng that "propern '' 111 lu :le n1ore th. n 111. ten. I thrngs. For ex-
anlple. the talent of an . rtl t pr te ted 1n • P' nght r the acadetnic 
treedorn of. un1vc It) profc r 1 a I r pert\ nght. I he cxcr 1 e of an 
1ndividu. 1' nght to unpro\ e hun elf ec n nu nU) 1 , ba 1 con ervanve 
value. apH. h 111 1 defended be . u e 1t 1 the be t ) tern to .llo\v indi-
vidual expre ton, the c urn ulan n of Inatt·n.l g d , . nd the \Vorking 
of free Jnarketo.;. 
Third, interrunonal con enr. t1 n1 tre e reah 111, pragn1.1ti 111, and 
pO\Vt:r politic 1n the ondu t of An1l.:n an ore1gn p hey, preferring to 
have a trong nanonal defcn e, t develop ne\\ \\capon y tcn1 , and to 
roll b.tck the borders of conln1lll11 111. I ntcrn. tlorul ltberali 111, on the 
other hand, peak n1ore 1dcalt tlcally about An1cncan foreign policy in 
relation to fort: ign po\vers an l the con1n1un1 t \vorld cnlphajzing good 
\viii and hunun rights. I nternattonal ltberali 111 Ius n1uch rnore confi-
dence in international org.1niz.ttion hke the United Nanons and is rnore 
likely to trust conununist leadL"rs in intt: rnation.tl agreernents. 
The realisrn of conserv.ttisrn is based on .1 vie\v of h urn.u1 nature that 
is suspicious of a per on's prorniscs .tnd of a nation's tre.lties and agree-
rnents. In Novernber 1 t.JRS the editors of the conserv.uive journal Com-
mentary invited rnore than thirty intellectuals to respond to questions 
about An1erican developrnents since the end of World War I I. The nla-
jority of the writers larnented the continued po\ver and oppressive poli-
cies of the Soviet Union, but they rnaintained that the United States had 
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remained powerful precisely because it was suspicious of n1oves the So-
viets had made around the globe.20 
Fourth, liberalism has historically emphasized the concept of equality, 
but not the absolute negation of liberty, and it has played a part in such 
movements as the abolitionist n1ovement before the Civil War and the 
contemporary civil rights rnovement. Political conservatism with its em-
phasis on liberty has stressed the freedon1 of each citizen to pursue his 
ambition without undue restraint, especially fron1 the government. 
Conservatives take special pride in the accon1plishments and opportuni-
ties capitalisn1 affords to its citizens. 
Conservatism instinctively senses that the liberal passion for furthering 
equality can only be brought about by greater and greater uniformity. 
Centralized planning n1eans a decrease in regional, neighborhood and 
individual autonomy, variety, and liberty. Part of the conservative alle-
giance is to known institutions which stand between the citizen and his 
government. 
Fifth, populists, though historically considered liberal, have since the 
1960s included a highly vocal conservative segrnent. Agrarian populists 
of the 1890s and 1920s en1phasized redistribution of economic goods, 
setting forth a strong anti-business platfom1. Equity was the don1inant 
theme of populist refom1ers. By contrast, conservative populists have 
emphasized a grass-roots agenda of traditional n1orality, pro-school 
prayer, anti-abortion, and anti-Equal Rights Amendn1ent. Whether 
conservative or liberal, populists appeal to basic values held by common 
citizens. 
Sixth, religious conservatisrn has a tradition beginning with the early 
settlers and continuing through the founders of most of the first colleges 
and universities, such as Harvard, Yale and Princeton. The first colleges 
were originally theologically conservative, but they gradually adopted 
liberal theological positions. Religious liberalism accon1n1odated Euro-
pean values to the An1erican experience.22 It does not have as long a 
tradition in An1erican history, but its roots go back to ideas like Thon1as 
Jefferson's Deism. Today it continues with such groups as the National 




The personal religious commitments of any particular liberal aside, it 
remains true that liberalism is less opposed to a secular society than is 
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conservatistn. Since the 1960s Catholics and Protestants have united to 
complain about the moral decline of the West. 
Social conservatism, the seventh category in Table 2-2, is concerned 
with maintaining order and continuity in society, while social liberals 
are n1ore interested in change to achieve certain desired ends. University 
of Chicago Professor Richard Weaver, a native of the South, wrote 
nostalgically about regional values and the threat to southern culture and 
tradition posed by socialliberalisn1 in his book The Southern Tradition at 
Bay (1968). 23 No region of the country is more supportive of social 
conservatism than the South. The ideas of person, position, and place 
have the greatest meaning in the South because of its unique history and 
social legacy. This type of conservatism is also found extensively in the 
vast rural, small-town, and agricultural regions of the nation. Social lib-
eralism, by contrast, is of an urban sophistication and emphasizes change, 
especially to achieve major reforms. Social liberals have been in the van-
guard of civil rights movements, organizations like the American Civil 
Liberties Union, and the labor movement. 
For conservatives the primary need in any society is order. Without 
political stability nothing else-not justice, not equality, not liberty, and 
not prosperity-can be accomplished. Order is not an end in itself, 
rather it is a means by which one can bring disenfranchised groups into 
the society. No expansion of the benefits of a society is possible without 
political stability. 
Although there are clear relationships among all eight conservative 
values in Table 2-2, there are also differences among those who adhere 
to them. For example, an economic conservative is not necessarily a 
religious conservative, nor is an economic liberal necessarily a religious 
liberal. Son1e liberals are very optimistic about hun1an nature, and at the 
same time counsel a realistic foreign policy with adversaries. We see a 
strong relationship between the politics and theology of American poli-
ticians which we will discuss in Chapter Six. 24 
Neoconservatism 
Neoconservatism and neoliberalism are products of the reaction in the 
1960s to the excesses of liberalism. Though having much in common, 
they have moved in different directions politically. Many neoconserva-
tives have adopted the Republican Party, while neoliberals ask for re-
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fonns within the Den1ocratic Party. Neoconservatives support a strong 
national defense n1ore than neoliberals do. Neoliberals are critical of 
large govemn1ent bureaucracies and the historic ties Democrats have 
had to labor unions. They have revived an crnphasis on the importance 
of con1n1unity and the negative aspects of the \velfare state. Neoliberal 
leader Charles Peters, editor of the n1agazine !Vashington Monthly, says 
that "Neoliberalisn1 is first and foren1ost a n1ovcn1ent of comn1unity. We 
believe in a society that shares its burdens and rewards. We reject the 
Me Decade and the proliferation of special1nterest groups. " 2 1 
Peters argues that neohber,1ls \vant to free hbcralisn1 fron1 automati-
cally favoring big unions and b1g governn1ent agamst business and the 
n1ilitary. He thinks the Den1ocrat1c Party could gain by becon1ing critical 
of public education, the ovd serv1ce, and labor un1ons, even though 
these groups have h1stoncally been c;taunch defenders of hberalisn1. 
Neoliberal vle\vs sho\v that con5ervatiYe thought, \Vlth it distrust of 
large govemn1ent progran1s ,1nd approval of con1n1un1ty solutions, is 
having a dran1atic unpact on the pohocal lett. Neohberalisrn and neo-
conservatisn1 are both reactions to the octal expenn1entation \vhich 
characterized the 1960s, but neoliberahsn1 l'i c;eek1ng to recapture those 
major block of voters loc;t to the R.epubhcan Party. Wh1te southerners 
and Catholics abandoned the I)en1ocrat1c Party In large nun1bers during 
the tenns of the !~eagan presidency. It iS apparent that the Den1ocratic 
Party cannot return to po\ver unless It recovers the e traditional constit-
uenCies. 
Libertan'anism 
Libertarianism, SOinetin1es con idered a type of conservatisrn, believes 
in the autonon1y of the individual and a tninin1al role for the govern-
ment. The 1na.xin1un1 reduction of sooal and governn1ent action is re-
quired so that the greatest possible roon1 is left for each individual to act. 
Libertarians think that individuals should be free fron1 governn1ental 
restraint in both econon1ic and noneconon1ic areas. For exan1ple, liber-
tarians would say that the govemn1ent should not regulate abortion since 
that is a personal n1atter. The heart of contemporary libertarian belief is 
the primacy of the individual. 
Although the Libertarian Party remains on the fringes of American 
politics, its ideas have stimulated much interest and admiration among 
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traditional conservatives. Libertarians oppose the interference of govern-
ment in the private lives of citizens, seek an unfettered free market, and 
oppose laws regulating the prices of consumer commodities. Libertarians 
favor nonintervention in the affairs of other nations, and call for a drastic 
reduction in the defense budget and defense policy. 
Traditional American conservatistn, modeled after Edmund Burke's 
philosophy and built on a substantial regard for religious values, would 
reject many libertarian proposals. Conservatism has great respect for 
community customs, morals, and the traditions that have guided public 
policies in the past. It holds that there are some religious and moral 
values that may be superior to individual rights and freedoms. Philo-
sophical and religious conservatives attack contemporary libertarians as 
radicals who are unconcerned about preserving the historic values of a 
society. Libertarianism, the critics charge, is a form of rampant individu-
alism which lacks a proper respect for custom and tradition. Still, most 
conservatives have great respect for the more modest libertarian belief in 
trying to restrain governmental activity in the economic realm. 
The ideas of the libertarians have influenced both major parties. The 
Republican Party in 1980 took a much n1ore aggressive stand against the 
social programs of the 1960s and 1970s partially as a result of libertarian 
influence. The programs to reduce income tax rates and deregulate some 
business and industry show a distinctly libertarian influence. The Demo-
crats have become more critical of intervention in foreign affairs and 
supported broader freedom from government interference in so-called 
victimless crin1es (prostitution, pornography, gambling) and the practice 
of abortion and gay rights also as a partial result of libertarian values. 
Midwestern Conservatism 
Midwestern conservatism has a long and distinguished tradition of 
service to the An1erican experience. States like Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas have regularly sent individuals 
to Congress who represented conservative, small-town values. Senators 
Robert A. Taft (R., Ohio) and Everett McKinley Dirksen (R., Ill.) along 
with former president Gerald Ford (R., Mich.) and current Senate leader 
Robert Dole (R. , Kansas) are in this tradition. 
They differ fron1 other conservatives on at least two counts. First, 
they are less ideological, and more politically pragmatic and prone to 
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con1pro1nise. Both J)irksen and l)ole have been leaders in Congress, 
where their conservative ideology guides but does not dominate their 
political behavior. Second, they n1ay accept or propose policies that 
would increase the size of govemtnent for prag111atic political, hunlani-
tarian or other reasons. In the late 1940s, for exan1ple, Senator Taft pro-
posed a n1ajor public housing progratn; Senator Dirksen was the key 
legislative leader in gaintng passage of the 1964 C1vil I~1ghts Act and 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act; although both 1neasures vvcre opposed by 
conservative I~epublican prcstdennal candidate Barry Goldwater. Gerald 
Ford was opposed for the I~epublican presidential non1ination in 1976 
by Ronald !~eagan, pritnanly because Ford's conservative Ideology was 
n1uch n1ore pragnuttc and less systetnattc than that of I~eagan and hts 
followers. Senator l~obert Dole's pragt11at1c tnstincts have led hin1 to 
con1pron1ise n1ore frequently 1n \vays that a tnore doctnnatre conserva-
tive vvould not. For exan1ple, 1r1 1985 Dole angered n1any conservatives 
by forging a budget-cutting con1pron11 e 'vhtch reduced 1nany favonte 
weapons progran1 at the Pentagon. 22 
Conclusion 
Conservatisn1 i5 best defined by exaxnining Its various types and their 
differences with hberahsn1. To the extent that defimt1ons overlap vve 
find it in1portant to note that both conservatiSnl and llberali 111 hold 
certain values in con1n1on, such as at,rreetnent on the niles of the gan1e 
in the political culture. Ho\vever, ltberals .1nd con ervattves di agree on 
which traits of the Arnencan character are n1ost in1portant and \VhiCh 
ones should be nourished and protected by governrnent. Conservative 
place greater e1nphasis upon the roles of religion, tndivtdual duty, virtue, 
private property, con1n1unity, and the ntle of la\v. 
We define conservatisn1 as a defense of the political, econon1ic, reli-
gious, and social status quo against the forces of abrupt change. Con er-
vatives believe that established custon1 , laws, and traditions provide 
continuity and stability in guiding society. The conservative attraction 
to the past is rooted in a respect for institutions and a uspicion of n1od-
ern political ideologies. Change n1ust be accotntnodated to custon1, his-
tory, and tradition-not in1posed fron1 son1e abstract blueprint or 
scheme. Conservative pren1ises are traceable to the ancient traditions of 
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both Athens and Jerusalem, as well as the modern tradition begun by 
Edmund Burke. 
Conservatives differ among themselves as to whether their beliefs are 
an ideology, attitude, or state of mind. One thing is clear-many people 
are conservative without necessarily knowing it or having thought care-
fully about why. They are attitude-conservatives, accepting conservative 
premises, and can be contrasted with action-conservatives, who have a 
seriously prepared plan of political action. Of whatever stripe, and for 
whatever reason, conservatism has had a major impact on American 
society since 1980 as n1easured by electoral and political success. Liberals 
and neoliberals have been forced to adopt and shape conservative ideals 
to fit a new agenda. 
Sometimes conservatism is referred to as communitarian individual-
ism. Conservatives believe that the con1munity serves as a healthy buffer 
between the onerous power of the government and the anarchical tend-
encies of rampant individualism. The community enables the individual 
to feel a part of one or n1ore groups which transfer custom and tradition 
to him. It gives the individual not only a feeling of belonging, but also 
ofbeing attached to the flow of history. In constrast, conservatives point 
out, socialists consider the state the principal reference point and the 
individual merely a tool for the ends of the state. 
Though commonly considered conservative, libertarianism is actually 
opposed to the fundamental premises of conservatism. More typical of 
conservatism is the pragmatic midwestern variety that has incurred op-
position from doctrinaire conservatism when it has either compromised 
with liberalism or espoused policies that would enlarge government or 
implement humanitarian objectives that might bring rapid change to the 
American social order. Religious, philosophical, and economic conser-
vatives have become much more important since the 1940s, while anti-
communist conservatives have decreased in importance. 
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The Ten Most Important Beliefs of 
Conservatism 
To be a consen,atil'c in tlzc umcatl5 1 J of commtmication is the 
road to dfectivellc.u i11 modem l~{c, i11 wltateucr dircctton o11c 
wishes to be effcctil'c. 
E D HIRSCH, JR I 
The dictionary definition of culture, a\ the "tdeas, custorns, skills, and arts of a given people," ha\ a part1Cular affinity for conservatism. 
Conservatives have ahvays believed that the poht1cal structure of a state, 
if it is to be stable, rnust reflect the traditions and cu<\tOnls of that society. 
"Do what you znay," \vrote Alexis de Tocqueville, "there is no true 
power an1ong rnen except 1n the free un1on of their \Vtll; and patriot1sn1 
and religion are the only t\.VO tnotives 1n the world that can long urge 
all the people toward the satne end. " 2 Conservatives believe that society 
is not a n1achine \vhich can be tinkered \.Vtth and altered at \vhinl, rather 
it is a living organistn nounshed by the values of the culture. 
The conservative fear 1s that the Untted States as a ociety is una\vare 
of the past values which n1.1de It exceptional; as a result, it is in danger 
of adopting nevv ideas foreign to its history. The n1oven1ents of Darwin, 
Marx, and Freud based on their ideas of evolution, econon1ic deten11in-
ism and the unconsciou , and advances 1n rnodern science and technol-
ogy have the potential of destroying rnodem n1an. In the minds of 
conservatives, the crisis of the hour in the United States i that the per-
manent metaphysical things of our culture (the belief in God and an 
understanding and shared sense of honor and duty) are gradually being 
replaced by the rnindset of the twentieth century, which holds that such 
ideals are prin1itive figments of the in1agination. In a book entitled Out 
of My Life and Thought, Albert Schweitzer wrote shortly before his death 
that two experiences had cast their shadows on his existence: the first 
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was that the world was full of suffering, and the second was that he was 
''born at a time of the spiritual decline of humanity.''3 If Schweitzer is 
right, the conservative belief that there is a divine intent to history and 
that man has a duty to conform himself to God-given and immutable 
laws of morality no longer has meaning. 
Of all the industrialized nations in the West, the United States has 
remained the one with the highest religious and moral commitment. 4 
The European example dictated that as the United States became more 
secular, it would also become less religious; however, polls regularly find 
a stable core of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish believers in the United 
States. Where moral values are concerned, the rule of thumb that "as 
Europe goes, so goes the United States" has been disproven. Europe 
modernized first and secularized first; the fear among conservatives is 
that America might follow its example and adopt values which deify 
politics and power, and denigrate piety and prayer. 
The deterioration of cultural moorings is a special concern of E. D. 
Hirsch, Jr., whose book Cultural Literacy was a nationwide best-seller. 
Hirsch laments the loss of an American culture which fostered such 
unique values as "Yankee ingenuity," inventiveness, independent-mind-
edness, a connection to the frontier, and a beneficence to the world: 
"the American civil religion, as expressed in our national rites and sym-
bols, is in fact a central source of coherence in American public culture, 
holding together various and even contradictory elements of its tradi-
tion. " 5 
Hirsch discusses the importance of a "civil Bible" as an inherited set 
of religious sentiments honoring tolerance, equality, freedom, patrio-
tism, duty, and cooperation in the society. The "civil Bible" of the 
American republic incorporated items like the Book of Genesis, the 
Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, certain articles 
from the Federalist Papers, Horace Mann's Twelfth Report to the Massa-
chusetts Board of Education, and Martin Luther King's "I Have a 
Dream" speech. What these and other related documents have in com-
mon is a fundamental agreement on the principles of justice, freedom, 
and progress which make the American experin1ent unique. Many of 
these propositions are contradictory with respect to each other, but col-
lectively they all have the effect of fostering a cultural heritage among 
the populace. They owe their origin and popularity to the religious 
heritage which gave birth to the republic. 
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The canons of conservatis1n are nothing more than the broad princi-
ples of society which are inherent in American culture. They are the 
standards en1bodied in the "civil Bible," the ideals of the past which 
1nake the society what it is at present. The definition of conservatism is 
the skeleton of the society; the canons are its flesh and blood. Once 
Winston Churchill was asked what n1ade the British culture unique. He 
replied, "It is stirred on aln1ost all occasions by sentin1ent and instinct, 
rather than by progran1n1es or worldly calculation. " 6 The canons of con-
servatisin embody the instinct of which Churchill spoke; the in1pulse of 
a culture is the intangible values which n1otivate it to action. 
The Soul of the Nation 
In the 1980s an increase in the irnportance and use of the ten11 ''conser-
vative" occurred. A National Opinion Research Center poll found that 
roughly 35 percent of the respondents said they \Vere conservative con1-
pared with 24 percent who classified then1selves as liberal. 7 President 
Reagan's econon1ic policies, cutting taxe \vhile decreasing federal 
spending and increasing defense spending, \Vere characterized as conser-
vative. Stands in other areas, like opposition to gun control and hostility 
to communisn1, al o earned one the title of con ervative. 
At the san1e tin1e there \Va a confusion in the n1eaning of the tenn. 
Conservatives argued against big governn1ent, and at the an1e time fa-
vored large govern1nent projects like the Star Wars progran1, 1nore de-
fense spending, and an expansion in biological \varfare research. 
Conservatives were against the police state, yet were eager to extend 
powers to the FBI and the CIA. They were in favor ofbalanced budgets 
and fiscal responsibility, although the Reagan adn1inistration registered 
huge budget deficits. Conservatives clai1ned to be the prin1e defenders 
ofWestem civilization, while at the san1e titne they presented no unified 
front on issues of biblical belief and opposition to abortion. 
Not everyone labeled as conservative takes sides on every issue with 
those sharing the label. As Frank S. Meyer has written: "Within the 
consensus of American conservatisn1 ... there exist strains and tensions, 
the origins of which are both historical and intellectual. " 8 What then are 
the "true conservative" beliefs, and how do they n1ake the history of 
the United States unique? Are certain opinions on various issues actually 
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related? Can one identify a true conservative by asking a series of ques-
tions? 
If defining conservatism is difficult, stating its canons of belief is nearly 
impossible. Two verbatim descriptions of its tenets are given by Clinton 
Rossiter in Conservatism in America and by Russell Kirk in The Conserva-
tive Mind. Rossiter lists in one place twenty-one tenets of conservatism. 9 
Russell Kirk includes six tenets that summarize many ofRossiter's quali-
ties.10 The ten canons of conservatism developed here are a synthesis of 
Kirk's and Rossiter's ideas along with those of a broad cross-section of 
other thinkers including Friedrich von Hayek, Richard Weaver, Peter 
Viereck, Eric Voegelin, William F. Buckley, Jr., Gertrude Himmelfarb, 
Leo Strauss, John Hallowell, Daniel Boors tin, and Robert Nisbet. 11 The 
ten canons or principles of belief to which conservatives generally sub-
scribe are: 
1. Continuity: Order and the Rate of Change 
2. Authority: Power and the Limits of Government 
3. Community: Decentralization of Social Institutions 
4. Deity: Man and Morality 
5. Duty: Responsibilities over Rights 
6. Democracy: Limited Government and the Constitution 
7. Property: The Role of Economics 
8. Liberty: Equality's Other Brother 
9. Meritocracy: The Leadership Class 
10. Antipathy: The Anticommunist Impulse 
These ten canons represent the best summary of what conservatives 
generally think are its most important principles. Together they form 
the unique American culture which conservatives seek to enrich and 
protect. 
Continuity: Order and the Rate of Change 
The most widely accepted conservative tenet is the belief in the impor-
tance of order in society. The conservative believes that respect for tradi-
tion is the first requirement for good government. The structure of 
society as a whole is said to contain the stability and wisdom of past 
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generations-even the involven1ent of God in its development. Because 
the conservative treasures the n1aintcnance of order in society so highly, 
he is opposed to broad or <;weeping change, preferring instead slower 
change within existing institutions, son1etin1es called organic change . 
Edn1und Burke, who wrote extensively about the destruction of insti-
tutions and order in France during the French Revolution, developed 
the principles n1ost often associated wlth n1odern conservatisn1. Burke 
saw the radicals of France, those vvho desired to totally remake the fabric 
of society based on their own reasoning, as the source of "sickness of 
n1orality and social decencies'' as well as the cause of total disregard for 
all property rights in that country. He found hun1an reason puny con1-
pared with the traditions establtshed by providence: "We are afraid to 
put tnen to live and trade each on his O\vn private stock of reason; 
because we suspect that this stock 111 each n1an is sn1all, and that the 
individuals would do better to avail thetn.;;elves of the general bank of 
capital of nations and age . '',., 
Clinton R.oss1ter affinns the tndt pensabthty and anctlt)' of inhented 
institutions, value , .;;y1nbols, and ntuals as central aspects of the stable 
society. He notes that the 1narks of the good society are order, unity, 
equity, stability, continuity, secunty, hannony, and the confinen1ent of 
change. "The An1erican," Rossiter observes, 'feels tnore deeply than he 
thinks about political principles, and \\1 hat he feels n1ost deeply about 
then1 is that they are the gift of great n1en of old." n Russell Kirk rnen-
tions a profound distn1st in the ''soph1sters, calculator , and econotnists'' 
who would reconstruct society on abstract des1gns. 11 
Conservatives are not averse to change; they sin1ply beheve that it 
should be n1ade in accordance \VIth .lCcepted principles in oCiety. Peter 
Viereck, in his book Consewatism Rcuisitcd, quotes Edtnund Burke as 
saying, "A state without son1e n1eans of change ... is \V:ithout the tneans 
of its conservation." 15 Conservatives sec change as necessary to preserve 
the order they love; it is the n1ethod and rate of change \vhich nukes it 
dangerous. The conservative values tradition, continuity, and order in 
society. These values n1ust not be disregarded, however carefully rea-
soned or attractive an untested refon11 n1ay be. 
Authority: Power and the Limits of Government 
Conservatives are son1etimes attacked for the apparent contradiction be-
tween supporting increased govemn1ent spending for defense and accus-
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ing the government of over-taxing and over-spending. But there is a 
coherent philosophy behind this policy, and it is closely tied to the con-
servative's passion for order. In the conservative philosophy, the state's 
primary function is to protect against foreign threats and to keep order 
at home. 
M. Stanton Evans has written that "government is morally obligated 
to protect America's interests" in foreign affairs. 16 More strength and 
firmness in foreign policy is also stressed by many other conservative 
writers, ranging from neoconservative Irving Kristol to staunch anti-
communist James Burnham. 17 The foundation of military strength is the 
belief that the American social order is unique and worthy of protection 
and respect. 
The moral position of America n1eans that it must necessarily act as 
umpire in a world which ignores international law. Military strength is 
the surest means of preventing conflict by restraining evil leaders who 
would otherwise exercise their option to destroy nations and violate 
international law. The realities of the twentieth century dictate that a 
strong defense is the best means of preventing international banditry. 
The 1991 war against Iraq is but the latest instance of American moral 
resolve in the face of international injustice. 
Because the conservative values order so highly, it follows that the 
police power is necessary to maintain societal institutions. M. Stanton 
Evans indicts the U.S. governn1ent for its policy of stressing rehabilita-
tion of criminals rather than their punishment. He concludes in Clear 
and Present Dangers that the "crime rate could be cut in half merely by 
requiring criminals already convicted to serve out their time." 18 The 
conservative sees the state as the most effective means of protecting 
against the selfish appetites of men, such aggression being manifest in 
both the aggression of foreign nations and the domestic disregard for 
civil authority. 
At the same time, the conservative is skeptical of attempts by the state 
to use its power for large-scale social planning. The growth of socialism 
during this century, both in the United States and other countries, has 
fostered a reaction against state involven1ent in the economy and in 
society in general. Friedrich von Hayek stated in his landmark work, 
The Road to Serfdom, that the "central direction of all economic activity 
according to a single plan" brings "dictatorship" and "the suppression 
of freedom." 19 Alan Otten, Edward Banfield, and M. Stanton Evans all 
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find that the liberal solutions to the proble1ns of crime, poverty, eco-
nomic growth, fan1ily, and dotnestic violence in society have failed. 20 
Banfield and Evans even say that liberal reforn1s were the source of much 
unemploytnent; they explain the plight of the hon1eless and other seri-
ous problen1s as rooted in ac;sumptions about man and society in the 
1960s.21 
The conservative distruc;t of centralized state power and planning is 
directly related to the conc;ervative's desire for only slow, organic 
change. Russell K1rk puts it this way: "Change and refom1 are not al-
ways identical, and ... innovation i<; a devounng fian1e of conflagration 
n1ore often than it is the torch of progrec;s. " 27 Chnton Rossiter echoes 
that a basic belief of conservatisrn is "the dec;Irabihty of d1ffusing and 
balancing power, social, econornic, cultural and ec;peCially political ... 
the indispensibility and sanct1ty of inherited instJtutionc;, values, syn1bols, 
and rituals, that i<;, tradition. " 2J 
Community: Decentralization of Social Institutions 
The proper function of govenunent, say conservatives, 1<; not to concen-
trate power but to diffuse 1t to the Institutions of organic society. 
Churches, trade unions, univer<;itie<;, ne\vspaper'l, bar as ociations, fann-
ers' unions, businessn1en 's clubs-in the conservative v1ew, all have a 
special role standing between citizen and govemn1ent. Institutions and 
regional associations serve as checks on the po\ver of the central au-
thority. 
An important conservative 1dea \Vh1ch is linked to distrust of too 
much govemn1ent power and a faith in traditional value is the belief in 
the necessity of strong social institutions-fan1ily (including extended 
family), church, neighborhood, and any other institution not controlled 
by the state. Robert Nisbet, a social psychologist who is a leading propo-
nent of the importance of social institutions, warns of the "advancing 
power" of the state and the "moribundity of the social order." Nisbet 
says that if we are to have a "truly free and also stable society, there must 
be a revival of the prestige of the private as contrasted with the public. " 24 
Nisbet notes two traditions in Western social and political thought: 
(1) the belief that the govemn1ent has total control over all institutions, 
as expounded by Hobbes, Rousseau, Bentham and others; (2) the belief 
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that there are clear distinctions between social institutions and the state, 
as expressed by Cicero, Aquinas, Bodin, Althusias, Burke, Tocqueville, 
and Proudon. He argues that the "cardinal proposition of the democratic 
dogma," as seen by Rousseau, was that "structures such as public 
schools" could do as well as families and kindred in raising and training 
children. Nisbet counters by asserting the conservative belief that the 
social institutions of the local community can better meet all the needs 
that government has taken upon itself. In other words, extended families 
do a better job handling welfare needs than state programs; and private 
schools perform better and with less expense than public schools. 25 
The stress on localism and neighborhood means the conservative 
places greater value on decentralized, area government as opposed to 
national bureaucracies. In the United States, World War II was a water-
shed after which the social and educational system gradually became 
much more centralized, asserting a significant influence in the local 
communities. With the New Deal came the large national welfare pro-
grams which were never reduced after the Depression. Conservatives 
are heartened by the recent emphasis on volunteerism as part of what 
they see as a trend toward a return to localism. Nisbet reiterates the 
conservative fondness for localism by stating that the "spirit of national-
ism," unlike that of localism, has seldom "entered into great creative 
performance. " 26 
Deity: Man and Morality 
''Reverence for God and respect for history'' is a significant element 
of the conservative tradition.27 Russell Kirk, Frank S. Meyer, William 
Harbour, and Ronald Lora, as well as three other scholars, Robert Nis-
bet, Clinton Rossiter, and Frances Wilson, all list it as one of their tenets. 
The conservative generally has a strong belief in God and holds to tradi-
tional moral values as opposed to "subjectivism," also called "nominal-
ism" or "relativism." C. S. Lewis describes subjectivism as the "whole 
attempt to jettison traditional values as something subjective and substi-
tute a new scheme of values for them. " 28 The main theme of Richard 
Weaver's Ideas Have Consequences is that "Western man" made an "evil 
decision" in following the "nominalism" of the twentieth century. 
Weaver writes, "Man has an irresistible desire to relate himself somehow 
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to the totality ... , and through religion [he] reveals his profoundest 
intuition regarding his origin, his tnission on earth, and his future 
state. " 29 
The conservative view of n1an is centered around the Biblical doctrine 
of"original sin"-the idea that n1an is n1orally flawed and imperfectible. 
It n1ust be noted, however, that although son1e conservatives base this 
belief on the biblical account of the fall of man, such a belief is not 
a necessary condition for a conservative's distrust of human nature. A 
conservative may distrust hun1an nature because he does not trust man's 
ability to hold to n1oral values or to govern without making serious 
mistakes. 
Russell Kirk describes this central tenet as "belief in a transcendent 
order, or body of natural law, which rules society as well as conscience." 
He contends that political problen1s, at botton1, are religious and moral 
problems. True politics is the art of apprehending justice and applying it 
to the community of souls. 30 
Duty: Responsibilities over Rights 
An important corollary to the conservative view of God and tnan is the 
belief in the preeminence of duties over rights. The conservative dis-
agrees with French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau, \vho held that 
man was at his best in a state of nature, unbound by society. To the 
contrary, the conservative contends that n1an's nature must be restrained. 
Because man's selfish and evil appetites must be controlled, and because 
God has the final authority over man, n1en should place n1ore en1phasis 
on their duty to God and fellow n1an than on their own personal rights. 
As Edmund Burke stated in a speech on the floor of the House of Cool-
mons, man's rights "are indeed sacred things," but they must "exist only 
in obedience to God. " 3 1 
Clinton Rossiter states that "rights are something to be earned rather 
than given .... The duties of man--service, effort, obedience, cultiva-
tion of virtue, and self-restraint-are the price of rights. " 32 Conservatives 
believe in historic, not human rights and view n1en in the context of 
established communities more than as single alienated individuals. Man's 
natural condition was to be in community, according to Aristotle, and 
without that communal identity, man is lost. 
54 CHAPTER THREE 
The significance of this conservative tenet during and since the New 
Deal is extraordinary. Contemporary public policy initiatives emphasize 
rights, but there has been little, if any, corresponding accent on responsi-
bilities. To conservatives, the liberal emphasis on rights encourages 
Americans to think more about what the government can do for them 
than about their responsibilities to do things for themselves. Conserva-
tives believe they have frequently been put at a disadvantage in the de-
bate on public policy issues emphasizing rights because it is politically 
difficult to oppose rights. In his 1961 inaugural address, President John 
F. Kennedy challenged the American people to "ask not what your 
country can do for you, but what you can do for your country." Today, 
the conservative wonders if John F. Kennedy or any president could 
make such a statement in an inaugural address since the American mind 
is so conditioned to emphasize rights over responsibilities. 
The conservative emphasis on the responsibility of state and local gov-
ernment to solve their own problems rather than turning to the national 
government is, of course, challenged by the emphasis upon rights over 
responsibilities. Policies of the New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, and 
Great Society caused state and local officials to look to Washington for 
solutions and money, instead of solving problems themselves without 
recourse to the largesse of the national government. Governmental poli-
cies designed to help local communities instead created a dependence 
on the federal government and contributed to the feeling that state and 
local governments were not responsible for solving their own problems. 
Politically, national politicians like the advantage they receive from giv-
ing out federal funds, and state and local officials enjoy the benefit of 
getting money for projects without raising taxes. Conservatives believe 
that these practices undermine not only individual responsibility, but 
also the corporate responsibilities of the local community. 
Democracy: Limited Government and the Constitution 
A focal point of American conservatism in particular is its view of the 
country's constitution. Because conservative and liberal views of the 
state are so different, their respective attitudes toward the Constitution 
and its interpretation are very different. Liberal scholars, such as Charles 
A. Beard and J. Allen Smith, indict the Founders for creating a docu-
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ment which protected their own material wealth and personal power.33 
Martin Diamond, an important conservative author, challenges the lib-
eral point of view in his book Our Democratic Republic by arguing that 
the Founders proceeded on principles rather than a desire for material 
gain. 34 Forrest McDonald also attacked the "economic" interpretation 
of the Constitution put forward by Charles Beard and argued that the 
interplay of econo1nics and politics created the unique American politi-
cal system. 35 
The Constitution is attacked by liberal scholars, who desire n1ore 
planning and change, while conservative scholars praise the wisdon1 of 
the Founders and advocate strict Constitutional interpretation. Conser-
vatives argue that, where possible, the Constitution <ihould be inter-
preted according to the "original intent" of the Founders unless and 
until the docun1ent has been an1ended. Not to do that, conservatives 
argue, is to allow the Constitution to be reshaped like putty by the 
moods and whims of the n1on1ent. Ifla\v changes with the circumstances 
of the titne, it becornes uncertain and unstable. In such circun1stances, 
Americans live under a govemn1ent of n1en, not of laws. 
It is not uncon1n1on for conservative and liberals to disagree on 
founding principles and the history of den1ocracy and the Constitution. 
Such differences even extend to the description of the political system. 
Conservatives refer to the system as a constitutional den1ocracy, to em-
phasize the constitutional lin1itations placed upon den1ocracy by the 
Founders. Conservatives tnay also use the tem1 "representative den1oc-
racy" to en1phasize that the Founders did not establish a direct democ-
racy, but rather one that allows representatives to act on behalf of the 
people, a conservative tenet. Some conservatives say only that our inher-
ited system is a federal republic. By whatever nan1e, it is clear that all the 
definitions imply limits on the scope and role of govemn1ent. 
Property: The Role of Economics 
The conservative view of the economy is traceable to John Locke, an 
eighteenth-century liberal who wrote in his "Second Treatise on Gov-
ernment" that the principal purpose of a people's govemtnent is "the 
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by 
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the general name, property. " 36 The Lockean theory of property became 
a defense of capitalism, and a central premise of conservative thought. 
Russell Kirk in The Conservative Mind says that "property and freedom 
are inseparably connected. " 37 Property is more than material things; it is 
also the means whereby one develops his personality by changing the 
external surroundings. The conservative fears any attempt at economic 
leveling, the government's arbitrary taking and giving of property with-
out regard to ownership in order to distribute more evenly a society's 
wealth. A distrust of wide-ranging government planning is closely re-
lated to the desire to protect the right of private property. 
Along with the sanctity of private property, most conservatives adhere 
to the view that laissez-faire capitalism is the best economic system. Cap-
italism is built on the assumption of private property, and socialism on 
the principal of state intervention. To economic conservatives, govern-
ment should interfere in the economy as little as possible, allowing the 
law of supply and demand to guide men in making profitable decisions. 
Manifestations of this philosophy include not only the efforts of former 
President Reagan to cut taxes, but also attempts to lessen government 
regulation ofbusiness. 
Scholars such as Peter Viereck and Clinton Rossiter contend that pri-
vate property and capitalism are very different. 38 Property gives man a 
place to stand, but no person can function in society and still be an 
extreme individualist. The just and stable economy "is a mixture of 
individual enterprise, group cooperation, and government regulation," 
according to Rossiter. 39 
Most conservatives endorse limited laissez-faire economics, but others 
advocate public housing and related social welfare projects. According 
to Rossiter, the final test of any government program is: "Does this law 
increase equality of opportunity?"40 The common charge made against 
conservatives is that their belief in a laissez-faire capitalist system makes 
no provision for the genuinely needy who, through no fault of their 
own, cannot meet basic human needs. The conservative response is to 
stress private and community solutions to this problem on the assump-
tion that increased governmental activity does more harm than good. 
Liberty: Equality's Big Brother 
Another key area of the conservative-liberal debate, which often centers 
on econonuc issues, concerns the balance between liberty and equality. 
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Despite the constant praise of both liberty and equality in our nation's 
tradition, the two concepts work aga1nst one another. Inequality seems 
a basic fact of nature, yet the vast differences between rich and poor 
demand son1e leveling. Making tnen1bers of a society more equal in 
material wealth and political power involves some change in the order 
of things. To achieve equality, the state n1ust take possessions, such as 
property and political influence, from some and give them to others. 
Leveling naturally infringes on the hberty of those from whom wealth 
or political power is taken; however, to allow some to acquire unrestric-
ted wealth and political power createc; inequality. 
There is no easy solution to th1s dispute. Theoretically a society with 
total liberty has no equality; anarchy would be the result, as all n1en1bers 
of society would have total freedon1 to do as they pleased. On the other 
hand, a society with total equality has no liberty and requires a totalitar-
ian govemn1ent to enforce con1n1on standards in all associations. Con-
servatisn1 celebrates equality by holding that people are entitled by God 
and nature to be treated as a rncans and not an end. They are entitled 
to equality of opportunity and suffrage; beyond this the conservative is 
unwilling to go. In the conservative vtew, individuals have an infinite 
variety of talents and are entitled to find economic, political, and social 
rewards without fear of govemn1ent license or redistnbution. 
Conservatisn1 favors liberty In the equality-liberty equation, but it 
does not con1pletely sacrifice equahty on the altar of freedom. The con-
servative position in An1erica holds that while liberty IS relatively n1ore 
important than equality, both n1ust exist in a society if it is to become 
democratic. It is liberty that creates the wealth in the society, and the 
stability of a regime is ensured only in a context of economic growth. 
So liberty is equality's older brother in the sense that it creates the condi-
tions for a discussion of redistribution. 
There are three reasons why conservatives believe economic and po-
litical costs are low in a society where liberty is more in1portant. First, 
government does not have to be enlarged to the extent of becoming 
oppressive as the enforcer of equality. As Harvey Mansfield points out: 
"A society of natural equals then needs government of unlimited scope, 
that is, an enormous inequality of political power, in order to protect its 
equality. " 41 Second, when equality outstrips liberty in in1portance, peo-
ple lose their incentive to excel. Third, tnaterial equality is not nearly as 
important as moral equality under God. Edmund Burke wrote that 
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wealth is not the true source of happiness, and civil life establishes order 
for the sake of the poor as well as the rich. 42 Social stability can be 
difficult to achieve if the emphasis on equality undermines order in so-
ciety. 
In contemporary society, with the advent of the New Deal in the 
1930s and the more recent civil rights and equal rights movement, 
equality has become sacrosanct and government has expanded accord-
ingly. Until the 1980s conservatives often found themselves in the unen-
viable position of being perceived as opposing society's improvement. 
But a burdensome bureaucracy and expanding government power even-
tually led to a backlash. The conservative emphasis on liberty found a 
receptive audience when the economy began to collapse under the 
weight of government regulation and interest group demands. 
The most dramatic example of this backlash was the controversy over 
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), a proposal which would have 
extended a wide range of rights to women. In 1972 Congress passed the 
amendment by a wide margin and sent it to the states for consideration. 
Within the first year, the legislatures in twenty-two states ratified the 
ERA by overwhelming votes. By 197 4-75, the ERA encountered un-
expectedly stiff opposition from conservatives. Thirty-five states ratified 
the amendment by 1978, three short of the necessary three-fourths 
needed, but four states rescinded their earlier ratification. By 1982, the 
Equal Rights Amendment was dead. In the end, the ERA was an issue 
that symbolized the conflict over a broad range of cultural values in the 
United States. Conservatives succeeded by raising the spectre of women 
being drafted for combat duty and disallowing provisions which at the 
time protected women in the workplace . In sum, the equality provisions 
of the amendment were antithetical to the liberty women currently en-
joyed in society. 
Meritocracy: The Leadership Class 
A belief in the importance of an aristocratic class is an idea that has long 
been a firm belief of conservatives. In its American application, this be-
lief was changed in important ways. When Edmund Burke defended the 
aristocratic class, he defended a specific group of titled nobles in En-
gland; however, America was founded as a society opposed to titles of 
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nobility. Peter Viereck notes that in the United States conservatives such 
as John Adams spoke of a "natural aristocracy," which anyone could join 
by virtue of n1erit and ability:11 
Despite the difference between the An1erican and English aristocra-
cies, the basic reason for the conservatives' regard for an aristocratic class 
in both contexts is the san1e: an elite class provides order. Kirk notes 
that the conservative believes that "Civilized society requires orders and 
classes. " 44 The Atnerican aristocratic class includes, an1ong others, those 
officials elected in our republican dernocracy to represent the people, 
thus protecting against a tyranny of the tnajority, whtch conservatives 
fear. Viereck stresses noblesse obhge rather than the elite class. He enl-
phasizes the in1portance of service by the n1eritocracy of society. To 
Viereck, aristocracy is i1nportant only in the sense of the "aristocratic 
heritage. " 45 
Antipathy: The Anticommunist Impulse 
Because conservatives believe An1encan values are unique and deserving 
of respect, anticon1n1unisn1 has played a tnajor role in the gro\vth of the 
moven1ent and has becon1e a very recognizable part of the conservative 
philosophy. George H. Nash, in Tlze Consen;afive Intellectual A!ot;ement in 
America, identifies the anticonununists as one of the three n1ajor groups 
which brought about the revival of conservatisn1 ince 1945. 16 Nash's 
list of key anticon11nunist thinkers includes Whittaker Chan1bers, jan1es 
Burnhatn, and Frank Meyer, who once en1braced cotnn1uni 111 in the 
1930s and turned against it in the 19-+0s and 1950s. Meyer's experience 
was not unusual atnong other anticon1n1unists of the tune who earlier 
flirted with communism only to ftnd it destructive of the rights of the 
individual and damaging to the interests of the local con1n1unity. 17 
As a belief, ::lnticomrnunisnl includes virtually every canon of conser-
vatism. Those who hold particularly to the in1portance of n1aintaining a 
strong national defense against foreign invasion and preserving the inter-
nal domestic order saw comn1unisn1 as a threat fron1 external hostile 
Soviet actions and fron1 con1n1unist syn1pathizers internally. Cotnmu-
nism is the ultimate manifestation of the conservative fear of a powerful 
central government which squashes freedotn to impose its plans. Con1-
munism is also, to paraphrase Whittaker Chan1bers, the alternate faith to 
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a belief in God. 48 Conservatives are appalled at the total obliteration of 
traditional values in the face of "godless communism." The historical 
record of the systematic starvation of the peasants in Stalin's Russia and 
the oppression of the population by a totalitarian political system which 
denied the transcendent haunts conservative fears about socialism in the 
West. 
The mainline conservative attitude toward communism is strong dis-
trust. Most conservatives are opposed to the type of demagoguery repre-
sented by Senator Joseph McCarthy and the conspiracy theories of the 
John Birch Society whose president, Robert Welch, even accused Presi-
dent Eisenhower of being in league with the Soviet Union.49 The bal-
anced conservative point of view is that while overreaction to 
communism in the form of demagoguery and conspiracy theories is un-
wise, a vigilant attitude toward communism must be maintained. 
The evidence undergirding the conservative attitude includes not 
only the lack of liberty in communist countries, but also the list of 
human rights atrocities committed in surrogate countries like Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, and Afghanistan. The squalid prisons in Cuba de-
scribed by Armando Valladares in his book Against All Hope, and the 
hopelessness of the slave labor camps documented by Alexander Solz-
henitsyn in The Gulag Archipelago: 1918-19 56, are the true reality of 
communism. The chief crime of communism is not that it takes away 
property, but that it removes freedom upon which property is based. 
Conclusion 
During his terms as president, Ronald Reagan n1ade it a habit to invite 
special guests to sit in the visitor's balcony during his State of the Union 
messages to Congress. In an address in his first term he hailed Lenny 
Skutnik, who had earlier rescued several drowning passengers from an 
airplane that had crashed in the Potomac River. Two years later he 
lauded Sergeant Stephen Trujillo, an Army medic who risked his life 
saving the wounded in Grenada. The president used this nationally tele-
vised speech to recognize a Vietnamese refugee who graduated with 
honors from West Point, a Harlem resident who cared for drug-addicted 
infants, and a high school student whose science experiment was carried 
aboard the ill-fated Challenger shuttle. The subjects of these introduc-
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tions were frequently criticized by the press as a diversion fron1 the real 
issues facing the nation, but the cntiCs failed to reahze the cruCial role 
syn1bolic values play In governing. 
The stones of these Indivtdua1s were an ernbodin1ent of a con1mon 
then1e: "For [ Arnericans] faith, work, f.1n1 tly, neighborhood, freedon1, 
and peace are not JUSt words; they're expressions of what An1enca 
means, definitions of \Vhat n1akes us a good and loving people. " 50 In 
short, Arnenca IS a speCial place. Critics of R.eagan's speeches to Con-
gress and hts presidency failed to reahze that rnost An1encans "vant to 
believe that their nation is both good and unique. Conservattsn1 appeals 
to this heartfelt desire. It IS fundan1cntally an attitude tO\vard nun and 
soctety that exan11nes the Issues of life through pnnCiple. 
The ten canons descnbcd here arc really ten pnnciples that conserva-
tives use to gutde their personal lives and to \VOrk withtn con1n1unittes. 
ConservatiSnl einbodtec.. a deep respect for the lessons of history and an 
abtdtng regard for the \VOrk of deity \Vithin that record. It IS ultin1ately 
a staternent of personal f.1ith that cn1phasizcc.. the responstbihtY of rnan to 
his Maker and also to hic.. fdlo\v n1an. Conservattsn1 teaches 1nankind to 
look first at \vhat one can do to solve one's O\Vn problen1s rather than 
seeking solutions fron1 another source 
Person, positiOn, and place arc irnportant halln1arks of the conserva-
tive f.1Ith. R .. ccognitton of \vho one ts 1n a society clnd one\ rec..ponstbth-
ties to that soCiety, respect for one's O\vn position as \vell as for the 
positions of others In society, and reverence for place or ~enc..e of local 
con1n1unity are In1portant to the <...onservative In creating and sustaining 
social ham1ony and stablltty. The conservative vie\VS ucccss ac.. achieving 
what one can within the confines of one's abilities, rather than attaining 
son1eth1ng that one either has not \VOrked for or does not hcl\ e the 
ability to earn. Conten1porary conservatives believe that the state n1ust 
pron1ote virtue 1nd social responsibility and take appropnate tneasure 
to in1prove the n1oral clin1ate of soCiety. 
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CHAPTE R FOUR 
The Classical Roots of 
Conservative Thought 
... [T]here is 110 doubt that conservatism as a modem 
movement is a response to the excesses of rationalistic zeal let 
loose by eighteenth-ce11tury radicals such as Jean Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-1778). Indeed) the word ((conservative)) 
was coined from the French word conservateur, a name given 
to certain French writers who wished to retum to the conditions 
existing prior to the rise of Napoleon I (17 69-1821) and the 
French Revolr-ltion. 
JAY A SIGLER 
A 11 political action is guided by sorne thought of better or worse. Political things are by their nature subject to approval and disap-
proval, to choice and rejection, to praise and blame. In democracies, 
government power is retained only after the people approve of the 
choices their leaders make. Politicians balance their decisions between 
the extremes of preservation and change: "When desiring to preserve, 
we wish to prevent a change to the worse; when desiring to change, we 
wish to bring about something better. " 2 judgn1ents about the rate and 
type of change do not exist in a vacuum, they rest on some conception 
of what should be, of what is best for society. 
The foundati0n of conservatisrn is the belief that the good society has 
a reverence for proven values which guide the integration of new ideas 
through time-tested institutions. Tradition is nothing more than the 
concrete experience of this truth which is carried in comn1on by the 
society. Knowledge of the past is the spiritual substance of shared living 
that makes society distinctively human. The fundamental values of con-
servatism, the premises of resistance to change and protection of past 
values, are best understood today as a reaction to the idealism of the 
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Renaissance, the flawed vision of the Enlightenment which culminated 
in the French Revolution, and the mistaken promises of modem utopian 
ideologies. 
The points of reaction which sparked the development of modem 
conservative thought were diverse. Movements like the Renaissance and 
the Enlightenment were complex social phenomena, but they still 
evinced a distinct theme and view of man and the state which influenced 
subsequent political thought. The French Revolution, the Protestant 
Reformation, and the decline of the Roman Catholic Church's author-
ity in society had a similar impact on social relations and politics. No one 
of these events standing alone could explain the emergence of modem 
conservatism, but together they led to an articulate conservative reaction 
to the changes being wrought in society by these movements, events, 
ideologies, and personalities. 
It was Protagoras who said, "Man is the measure of all things, of what 
is that it is and of what is not that it is not. " 3 In all the movements to 
which conservatism reacted, there was a preoccupation with man-his 
mind, his reason, and his ability to solve his own problems. Conserva-
tism, with its religious roots (especially in the Roman Catholic Church) 
and its classical ties (to the writings of Plato and Aristotle, with their 
emphasis on balance and order in society) looked less to mankind and 
more to deity, less to reason and revolution and more to principles and 
traditions. In this chapter these foundations of conservatism are exam-
ined and explained. 
Classical Political Thought 
In the twentieth century, states are so large, so remote, and so impersonal 
that they cannot fill the place in modern life that the city filled in the 
life of ancient Greece. Four centuries before Christ, the art, religion, 
ethics, economics, and politics of a citizen were set by the city in which 
he lived. The life of a city was a social experience; its constitution, as 
Aristotle said of Athens, was a "mode of life" rather than a legal struc-
ture. Consequently, the guiding ideal of classical political thought was 
the harmony of life held in common in the community. The "polis" 
was a divine association, where order ruled over chaos and where the 
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ways of the gods, the ways of nature, and the ways of n1an came to close 
approximation. 
In Greece, the city was a place where It~ inhabitants were to live in 
agreement, with as n1any citizens as possible taking an active part in a 
con11non life. In ancient Athens offices were rotated to give more citi-
zens a share in the governn1ent. On the basis of figures given by Aristotle 
in his Constitution of Athens, It is estin1ated that in any year as n1any as 
one citizen in six tnight have had son1e share In the civil govemn1ent, 
even though it tnight have an1ounted to no tnore than jury service. Even 
if he held no office, a citizen could still n1eet in a general assen1bly to 
discuss city business at least ten tin1es a year. 
Classical politiCal philosophy \vas charactenzed by 1ts tdeals, which 
were directly related to political life. Looking at political hfe fron1 the 
perspective of an enlightened c1t1zen or statesn1an in ancient Athens 
n1eant that one day's pohtical discussions n11ght be the next day's gov-
ernment policy. l)iscu~sion of Lnv~ naturaily involved agreement as to 
what was best for the society. Good n1lers \Vere those \vho placed thts 
common interest above their private Interest; good decisions for the 
polity were those n1ost in accordance \Vtth the requiren1ents of hun1an 
excellence: "Since political controverstes are concerned with 'good 
things' and 'just things,' cla~stcal pohttcal phllosophy \Vas naturally 
guided by considerations of 'goodness' and 'ju~tice.' '' 1 
The distinct question wh1ch guided the Platonic dialogues \Vas ''What 
is virtue?" The ideas of h,lnnony and proportionality as applied to the 
ethics oflife were a critical concern of classical political philo ophy. The 
fundamental thought in the Greek idea of the state \vas the han11ony of 
a life shared in con1n1on by all It n1en1bers. Life was conceived a an 
activity directed toward son1e goal, but in order to pursue a specific goal, 
a society had to be constituted in accordance with that goal. Classical 
philosophy was guided by the question of the best regirne, even though 
that ideal might rever be reached. 
An exan1ple of this philosophy is Plato's n1ost fan1ous book, the Re-
public) written in his mature n1anhood, probably within a decade of the 
opening of his school in the fourth century B.C. The book ernphasizes 
that knowledge is virtue, a proposition which implies that there is an 
objective good to be known and that it can in fact be known by rational 
or logical investigation rather than by intuition, guesswork, or luck. 
Government, to be just, must be based on this abstract good, which 
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could only be realized by leaders who were properly educated: "Plato's 
theory is therefore divisible into two main parts or theses: first, that 
government ought to be an art depending on exact knowledge and, 
second, that society is a mutual satisfaction of needs by persons whose 
capacities supplement each other.' '5 
The ideals of the Republic were never realized; today it is regarded as 
the greatest of utopias. Still, its romantic ideas of free intelligence guided 
by custom and the voice of reason remain as a legacy centuries after 
Plato elaborated them. The book's voice is that of the scholar, whose 
faith in structured activity society would do well to rely upon. Classical 
philosophy strives for knowledge of the whole, the totality of the parts, 
even though such knowledge may ultimately elude us. 
Modern Political Thought 
Modern political thought, by contrast, rejects the classical schemes as 
unrealizable and unrealistic. The founder of modern political philosophy 
was Machiavelli (1469-1527), who objected to the classical approach to 
politics which emphasized an unrealized utopia. The description of the 
ideal regime did not interest Machiavelli because its realization was im-
probable; instead he took as his standard the objectives actually pursued 
by existing societies. His lowering of the requirements of conduct meant 
that virtue could no longer define the good society; rather, the state 
must have as its objectives the lesser ideals of prosperity, glory, empire, 
and freedom from foreign domination. 
By Machiavelli's time the classical tradition had undergone profound 
changes; the conten1plative life had found its home in monestaries. 
Moral virtue in the sixteenth century meant Christian charity. Machia-
velli had no sense of religion as a deep personal experience; he saw it 
only as an instrument of political domination. He held the church partic-
ularly responsible for the current state of affairs: it was too weak to unite 
Italy and too strong to prevent anyone else from doing so. Ultimate 
thoughts about the good were useless-what counted were ends and 
1neans, power and its exercise: "The consuming problem of the six-
teenth century was whether the state is to be regarded as a moral organ-
ism or simply as a power bloc. " 6 The great exponents of the ethical state 
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stood in the classical tradition; Machiavelli was positioned in the amoral 
camp. 
The Renaissance 
Today we remember the Renaissance as a tin1e of artistic and creative 
greatness. The revival of comrnerce and urban life produced in Italy a 
galaxy of brilliant city-states which contrived to balance political power 
among themselves and endow their particular comn1unities with the 
greatest of artistic achievements. The Renaissance "ideal was the explo-
ration of all learning and all skills .... The universal n1an, the 'uo1no 
universale ,' essayed to excel in sport, art, literature, exploration or war. " 7 
It is corrunon to say that the Renaissance represented a rebirth in learn-
ing, but it is more accurate to say that it en1bodied a rebirth of an idea 
about man. 
A change in thinking took place; medieval Christian notions that rnan 
was a flawed and sinful creature in God's universe were replaced by 
an understanding that man hirnself was the center of all things. One 
commentator has written of Leonardo da Vinci, who is comn1only re-
garded as a prototype of the Renais ance man, that "throughout the 
thousands of pages he covered with notes and ideas, God is seldom n1en-
tioned, but nature appears innurnerable tin1es .... For [hin1] there was 
no authority higher than that of the eye, which he characterized as the 
'window of the soul. ' " 8 The abilities of Da Vinci and Michelangelo 
were models as to what man is capable of being and doing. The change 
in attitudes about the nature and purposes of n1an are clearly seen in the 
art of the time. 
In 1501, the government of Florence invited sculptors to submit their 
designs for using a 17-foot block of Carrara marble that had lain in the 
cathedral courtyard for seventy years. An earlier sculptor had begun 
work on the marble but had given up, and subsequent artists judged the 
marble to have been gouged so deeply as to be ruined. The winning 
design was submitted by Michelangelo, who carved on the flawed mar-
ble for three years until he completed his masterpiece, "David." Asked 
how he found the solution to the ruined marble, Michelangelo said 
simply that he had seen the figure imprisoned and set it free. Such was 
the Renaissance vision. 
The view Michelangelo had of David is a prototype of the Renais-
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sance ideal for man. One scholar comments, " [the statue] towers above 
us as revelation of a transferred humanity .... It is characteristic that 
such a figure should appear dreamlike. " 9 In the perfect body of David, 
the undercutting of the hair, and the strong anatomical features lie the 
message that man has unlimited abilities. The ultimate hope of the Re-
naissance was that all men would realize and attain a perfection never 
before known. 
Not surprisingly, Machiavelli longed for a political David, a strong 
and powerful leader who would return Italy to greatness. He assumed 
that power was an end in itself, and he confined his inquiries to the 
means best suited to acquire, retain, and expand power. Caesar Borgia, 
who assassinated his older brother and the husband of his sister, was held 
up "as an example to be imitated by all who by fortune and with the 
arms of others have risen to power .... One can find no better example 
than the actions of this man. " 10 Machiavelli, more than any other politi-
cal thinker, defined the philosophy of the modern nation-state by ideal-
izing the power of its rulers. In this view, the organized force and 
supreme authority of the state obligate and regulate other institutions in 
society. 
The Reformation 
The sixteenth century witnessed two great revolutions in thinking. 
The Renaissance flourished in the city-states of southern Europe, while 
the Reformation was characteristic of nation-states in northern Europe. 
Although the original ideas of the Reformation were religious, religion 
was readily used as a cloak for less lofty aspirations: "Nowhere was the 
issue purely religious; in all countries it was mixed with political, dynas-
tic, economic and diplomatic considerations. " 11 
In many ways the Reformation was a reaction against the secular 
church and humanism of the Renaissance. Renaissance idealism was 
based on a revival of Greek and Latin models of man and human learn-
ing. Aristotle had been canonized when his philosophy was grafted onto 
Christian theology by Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages. The 
Church's approval had been extended in a general way to cover Aristot-
le's scientific as well as his philosophical ideas. Protestant reformers, from 
Luther onwards, stressed the supreme authority of scripture and the fal-
lacy of human reason. "The Reformation [took] the form of a revolt 
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against the Roman Church, accused of having departed from the true 
faith as revealed in the Bible." 12 
Martin Luther was born in 1483 and lived until 1546. As a young 
priest he was shocked by the in1morality in the church of his time. His 
proffered remedy was "Sola Scriptura," a return to the Bible and a rejec-
tion of the hun1anist tradition in the secular church. In a letter to a friend 
written in May 1517 Luther wrote, "Aristotle is going downhill and 
perhaps he will go all the way down to hell." 13 A few n1onths after 
writing this, on October 31, 1517, Luther nailed to the door of the 
Wittenburg Church the "Ninety-Five Theses," whtch ended with a 
bold declaration, "I an1 neither so rash as to wish that rny sole opinion 
should be preferred to that of all other n1en, nor so senseless as to be 
willing that the word of God should be n1ade to give place to fables, 
devised by hurnan reason." 14 
The Refonnation \.Vas a reaction to the f.:1bles, hun1anism, heresy, and 
perversions that hun1an reason had added to alter the pnstine faith of the 
early church. It was a specific rejection of the Renaissance, \.Vith its 
idealisn1 and hopes for "uorno universale." To the reformers, the reli-
gion of the Renaissance was little tnore than pantheisn1, a behef that 
God is not a personality but a force or n1an1festation that is behind all 
religions. The vision of the refonners was that rnan was fallen, finite and 
frail; they were not ron1.1ntic about rnan. Each Reformation country 
showed the practice of checks and balances in Its govern1nent constitu-
tion to guard against the accu1nulat1on of power by rulers. 
The Catholic fight against Prote tantism encouraged a corresponding 
reform n1ovement within the Ron1an Catholic Church, the Counter-
Reforn1ation. In 1534, Ignatius Loyola founded his Society ofJesus, the 
Jesuit order, for the propagation and defen e of the faith. Whereas Lu-
ther discovered the Epistle of Rornans and subjected his self-will to the 
grace of God, Ignatius concentrated on the suffering Christ and obedi-
ence to the represedtatives of the Church. The Jesuits took the lead in 
refuting Protestant theologians and stimulating changes in the Catholic 
Church. "The history of the Counter-Reforn1ation is in part the history 
of the triumph of the conservative and the militant over the conciliatory 
and the liberal. " 15 The Council of Trent, which began its deliberation 
in 1545, affirmed the traditions of the Catholic Church and at the same 
time legislated new rules cleansing the Church of past excesses. 
For Roman Catholics particularly, the Reformation is seen as a chal-
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lenge to conservatism because it severed ties to a continuous line of 
authority, spiritual and temporal, over several centuries. At cross pur-
poses were two diametrically opposed doctrines, the Protestant's doc-
trine of the authoritative Bible and the Catholic's belief in the 
authoritative Church. While both Roman Catholicism and Protestant-
ism have produced many conservative scholars, their view of the Refor-
mation differs. Contemporary conservative Russell Kirk, a Catholic by 
conversion, puts the issue this way: 
Obedience, submission to God, is the secret ofjustice in society and tran-
quility in life, quite as much as it is indispensable to eternal salvation. To 
redeem Americans from sectarianism is the task of the intelligent social 
refom1er as well as the duty of the priest; for free political institutions can 
be secure only when the people are imbued with religious veneration. 
Democracy, more than any other form of government, rests upon the 
postulate of a moral law, ordained by an authority superior to human 
wisdom .... 
Under Protestantism, the sect governs religion, rather than submitting 
to governance; the congregations bully their ministers and insist upon 
palatable sermons, flattering to their vanity; Protestantism cannot sustain 
popular liberty because it is itself subject to popular control, and must 
follow in all things the popular will, passion, interest, prejudice, or caprice. 
The modem spirit, of which Protestantism is one expression, detests the 
idea of loyalty, upon which the whole hierarchy of this world and the 
next is founded .... 16 
Historically, Protestants would vehemently dispute Kirk's view of the 
matter. For them, the Protestant Reformation was conservative in that 
it reconnected Christianity to its historic past, one that was nearly lost 
through the corruption of doctrine and practices of the Roman Catholic 
Church. Protestants believe that the Roman Catholic Church had 
warped the foundations and traditions of the church. They endeavored 
to return the church to its scriptural roots: "One could say that the 
Renaissance centered in autonomous man, while the Reformation cen-
tered in the infinite-personal God who had spoken in the Bible." 17 
To the Protestant the Bible is the ultimate authority; to the Roman 
Catholic the church is the ultimate authority. The Roman Catholic con-
servative believes that the church is the repository of the continuity of 
the ages, and her traditions are, therefore, authoritative. The Protestant 
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conservative argues to the contrary that the Bible is the touchstone of 
truth and that all hun1an action n1ust be n1easured against it. Whenever 
traditions violate Scripture, Protestants hold that those practices n1ust 
give way to biblical truth. Kirk's argutnent that Protestantis1n is subject 
to popular control is n1et with the Protestant retort that the failure of 
Rornan Catholicisn1 to subject itself to the tnlth of the Bible led to 
the corruption of doctrine and practices, \Vhich were the cause of the 
Refom1ation In the first place. 
The Protestant vtew is that the RefonnatiOn was genuinely conserva-
tive in that it reconnected Christianity to Its true foundations and correct 
traditions. To the Protestant, the Bible provides a standard of certainty 
by which to judge £1ith and practice. The H .. on1an Catholic Church, by 
contrast, offers no certainty Since Its standards are liable to change fron1 
generation to generation. As one Protestant \Vriter has said, "The Bible 
gives a different way to corne to God fron1 that teaching \Vhich had 
grown up in the church through the previous centunes .... The indi-
vidual person, they taught, could con1e to God dtrectly 'by £11th' 
through the finished \vork of Chnst. '' 1 ~ 
Loyalty, the other i sue ratsed by Ktrk, .1lso arouses ,1 Protestant re-
sponse. Kirk's standard of loy,1lty is n1easured by loyalty to the Rotnan 
Catholic Church and her traditions. Protestant~. by contrast, have histor-
ically measured loyalty by one's \Vtllingness to believe in and to practice 
the teachings of the Bible a under tood In con1n1on ver tons of the 
original translations. It was this type of loyalty ·which caused the Puritan 
to embark on a journey to the Ne\V World in the first place, and it \Va 
a similar allegiance that n1oved others to challenge church practices \Vith 
the question, "Is it biblical?" 
While Ron1an Catholics and Protestants have these fund,1n1ental dif-
ferences, there is still much that unites thetn. Both reject the Renais ance 
humanistn and idealisn1 of that era, and both shan1e the corruption 
which led to the original schisn1 bet\veen Catholic and Protestant. The 
measuring rod of conservatisn1 n1ight differ between the two, but they 
are in agreement that later currents of opinion are blasphen1ous to the 
respective conservative traditions which both seek to protect. 
The Enlightenment 
"Rich and weighty as were the legacies bequeathed to us by ancient 
Greece and Rome, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Refonna-
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tion," writes Paul Hazard in European Thought in the 18th Century, "it is 
the Enlightenment of which we are the direct and lineal descendants. " 19 
The legacy of the French Enlightenment was a belief in the universal 
regeneration of mankind, who, when remade by reason, would become 
beautiful new creatures, happy and thoroughly secular in their thinking. 
In such a vision man and society were perfectible. The romantic ideal of 
the new political conununity would be one where all previous religions 
would be replaced by a new civic religion, that of rationalistic humanism 
in which the civic bonds themselves would constitute a kind of sacred 
association. 
Today tnost college courses on the Enlightenment exanune in detail 
the writings of French personalities like Rousseau, Voltaire, and Diderot. 
Very little attention is given to the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment, and 
writers like Locke, Hume, and Adam Smith. Yet it is the Anglo-Scottish 
Enlightenment which most directly influenced the American experi-
ence. The traditions of the latter movement aimed "at gradual improve-
ment of the human condition-a process, moreover, in which each 
individual bears his share of responsibility for a successful outcome, 
rather than salvation being provided 'from above' by a ruling party or 
class. " 20 Although the American Revolution was inspired by a casual 
mixing of the two Enlightenments, it was the Anglo-Scottish tradition 
that was decisive in the end. Instead of a reign of terror, the American 
Revolution ended in the Constitutional Convention. Instead of fratrici-
dal warfare among revolutionaries arguing over utopian expectations, 
the American Founders compromised on a limited government with 
divided power. 
The French Enlightenment was fueled by the vision of two men: 
Voltaire (1694-1778), who sketched out four periods ofhistory culmi-
nating with the France of his time as the apex; and Jean Jacques Rous-
seau (1712-1778), who saw the primitive as innocent, and autonomous 
freedom as realizable. Voltaire made freedom of speech his crusade, but 
he had little interest in politics and no interest in the masses, whom he 
regarded as cruel and stupid. Rousseau's freedom was a release from 
God, culture, authority, and any kind of restraint-his pride was in the 
"noble savage." Social conventions were the "chains" of his famous 
dictum in The Social Contract: "Man is born free and everywhere he is in 
chains." Deity, history and con1munity-the nametags of conserva-
tisn1-were anathen1a to Rousseau. In the period of the French Revolu-
THE CLASSICAL ROOTS 75 
tion, his ideas gave birth to the laws which made divorce as easy as 
n1arriage, abolished the distinction between legitimate and illegititnate 
children, gave France a new calendar with ten days in each week, and 
established a new state religion based on reason.21 
The Anglo-Scottish Enlightenn1ent had more xnodest ambitions. In-
stead of a new state religion, it ain1ed at the fonnation of religious tolera-
tion. Even though n1any of the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment thinkers 
were religious skeptics, or at n1ost deists, they recognized that organized 
religion was a necessary part of con1n1unity life which inculcated moral 
habits and obviated the need for governn1ent instruction. The envi-
sioned society of Anglo-Scottish ten1perance was ruled by a lin1ited gov-
ernment, one restrained in power and authority. The success of the 
English-speaking Enlightenn1ent was that it did not destroy the old order 
but created a new and viable one out of existing institutions: "The 
Anglo-Scottish Enlightenn1ent \Vas no le s rationalist than the French, 
but it found its appropriate expre sion in a cairn historical sociology 
rather than in a fervent political n1essianistn. " 22 
French Revolution 
The French revolutionarie ·wanted to produce a new n1an through 
education, persuasion, and, if required, force and terror. To achieve this 
goal with these means, they were willing to destroy all ocial and gov-
ernmental institution . The history of France at this tin1e is replete with 
accounts of revolutionary tribunals dispensing revolutionary justice, a 
reign of terror, and bloodthirsty proclan1ations by n1ob before guillo-
tines. As it turned out, the French revolutionaries were n1ore interested 
in power than freedom. Rousseau's writings were the feast of the revolu-
tionaries, who pillaged France's guilds, n1onasteries, and econotny in the 
name of citizenship. The new sentin1entality denied morality and na-
tional boundaries. Rousseau wrote, "Today there are no Frenchn1en, 
Germans, Spaniards, or even Englishn1en; there are only Europeans ... . 
They are at home wherever there is n1oney to steal or won1en to se-
duce."23 
The French mutiny savagely attacked the patriarchal family, declaring 
marriage a civil contract and abolishing the traditionally accepted laws 
of paternal authority, primogeniture, and entail. By 1794 the number of 
divorces exceeded the nun1ber of n1arriages. Property, a key en1bodi-
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ment of human liberty and freedom for the conservative, was severely 
restricted by destroying the relationships between property and commu-
nity groups, such as family, church, guild, and monastery. The aim of 
the revolution was to refashion a people-to destroy their past, alter 
their habits, and purify their desires. Why was the French Revolution 
like this? "It was perhaps Romanticism," writes Simon Schama in his 
book on the period, ''its fondness for the vertiginous and the macabre; 
its concept of political energy as, above all, electrical; its obsession with 
the heart; its preference for passion over reason, for virtue over peace, 
that supplied the crucial ingredient in the mentality of the revolutionary 
elite: its association of liberty with wildness. " 24 The result of this social 
experimentation was a bloodbath and rapid breakdown of authority cul-
minating in the authoritarian rule of Napoleon Bonaparte. 
It was this spectacle which caused Edmund Burke to take up his pen 
and state the general principle of English constitutionalism which he had 
previously accepted as a part of the natural order of things. For Burke, 
and generations of conservatives after him, civilization was the posses-
sion not of individuals, but of communities. To conservatives, the civic 
culture is all of man's inherited spiritual possessions; its art, moral ideas, 
science, and learning are not something to be ransacked by revolutionar-
ies in the name of change. The revolution was in Burke's own words, 
both "sublime and terrible." "In England we have not yet been com-
pletely embowelled of our natural entrails; we still feel within us, and 
we cherish and cultivate, those inbred sentiments which are the faithful 
guardians, the active monitors of our duty.' '25 
Utopian Ideologies 
The French Revolution expanded the political and intellectual divisions 
in Europe. In the nineteenth century, democracy seemed inevitable, 
even in politically backward states with long-standing dynasties like 
Russia and Germany. The political virtues of self-government were ac-
corded lip service by autocrats, and gradual experiments in democracy 
were tried. However, the twentieth century gave rise to violent revolu-
tion and the authoritarian excesses of fascism, Nazism, and con1munism. 
Dictatorships in the twentieth century are of three types: (1) the auto-
cratic military ruler; (2) a single individual in a ruling group; and (3) a 
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"kind of dictatorship [which] seeks to refashion human society in terms 
of some ideology or doctrine. ""'6 The practice of terror, propaganda and 
rulership by a single political party has characterized dictatorships in the 
twentieth century of both the Right and Left, by the fascists, Nazis, 
and conm1unists. The social and technological changes of modem times, 
especially the expansion of rad1o and television, have had the effect of 
n1aking authoritarian states n1ore powerful. 
The rise of totalitarian1sn1 1n the twentieth century has provoked the 
surviving den1ocracies to cxatnine their foundations. Conservatives have 
benefited fron1 such c;crutiny since their ideals explain past social 
achievements. The prin1ary reac;on n1any conc;ervatives oppose having 
conservatisn1 labeled an ideology IS that the term-especially in the 
twentieth century-is clSSOCI.lted \Vith UtOpian ideas hke COD1muniSITI 
and socialisn1. The goal of an tdeology 1s to rernake society and hutnans 
in the in1age of son1e ideal. Conservatisn1, on the other hand, teaches 
that we should understand soc1etv through experience and learning. So-
ciety's behavior should be deten111ned by hnks to the pac;t, not by the 
itnposition of an abstract dogtna. Action 1s the n1otif of the ideologue, 
reflection is the rnanner of the conservative. 
While the conservative chenshe d1vers1ty, the ideologue prizes uni-
fom1ity. The ideologue Vle\VS tnen as instnnnents to be n1an1pulated 1n 
the interest of obtaining a untfonntty of practice. By contra t, conserva-
tives value variety, con1plex1ty, subtlety, and nuance. Con1n1unity, the 
benchn1ark of hurnan organization for the conservative, is the enlbodi-
ment of those values. The individual learns standards of acceptable be-
havior n1ore through con1n1unity institutions like the fatnily, church, 
neighborhood, and voluntary associations, than through la\VS and stan-
dards imposed by govemtnent. 
The neoconservative n1ove1nent of the 1980s was triggered by a disil-
lusion with utopian protnises and experin1ents. The experiences of per-
n1issiveness, poverty, crin1e, Inflation, and n1oral disarray that came to be 
associated with liberalism's social and econon1ic agenda since the 1930 
led to an increasing an1bivalence about the role of govemtnent in the 
life of its citizens. The feeling an1ong neoconservatives was that Wash-
ington had tried for too long to do too n1uch and, for the most part, 
had done it badly. The adversarial stance toward general culture which 
characterized radical thought in the 1960s led to a reaction by those who 
wished to protect and defend the fundan1ental values of the free society. 
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Conclusion 
Without the challenges posed by the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, 
the French Revolution, and utopian ideologies, there would be no artic-
ulate modern conservatism. The uniform characteristic of all these 
movements is a faith in human reason and capacities. In conservative 
eyes, the ideal of human association liberated from custom has seldom 
brought freedom, and never spawned lasting social improvement. Reac-
tion, then, is a characteristic of modern conservatism. As society began 
to adopt the idealism of the Renaissance and incorporate the beliefs of 
the Enlightenment, conservatives elaborated the virtues of a well-
ordered past. 
The French Revolution was especially important in the development 
of conservative thought. It was Edmund Burke who saw the need to 
react to the challenges to order and authority in evidence in the J acobin 
excesses. After Burke, much conservative writing has been in response 
to threats undermining the values of community and society. 
The clearest definition of the premises necessary for a stable society 
are found in the writings of classical philosophy. In all classical political 
thought is a concern with the good state, justice, and the improvement 
of the citizenry. Modern political thought, by contrast, is mainly inter-
ested in the accumulation and exercise of power. 
The roots of conservative thought follow both Roman Catholicism, 
with its unifying thread of church tradition and classical values, and Prot-
estantism, with its emphasis upon the importance of biblical authority. 
Conservative scholars like Frances Wilson, Russell Kirk, Frank Meyer, 
and Willmoore Kendall were all Roman Catholics. In recent decades, 
the Catholic Church's hierarchy in the United States has found itself at 
odds with more traditional authorities in Rome and their followers in 
the United States. The ink was hardly dry on the American Roman 
Catholic Bishop's statement on the economy before conservative Amer-
ican Catholics rebutted it. Conservative Catholic orders of priests and 
nuns have been able to attract the young more than the liberal orders. 
The liberal Jesuits, for example, have suffered enormous losses from their 
ranks, while the conservative Opus Dei and Legionnaires of Christ have 
enjoyed extraordinary growth. 
In Protestantism, reaction has also been at work. In all major denomi-
nations conservatives have responded to the dominant liberal theology 
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by forging a counter-revolution to reestablish traditional practices. 
Mainline Protestant churches that etnphasize n1aterial and social issues, 
ordain won1en to the priesthood and the pastorate, and no longer hold 
the Bible as the authoritative Word of God, have seen their memberships 
dwindle. Time n1agazine reports that "a preoccupation with political and 
social issues at the expense of good old-fashioned faith has alienated 
many [mainline] n1en1bers." 27 The fastest growing churches in recent 
years have been those offering certainty of doctrine and practice. Such 
congregations are les likely to address econon1ic, political, and social 
issues except when they feel forced to react to liberal positions on homo-
sexuality, the role of wotnen in society, the prohibition of school prayer, 
and other innovations that they believe undennine the historically ac-
cepted custon1s and practices of the faith. 
Kierkegaard wrote, "Everything that passes for politics today will be 
unmasked as religion ton1orrow. " "'R If the saying is accurate it n1ay por-
tend an alliance between Prote->tant and Catholics 1n the future. Con-
servative Catholics and Protestants alike decry the decadence of society, 
the deterioration of the public schools, the loss of respect for authority, 
and the dependence upon governn1ent rather than personal initiative. 
They see these trends as the logical and a\:vfu1 fulfillrnent of the self-
centered pride flowing fron1 the tnoven1ents of the l~enaissance and the 
Enlightenment and the confidence in the tnodern political utopias. Such 
viewpoints spawned conservative Cathohc groups like the Eagle Forun1, 
and conservative Protestant groups like Concerned Won1en of An1erica. 
Both conservative Catholics and conservative Protestants are reacting 
to changes that threaten values which they believe in1portant. In n1ost 
instances, they are reacting to the s~11ne things in the political reahn. 
Abortion, for instance, h as resulted in lin1ited efforts by conservative 
Catholics and Protestants to join together in opposition to threatening 
moral changes. However, lingering differences about ultin1ate authority 
make their cooperation effective only on specific issues. 
Reaction is the foundation of n1odern conservatisn1. Neoconservatism 
is the most recent tnanifestation of a n1oven1ent which reappraises 
American culture after finding fault with the social experiments of the 
1960s. Typically, conservative moven1ents begin in reaction to hostile 
moven1ents, ideas, and events. T he fires of its conten1porary resurgence 
are fueled by threats to the accepted customs and traditions of a society 
posed by past flirtations with experitnentation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Historical Development of 
American Conservatism 
T11ejuture, as always, is ueiledfrom our l'ision. Butfor the 
moment the cotzsen,atiue intellectualmoucmctlt 111 America, 
born itz the wilderness a generattoll ago, has wulenicdJ/y 
achieved an unprecedented leuel ~f it!f/11cnce and 11nportancc 
... to understand this intellectual moiiCIIICIIf and its 
aspirations, MIC tnHst rmderstand history. 
(.I 0 R G E H A~ H 
' ' The United States," \Vrite~ eyn1our Martin L1pc;et, "n1ay prop-
erly claim the title of the first ne\v nation." Th1 designation 
means that it was the first country to succe sfully develop ,1n Industrial 
econon1y with an integrated social structure and a stable detnocratic pol-
ity without disintegrating in the process. 2 But the nation did not pring 
from virgin soil without a value yc;ten1 rooted in year of toil and experi-
ence. There is a type of spiritual history, \vbat Eric Voegelin calls "para-
dign1atic" history, which traces the intellectual and cultural developrnent 
of a nation.3 Every person love sotnething, and the e attachn1ents truc-
ture existence in some way. To understand An1erica is ftr t to con1pre-
hend the values which guided the fomution of its institutions in the 
early republic. Conservatives focus on a set of values which defined the 
"good life" in America at the tirne of its founding. The An1erican econ-
omy owed its success to hard, continuous work, frugality, self-disci-
plined living, and individual initiative. Such values can1e fron1 across 
the Atlantic, from notions of individual honesty that grew out of the 
Reformation and would later be known as the Protestant work ethic. 
More immediately, the political systen1 owed its genesis to the English 
Revolution of 1640 and the subsequent transfer of power to Parliarnent 
institutionalized by the Glorious Revolution of1688. In England, parlia-
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mentary democracy replaced royal absolutism, conunercial and industrial 
wealth replaced land as the base of economic influence, and the middle 
class stamped society with its outlook and morality where once the aris-
tocracy had ruled. The pattern of a peaceful, restructured society was set 
a hundred years before the American Revolution. 
The absence of a monarchy and an aristocracy made the American 
belief in equality and opportunity crucial. The revolutionary leaders in 
America quickly turned the experiment into a stable order. Such was 
not the case in France, whose revolution began two years after the Con-
stitution of the United States was framed. The Jacobin ideas of liberty, 
fraternity, and equality were completely at odds with the limited revolu-
tionary notions in England and the United States. 
Edmund Burke wrote that while there were structural reasons for 
the French Revolution, such injustices could never justify the complete 
dismemberment of society. It was custom, tradition, and membership in 
society, far more than reason, that gave quality to human nature. Burke 
wrote that the deep-seated historical forces at work in France were less 
important in explaining the excesses of the Revolution than the false 
doctrines of philosophers captivated by an Enlightenment optimism and 
a fanatical atheism. Although designated as the founder of American 
conservatism, Edmund Burke's title is somewhat misleading. The 
French Revolution was the foil of other prominent writers who surfaced 
simultaneously with Burke.4 While their ideas differed in some ways, 
such widespread and similar responses give evidence that basic conserva-
tive ideas and values were in evidence before Burke so skillfully articu-
lated and defended them. Burke spoke out forcefully against the collapse 
of the moral and social order in France, and identified the principles 
causing the societal breakdown: (1) faith in a priori change and human 
reason, and (2) a lack of respect for traditional values and property rights. 
Unlike the limited American Revolution, the French experience was 
a destructive and chaotic break between past and present. Custom, his-
tory and tradition were eclipsed in France, where they had been exalted 
in America. The American Revolution was a limited one, aimed at 
allowing Americans the benefits derived from the experiences of the 
English. The Constitution was seen as an extension of the ideas of the 
Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights. The policies of King 
George were criticized because they stood in the path of this legacy 
which was reserved for free men. 
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The developn1ent of the "l~ights of Englishmen" from the Magna 
Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of I~ights were sacred to the 
A1nerican colonists. Much of the colonial resistance took the form of 
arguing that these rights of fundamental law, which were largely due 
process rights, vvere being denied to then1 as colonists. The ordering 
documents of the colonies-for exan1ple, the Massachusetts Body of 
Liberties-reflected a concern to establish these rights. The populanty 
of Coke's Institutes and later Blackstone's Commentaries was a Inanifesta-
tion of concern that these due process rights be preserved. All this made 
the A1nerican !~evolution quite tan1e; it \Vas a conservative (even reac-
tionary) revolution. 
In this chapter, the evolution of An1encan conservatisn1 IS traced from 
the founding ideas ofEdrnund 13urke to the recent prescnpt1ons ofRon-
ald Reagan and George Bush. An1encan conservatisn1 has passed 
through three distinct periods in the past t\vo hundred years. These are, 
first, from colonial tin1es to the Ctvil War; second, frotn the Civil War 
to the Ne\v Deal; and th1rd, fron1 the Ne\v l)eal to the present. The 
then1e which unites all the~e periods is best articulated by George H. 
Nash, author of the landn1.1rk \vork on the conservative intellectual 
n1ove1nent since World War II: 
If there 1s a smgle phJ.losophical prennse that d1st1ngutshes recent Amen-
can conservatism, It IS the conviCtiOn that "Ideas have con equences." We 
live in a decade in \Vhich, for the first t1me m generations, the ideas of 
self-identified conservatives seen1 ascendant-an era In which the argu-
tnents of"acadenuc scnbblers" of the Right are being translated, however 
itnperfectly, mto public pohcy. ' 
For conservatives, fonn precedes content-ideas are the deten1unants of 
culture. To understand a nation is to ask questions about its standards 
and values. Our purpose here IS not to argue whether Atnerica is conser-
vative or liberal in its heritage, but rather to describe and analyze the 
flow of American conservative thought during its life as a nation. 
The Early Era: Colonial Times to the Civil War 
This era is broken down into a discussion of several themes and time 
periods. We identify the intellectual personalities and varieties of censer-
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vative thought in the periods of (1) the colonial and founding period; 
(2) the Federalists versus Republicans period; and (3) the pre-Civil War 
period, including the writings of John Randolph and John Calhoun. 
Conservative thinkers will be discussed individually and in the context 
of historical thought. 
The Colonial and Founding Period 
At the time of the American Revolution about three-quarters of the 
North American colonists were of Puritan extraction.6 Puritans might 
have attended a Congregationalist, Presbyterian, Anabaptist, or even 
Anglican church, but what united them all was the belief that the official 
church of England was not a true Christian church and needed cleansing 
from its elaborate ceremonies and forms. Clinton Rossiter, in Conserva-
tism in America, describes this sense of shared values among the colonists 
as a conm1on belief in "original sin" and an obligation to law and duty. 
Such was the assembly of "visible saints" who gathered in John Win-
throp's "Shining City" of Massachusetts to deliberate matters of state. 
Winthrop described then1. in his journal as a people who "in all differ-
ences and agitations ... continued in brotherly love. " 7 
Puritanism was the dominant political and intellectual force in the 
new nation through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John 
Winthrop, John Davenport, John Cotton, Nathaniel Ward, John Eliot, 
William Stoughton, Samuel Willard, and all the Mathers stamped the 
nation with a set of conservative values which emphasized respect for 
the established order, leadership by the favored few, the importance of 
community, and a preference for gradual change.8 The Puritans also gave 
the nation institutions like a written constitution, regular elections, and 
the secret ballot, and principles like the work ethic, the federalist princi-
ple, and the separation of church and state. In sun1, the national institu-
tions and values were influenced by Calvinism more than Deism, by the 
Reformation more than the Enlightenment, and by the revolution in 
England more than the revolution in France. 
The Puritans traced their roots not to England, but to Moses. Old 
Testament Israel was the source of inspiration for the "New Jerusalem" 
in Massachusetts. Russell Kirk writes that in such a heritage, the Chris-
tian faith is the principle of modern civilization: its theological and moral 
doctrines inform us ''of the nature of God and n1an ... , human dignity 
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and the rights and duties ofhun1an persons. "CJ Although in colonial tin1es 
there were no argun1ents over the benefits of capitalisn1 as opposed to 
socialisn1, or the itnportance of a strong national defense, or any clear 
expression of what would later be called a conservative philosophy, the 
influence of the Bible \vas everywhere apparent. Conservative values 
about the nature of tnan and the ln11Its of governn1ent characterized 
political debate 1n the colonies fro111 the tune of their settlen1ent to the 
An1erican Revolution. 
The founding of the An1ctic.1n republic prec;ents a rare opportunity to 
observe the authors of a constitution grappling \VIth the fundatnental 
problen1s of fon111ng a nc\v govcrmnent. Their actiVIty took place after 
a "reluctant revolution," to usc the \\ ords of lrvtng Kn5tol, \vhich pro-
tected the social Institutions of society. Unlike the French !~evolution, 
the leaders of the An1encan R.evolution lived out the1r hves in peace 
after it vvas over. 10 Peter Vtercck says the AnH~ncan !~evolution "re-
flected England\ heritage of I oH8," noting that Edtnund Burke "£1-
vored their revolution as dctl-ndmg the trtltbtional nght of freeborn 
English1nen against ne\v-(lngkd roy,1l ustuvattons." 11 
The victory of con ervative pnnctples Ill fonntng the govemn1ent is 
borne out by the f.1shionablc cnttosn1s the fratner5 of the Constitution 
have received fron1 revtstonist h1stonans. Charles A. Beard called the 
fran1ers " hardfisted con-.erv,ltlvcs" \vho atten1pted to "han1string the 
masses." 11 Others cntictzed thcn1 for having an "eighteenth century" 
view of n1an as depraved, and for trytng to fn1stratc the \vill of the 
majority. Clearly, the Founders created ,l constitutional detnocracy donl-
inated by "repubhcan tendenues. '' A full-fledged dernocracy \Vould 
have relied on n1ajority votes, gtven tronger po\ver to the national gov-
emn1ent to act on behalf of all the people, and provided for a unified 
executive to speak on behalf of the nation. But the resulong constitu-
tional republic established a lun1ted governn1ent, restrained by the ele-
ments of ch ecks and balances an1ong the branches of the national 
government, a division of power bet\veen the national and state authori-
ties, and a requirement of extraordinary n1ajo1itie to an1end the Consti-
tution or to override a veto. The result \vas a systen1 \vhich restrained 
action, allowing for gradual change. 
The work of the Founders is in large n1easure due to \Vhat Rus ell G. 
Fryer calls the ''consensual character of the ideological legacy of the 
Revolutionary Constitutional period." Fryer finds three distinctive tra-
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ditions in the political thought and history of the time which contrib-
uted to this underlying value consensus. These were the ideas of "natural 
law, natural rights and limited governn1ent," which "united the Found-
ers on the key issues of popular sovereignty and the virtues of limited 
governn1ent." 13 In large part, these ideas were contained in the common 
law tradition in evidence in virtually every colonial ordering document. 
The men themselves shared comn1on values; they "were men of the 
English and Scottish Enlightenment, not the French . . . [who] were 
closer to Hobbes than Rousseau." The Founders were well-educated 
men for their time whose "discourse was history ... with no more than 
five exceptions (and perhaps no more than three) they were orthodox 
members of one of the established Christian communions. " 14 In sum, 
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had substantial political 
experience as well as business and property holdings, and they were 
determined to draft a document which reflected the English common 
law tradition of limited government with a protection for individuals. 
The real constitution in America was not the paper document, but the 
whole constellation of customs and traditions that had formed in the two 
centuries of the colonial settlement and revolutionary experience. 
Three personalities, John Dickinson, James Madison, and John Taylor, 
are exen1plary of conservative attitudes during the founding period. John 
Dickinson (1732-1808), a Philadelphia lawyer who participated in most 
of the in1portant events of the time, wrote Letters From a Farmer in Penn-
sylvania. In his treatise, Dickinson said, "Experience must be our only 
guide ... reason may n1islead us." His conservative views held that the 
objective of government must be to free men so that they can choose 
their own ends, rather than allowing government to select ends for the 
populace. 15 J an1es Madison (1751-1836) is often placed outside the con-
servative tradition by writers. But Madison's conservative instincts are 
best illustrated in his strong preference for the separation and balancing 
of powers. He is the author of a renowned statement on the subject: "In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to 
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itsel£" 16 
Madison's acceptance of the Bill of Rights was born out of the necessity 
to compron1ise with the Anti-Federalists, not out of a conscious desire 
to plant the doctrine of "natural rights" in the document. John Taylor 
of Carolina (1753-1824) was a fierce Anti-Federalist who typified the 
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conservative southern planter. Taylor viewed the Constitution as an in-
strument to protect state power from don1ination by a central govern-
ment. Ideas of hierarchy, cotnn1unity, custon1, and religion pervade 
Taylor's writing. Taylor believed that adn1inistration of law, not the im-
position of an abstract vision of social justice, is the chief obligation of 
govemn1ent. 17 
The Federalists !Jersus Republicans Period 
The initial controversy under the Constitution resulted in the fonl1a-
tion of the first Arnerican political partie~. Thon1as Jefferson and jan1es 
Madison fom1ed the Den1ocratic-R.epublicans tn the 1790s to oppose 
Alexander Han1ilton and John Adan1s, who~e party was known as the 
Federalists. The quarrel bet\veen these parties encon1passed a great vari-
ety of i sues, but it began \Vith opposition to the financial policies devel-
oped by Ha1nilton and heated reactions to the events surrounding the 
French Revolution. The con~ervative-liberal debate is characterized by 
Russell Kirk: "The I"Z.epubhcans, Jefferson and Madison chief atnong 
then1 ... can1e to syrnpatht7e \Vlth French equalitarian theories. The1r 
opponents, the Federalists, appealed to the lesson of h1story, the legacy 
of British liberties, and the guarantees of pre~cnptive con titutions.'' 18 
The conservative ideas c11ne to be identified with the Federalist Party. 
John Adan1s (1735-1826), the nation's second president and author of 
Defense of Constitutions, was the n1ost significant of the Federalists. Rus-
sell Kirk identifies Adan1s a~ the ''founder of tn1e con ervatism in 
Atnerica." 19 Ronald Lora qualifies the Adan1s legacy by saying that 
Adan1s only agreed \Vith Edn1ltnd Burke on two is ue -the itnportance 
of property and hun1an inequality. Adan1s \vas not as firn1 a supporter of 
aristocracy as Burke; he favored a conventional balance between aristoc-
racy and democracy. But in his stands on property, constitution , and the 
dangers of the French Revolution, Adan1s \vas a true conservative. 
Alexander Han1ilton (1757-1804) was a conten1porary of Adams and 
an activist in the Federalist Party. Han1ilton's views on religion and order 
are strikingly sin1ilar to those of Burke. Han1ilton declared: "The at-
tempt by the rulers of a nation to destroy all religious opinion, and to 
pervert a whole nation to atheism, is a phenomenon of profligacy re-
served to consun1n1ate the infamy of the unprincipled reformers of 
France." He tied this disregard for religion to the breakdown of French 
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family ties and all order in that country, manifested in easy divorce, 
children testifying against their parents, and the frequent prescription of 
murder.20 
Hamiltonian conservatism deserves special attention, however, in that 
it differs in several key ways from traditional conservatism (i.e., that 
which was expressed by Burke and conforms to the basic views already 
discussed). Hamilton announced at a New York Convention in 1788, 
"But there is another object, equally important (as liberty), and which 
our enthusiasm rendered us (at the formation of our 'confederation') 
little capable of regarding ... I mean a principle of strength and stability 
in the organization of our government, and of vigor in its operation. " 21 
He was, of course, referring to a strong presidency (actually a monarchy) 
and a strong central government. Hamilton's economic ideas were also 
very different from traditional conservative beliefs in that he wanted 
strong government direction of the economy. Kirk calls Hamilton's eco-
nomic ideas those of mercantilism, a tenet of which was revealed in this 
statement by the first Secretary of the Treasury in the new United States, 
"to preserve the balance of trade in favor of a nation ought to be a 
leading aim of its policy. " 22 
Why did Hamilton have such different views on the power of the 
state and economic policy? While he held to many traditional conserva-
tive beliefs, such as a desire for slow, organic change, the importance of 
religion in social life, and a distrust of m~n's abilities to plan, his reason-
ing branched off in a different direction from traditional conservatism. 
Kirk's analysis of Hamilton is that "he believed that salvation from the 
consequence of leveling ideas lay in establishing invincible national 
authority .... (It] seems hardly to have occurred to Hamilton's mind 
that a consolidated nation might also be a leveling nation, though he 
had the example of Jacobin France before him; and he does not appear 
to have reflected upon the possibility that force in government may 
be applied to other purposes than the maintenance of a conservative 
order.''23 
Hamilton's brand of conservatism may be properly labeled authoritar-
ian conservatism. While the origin of authoritarian conservatism is gen-
erally traced to Joseph de Maistre (1753- 1821), authoritarian thought 
existed before Maistre much as traditional conservative beliefs existed 
before Burke. It was Maistre, however, who expressed authoritarian 
conservatism most clearly in response to the ideas of the Enlightenment 
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and the French R .. evolution. Maistre favored a strong central govern-
n1ent so fim1ly that he even declared the public executioner the very 
cornerstone of proper governn1ental power over the people: "All gran-
deur, all power, subordination re)tS on the executioner; he is the horror 
and the bond of hun1an association. "2 .J Peter Viereck describes the au-
thoritarian conservative as a "reactionary 'Ottantotist,' " referring to one 
who wants to go backward to better days in the past. Viereck considers 
authoritarian conservatives extren1e in their etnphasis upon authority as 
contrasted with the traditional or Burkean con"ervatives' en1phasis upon 
liberties.25 The prin1acy of political authority and the desire to n1ove 
backward in titne are at the heart of the difference between authoritarian 
and traditional con ervat1sn1. 
These differences are apparent \Vhen the conservatisn1 of Han1ilton is 
contrasted with that of Adan1s. Adan1s ·wanted to protect against "tyr-
anny," \Vhatever its cause, \vhether frotn n1onarch or den1ocracy (the 
n1ajority infringing upon n11nonty nghts). ""~(, Harnilton, by contrast, did 
not trust the people and de\Ired a linuted n1on<1rchy, a titled aric;tocracy, 
and govemn1ent direction of the econorny. He wanted to go back to the 
central authority of England. Fisher An1es, another Federalist leader, 
went so far in his indictn1ent of dernocracy to say, ''Our disease is de-
n1ocracy. It is not the skin that festers-our very bones are carrions, and 
their tnarrow blackens \vith gangrene. What rogues shall be fir t, IS of 
no n1on1ent-our republican1sn1 n1ust die and I'rn sorry for it. " 2., 
An1es believed that the ''detnocracy" of the French R .. evolution was 
an ideological threat to the ordered liberty 111 the United State . He 
believed that only an anstocracy of talent could sustain the ideal set 
forth in the Constitution. Though not \vell known today a a conserva-
tive leader, Fisher Arnes was the leader of the Federalists in the first four 
sessions of Congress and was instrun1ental in shaping the language of the 
First Amendment. His writings resonate \Vith great feeling about the 
principles of conservatism. 28 
The Pre- Civil War Period 
The election of Andrew Jackson to the presidency in 1828 marked 
the first major decline in conservative influence in American politics. 
While the previous contests between Federalists and Republicans wit-
nessed the election of tnen with liberal views, such as Thomas Jefferson, 
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the period was marked by a consensus on basic ideas. Jefferson himself 
saw the danger in "frequent and untried change," and believed in the 
importance of a natural aristocracy aware of the bad side of human na-
ture.29 Jacksonian democracy, by contrast, came to symbolize the grow-
ing sway of social and political equality in the United States. Jackson was 
from Tennessee (all previous presidents of the United States had been 
from Virginia or Massachusetts), and brought with him all the passions 
and impulses of frontier individualism. Gone were the aristocratic habits 
and traditions of the east; in their place were those of planters, farmers, 
mechanics, and laborers. 
This change of emphasis was not merely due to Jackson. His predeces-
sor, John Quincy Adams, whose conservative credentials were impecca-
ble, had come to believe that man could be improved by the workings 
of democracy. Jackson's party built victory from the bottom up rather 
than, as during the nation's founding period, from the top down. Jack-
son vetoed acts of Congress and declared himself a "Tribune of the 
People" whose responsibilities were superior to those ofCongress.30 The 
popular mood undermined conservative values of elite rule and tradi-
tional values. 
Still, there were important conservative thinkers during this decline 
of conservative thought. John Randolph (1773-1833) was one of the 
more important voices opposing the new egalitarianism. He thought 
Jackson's election meant that "the country is ruined past redemption ... 
it is ruined in the spirit and character of the people. " 31 While Randolph's 
words sound antidemocratic in retrospect, it was tyranny and govern-
ment "innovation" which he feared more than the policies of the new 
administration. 32 In a speech to the Virginia Constitutional Convention 
(1829-1830), Randolph spoke out against this tyranny, which he called 
"King Numbers." He felt that the Virginia Constitution did not need 
to be changed, particularly in the direction of expanding the electorate 
and majority rule. He stated that were he a young man who would have 
to live under the Constitution for a long time, he "would not live under 
King Numbers."33 
In his same speech at the Virginia Constitutional Convention, Ran-
dolph spoke out against governmental social programs. His argument 
was that such programs benefited their administrators more than the 
poor, and he said that he had several friends who had "amassed opulent 
fortunes: as administrators." Randolph spoke out against the prevailing 
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idea that "all things must be done for then1 [the people] by the govern-
ment. " 14 The need for Randolph to take such stands against n1ajoritarian 
power and increased goverruncnt shows the clear decline of conservative 
influence in goven1n1ent. 
It is fashionable an1ong historians to indict John C. Calhoun (1782-
1851) and his "doctrine of nullification" (which held that states could 
ignore or nullify an act of the central governn1ent) as a contnbuting 
factor to the breakdov1n of order before the Civil War. But Calhoun 
knew that tn1e nationali 111 sprang frotn a love of one's own regton. 
Calhoun \Vanted to preserve the southern heritage, but he feared the 
expansion of central govemn1ent as a threat to all areas of the nation. 
Both Peter Viereck and Russell Kuk attnbute great in1portance to Cal-
houn in the developn1ent of Atnencan conservatisn1 . .,., 
Calhoun stood fin11ly in f.:1vor of checks on n1ajorities and the 1dea of 
"concurrent tnajorities,'' as set up by the Constitution, to protect against 
the rnajoritarian tyranny that R.andolph, Adan1s, and other had feared. 
He recognized the fallacy that n1le b) ~itnple n1Jjonty \Vas rule by the 
people, and believed that the 11nportant question \vas ho\v to "vest the 
powers of the Governn1ent 1n the \\hole- tht? entire people-to n1ake 
it in truth and reality the Governtnent of the people Instead of Govern-
rnent of a dotninant over a subject part." His O\vn ans\ver \vas that thi 
could be accon1plished "by judicious and wise division and organization 
of the Governn1ent and cotnn1unity ... and the concurrence of all as 
the voice of the whole." '<> Calhoun stood for the republican re traints of 
the Constitution upon dernocracy as estabh hed by the Founders at a 
tin1e when nujority rule enjoyed strong support. He saw that tyranny of 
the rnajority could be just as iniquitous as tyranny of the 1ninority. 
The Civil War created a discrepancy .1pparent to Calhoun and other 
thinkers already discussed. Southern society was a stronghold of the con-
servative values of the i1nportance of fa1nily and con1n1unity, distrust of 
rapid change, and the importance of religious beliefs. Yet the South 
disrupted the national order by ren1oving itself fron1. the national gov-
ernment's authority in order to support the institution of slavery. This 
discrepancy causes some confusion about the conservative versus liberal 
leadership of that era. Although President Abraham Lincoln expanded 
presidential power (generally considered a liberal act), such an expansion 
was used to preserve the Union, an objective consistent with conserva-
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tive traditions. Once a stronger national power was in place, the nature 
of the Union was permanently changed. 
Conservative Literature and Jurists 
Some of the major conservative thinkers of this era were writers, 
rather than politicians or political philosophers. Orestes Brownson 
(1803-1876) personally symbolized the paradox of the Civil War. He 
supported the Union, but preferred southern society to the "gospel of 
material success" and "radical notions of human progress" prevalent in 
the North. He identified the Civil War as a struggle between "just au-
thority and anarchic impulses," not a battle of" democratic ideologues" 
against a "conservative society. " 37 
Brownson's religious past included association with Congregational-
ism, Presbyterianism, Universalism, socialism, atheism, and Unitarian-
ism, and culminated in Roman Catholicism. The logic of his seemingly 
convoluted path was a desire to locate religious authority with absolutes 
that required obedience. For Brownson, the belief in such absolutes was 
the foundation for a stable society. Should the nation obey the moral 
authority of the Roman Catholic Church, he believed, it would be free 
to pursue the common good rather than be divided by the fickleness of 
public opinion and the caprice of individual judgment. Brownson be-
came not only the leading cultural defender of Roman Catholicism in 
America during the 1800s, he also foreshadowed what would happen in 
the 1900s. Many prominent American conservatives since 1945 have 
been Roman Catholics or converts to Roman Catholicism. They have 
in common the conservative emphasis on religious order and social sta-
bility. 
Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804-1864) shared Brownson's skepticism 
about the claims of progress. According to Russell Kirk, Hawthorne 
"dwells almost wholly upon sin, its reality, nature, and consequences; 
the contemplation of sin is his obsession, his vocation, almost his life. 
Here he becomes a major preceptor of conservatives." Hawthorne dis-
trusted man's nature and believed in the importance of traditional values. 
He stood out against the transcendentalist view of the essential goodness 
of man, and he looked with affection on the past, with its conserving 
and molding forces. To Kirk, Hawthorne's writings develop a close rela-
tionship between the spiritual and the material: 
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Whenever n1an tries to ignore sin ... progress n1aterial and spiritual col-
lapses, and the reality of evil is i1npressed upon 111en's minds by terror and 
suffering. Only one species of refon11 really is worth attempting: reform 
of conscience. 38 
Jan1es Fenimore Cooper (1789-1851) was another writer who cham-
pioned the freedom and dignity of den1ocracy while at the sarne time 
warning that abstract ideals of equality and liberty were not attainable. 
In The American Democrat, Cooper en1phasizes the guiding role culture 
and continuity play in society, and the corresponding weaknesses of 
public opinion as a n1eans to control government excesses. Property 
rights, another conservative tenet, were very in1portant to Cooper. He 
believed that a dernocracy could only flourish if its leaders were gentle-
n1en; such designations were defined not prin1arily by wealth but by 
public spiritedness and prudence. 
The two leading jurists of the era, Jan1es Kent (1763-1847) and Jo-
seph Story (1779-1845), were conservatives whose influence extended 
through a generation of lawyers. Kent strongly defended such conserva-
tive legal tenets as con1n1on lavv, with its en1phasi on precedents: 
The reports of judicial decisiOns conta1n the most certain evidence, and 
the most authoritative and precise application of the n1les of con1mon 
law. . . . The evils resulting frorn an indigestible heap of laws, and legal 
authorities, are great and manifest. They destroy the certainty of the law, 
and promote litigation, delay and subtilty .... It would therefore be ex-
tremely inconvenient to the public, if precedents were not duly regarded 
and pretty irnplicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability of such 
rules, that professional men can give safe advice to those who consult 
them.39 
Also holding strongly to the common law tradition was Justice Joseph 
Story, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845. 
Story wrote the textbook of the day for America's legal profession, Com-
mentaries on the Constitution. Common law, to Story, "comprehends nat-
ural theology, moral philosophy, and political philosophy ... man's 
duties to God, to himself, to other men, and as a member of political 
society." Story rejected John Locke's theory of natural rights, a principal 
basis for claims by liberals for changes in the law. 40 
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Conclusion: Colonial Times to the Civil War 
It is clear from this discussion of early American conservatism that 
there are different types of conservatism. Religious conservatism was 
especially prevalent in the colonial period among the Puritans. Political 
conservatism made important contributions to the Constitutional Con-
vention and was in evidence in the general culture. Authoritarian con-
servatism manifested itself in the ideas of Alexander Hamilton, while 
social conservatism was characteristic of the American South. Of course, 
the traditional conservatism of Edmund Burke contained the tenets of 
religious, political and social conservatism in evidence elsewhere. 
The line of demarcation between conservatism and liberal thought is 
not always clear. For example, Thomas Jefferson held to some important 
conservative tenets even though he is considered a founder of liberal 
American thought. Similarly, James Madison has been labeled as a liberal, 
but careful analysis of his views reflects a significant strain of thought 
consistent with political conservatism, especially as it relates to ideas of 
republican government which restrict rapid change. Likewise, differ-
ences among conservatives are sometimes unclear. John Adams is consid-
ered the direct heir to Burkean conservatism, although, with respect to 
the importance of the aristocracy, Adams was in disagreement with 
Burke. Alexander Hamilton's authoritarian conservatism included a solid 
foundation in traditional conservatism's religious, political and social val-
ues. The conservative position on the Civil War was divided between 
southern conservatives who supported the South and northern conser-
vatives who saw the responsibility of preserving the Union. 
It is clear from this discussion that conservatism is more than political 
writings or stands on issues of public policy. The constellation of culture 
involves all the ideas, habits, values, prejudices and institutions which 
make up a society. The ideas of conservatism pervade much of literature. 
Works by Hawthorne, Cooper, Brownson, and many others emphasized 
the values of community, the legacy of the past and the individual's 
circumstances before God as important determinants of life. Conserva-
tism had a significant impact on American law through the influence of 
conservative jurists like Kent and Story. In their view, law had a religious 
and moral foundation which should conform to the heritage of custom 
and tradition embodied in common law. Christian religious values are 
central to the definition of conservatism. Roman Catholic converts have 
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been prominent an1ong spokesn1en for the movement as have conserva-
tive Protestants who stand in the tradition of the Puritans. Southern 
conservatism found expression in the writings of Taylor, Randolph and 
Calhoun. 
Conservatisn1 suffered a reversal during the Jacksonian era as the im-
portance of public opinion, an expanded electorate, and social equality 
grew. The decline in traditional attitudes was so severe that some conser-
vatives lamented the very passing of conservatisn1 as a belief systen1. At 
the end of the Civil War, southern conservatives believed their conserva-
tive crusade for state and con1n1unity rights was at an end. 
The Middle Era: The Civil War to the New Deal 
The Civil War left a searing scar on the pohtical system. Those who 
supported the Union becan1e, for generations, Republicans; those who 
supported the Confederacy, or who had opposed the war, became Denl-
ocrars. Conservatives in both parties caine to see the constant growth of 
the central govern1nent as a threat to the whole society. Millions of 
Europeans emigrated to the United States between 1880 and World War 
I, bringing with then1 different ideas such as Darwinisn1 and Marxisn1, 
and a variety of religious and political convictions. Catholics fron1 Po-
land, Italy, and Ireland, and Jews fron1 Russia and Eastern Europe sought 
a new start on An1erican shore . Their differing religious and social val-
ues were not easily accepted by established groups in American society. 
Liberalism, as a doctrine en1phasizing the full developn1ent of the in-
dividual free from the restraints of government, religion, and social con-
ventions, beca1ne a donunant force for action during these decades. The 
labor movement, advocates of the "Social Gospel," rnuckrakers, and 
progressive intellectuals all campaigned for social restructuring during 
this tin1e. Mainline Protestant denonunations, colleges, universities, and 
seminaries began to turn to the liberal theologies popular in Europe, 
while politically liberal presidents like Theodore Roosevelt and Wood-
row Wilson n1ade a major impact on American government and so-
ciety.41 
With change came an expansion in governn1ent power; this prompted 
a strong reaction in the writings of various conservatives. Russell Kirk 
said that he saw during this era "how easily an abstraction like capitalisn1 
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might succumb to another abstraction called Communism. " 42 The con-
servative temper of the times was one of reaction against the tide of alien 
ideas which threatened American institutions. After 1900, opposition to 
socialism became a benchmark belief among conservatives. Conserva-
tives do not like the abstract political and social philosophies of either 
the left or the right. In this section we examine the thinkers who stood 
against the support for expanded government. These writers are classi-
fied as follows: (1) critics of democracy; (2) New Humanists; (3) critics 
of progress; ( 4) Libertarians; and (5) miscellaneous critics. 
Critics of Democracy 
Both Henry Adams (1838-1918) and Brooks Adams (1848-1927) saw 
a danger in placing too much faith in the judgment of the common man. 
In this belief they echoed their ancestor, John Quincy Adams, whose 
suspicions of democracy were fueled by the admission of new states on 
the frontier. Henry Adams wrote in The Degradation of the Democratic 
Dogma (1920) that "at this particular juncture of human affairs the ten-
dency is very strong throughout the world to deify the democratic 
dogma, and to look to democracy to accomplish pretty promptly some 
approach to a millennium among men. " 43 His book Democracy (1908) 
is described by Russell Kirk as showing a "contempt for democratic 
corruption. ''44 
Brooks Adams's sense of fear of the overconfidence in democracy 
came from his conservative view of man. He stated that the country was 
in a "social war" because it "tried to ignore certain fundamental facts 
which are stronger than democratic theories." The nation should not 
expect too much from democracy because "the strongest of human pas-
sions are fear and greed. " 45 Some conservatives have discounted the 
Adams brothers because they grew virtually reactionary in their pessi-
mism about the world, in contrast to the guarded optimism and joy of 
accomplishment which characterizes traditional conservatism. Ronald 
Lora writes that Brooks Adams eventually came to believe the world was 
in complete chaos, while Henry Adams, based on his work of applying 
scientific ideas to philosophy, concluded that the world would end in 
inertia due to the Second Law of Thern1.odynamics. 46 
The increased confidence in democracy and in expanding the role of 
government (possibly leading to socialism) was also the concern of E. L. 
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Godkin (1831-1902). Godkin was the editor of The Nation, which is 
one of today's n1ost liberal n1agazines but at that time was a fountainhead 
of conservative capitalistic notions. Godkin believed that the basic prob-
letn of socialistn was its failure to consider costs. Improvements in soci-
ety were laudable, but the question was who would pay for then1. He 
compared socialisn1 to a n1an who decides to n1ove fron1 his "sn1all flat 
to a house on Fifth Avenue, for the good of the fan1ily; but, he had 
received no raise in his incorne. " 47 Godkin was uneasy about the degra-
dation of detnocracy and conden1ned "yellow journalism," which he 
believed fueled the ftan1e of tnass sentin1ent and unden11ined considered 
judgrnent. 
The New Humanists 
Two very in1portant conservative \Vriters of the tniddle era \Vere Ir-
ving Babbitt (1865-1933) and Paul Eln1er More (1867-1937). They 
called their beliefs "hun1anist," but it was not the hun1anisn1 of liberal-
isn1 and the Humanist A!an{{esto, \Vh1ch both vigorou ly opposed. As 
Babbitt describes it, "The hurnan1st exercise the \vill to refrain, but the 
end he has in view IS not the renunciation of the expansive desires but 
the subduing of thetn to the la\V of n1easure." He sa\v hurnanist belief a 
a third possible attitude to,vard life between a "pure traditionalist'' reli-
gious view and that of a "rnere tnodernist" like Rous eau. While Babbitt 
praised the virtues of religion, he sa\v hun1anist virtues as i1nilar but 
"n1ore accessible" than those of "the saint. " 4H Babbitt's idea of hurnan-
ism was not to deny the clain1s of religion in its own sphere; what he 
disputed was the necessity of deriving the non11s of justice solely frorn 
revelation.49 
Babbitt's beliefs were those of the traditional conservative in ahnost 
every area. He blan1ed Rousseau for the n1yth that tnan is good, a n1yth 
which conservatives agree has had serious consequences in the n1odern 
world. Babbitt also associated Rousseau with the utilitarian "glorifica-
tion of man's increasing control over the forces of nature under the 
name of progress. " 50 He praised Edn1und Burke's "realism" and "humil-
ity" (in submission to God), as opposed to Rousseau's nonunalisn1 and 
pride. 51 He also en1phasized the in1portance of duties that con1e with 
rights, as opposed to natural rights. 52 
Perhaps Irving Babbitt's greatest interest was in the area of education. 
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He said the educational system was heavily influenced by Rousseau, 
whose book Emile argues for the natural development of a child without 
societal barriers. As a result, the educational system viewed anything that 
set "bounds" as "prejudiced." Babbitt argued that what was needed was 
more, not less, discipline in schooling. He urged a "classical education" 
to teach people to live by standards, and he praised the order of classicism 
as opposed to romanticism. 53 Though a scholar and a Harvard professor, 
Babbitt scorned the ivory tower and the intellectual treason of professors 
who were lured by the muses of ideology away from the precincts of 
reality. 54 
Paul Elmer More, like Irving Babbitt, was an advocate of "classical 
education. " 55 More had a conservative view of man and warned of those 
who would change the institutions of government to "adapt them to 
the nature of man as he should be" and "relax the rigor of the law, in 
pity for the degree of injustice inherent in earthly life. " 56 He stood 
against the mood of economic equality of the time. In an essay dealing 
with the United Mine Workers' strike against John D. Rockefeller, he 
was angered that while the rights of the mine workers were voiced by 
journalists everywhere, Rockefeller's personal rights and property rights 
were voiced by no one. 57 More feared the results of insecure property, 
and said that it was "safer ... to err on the side of natural inequality 
than on the side of ideal justice. " 58 
In the eyes of Francis G. Wilson and Russell Kirk, More should be 
considered "the greatest of our intellectual conservatives" and the 
"greatest of American Critics." More's humanism gradually evolved 
until he converted to Christianity and became an orthodox Anglican. 
As an editor, an historian and a literary critic, he argued democracy, to 
be successful, had to be leavened with aristocracy; that private property 
is essential to national stability; and that our understanding of God and 
man depends upon our knowledge of the Incarnation. 59 
Critics of Progress 
The Progressive Movement began in America during the 1890s and 
continued un61 World War I. Most historians agree that it was a move-
ment of the urban middle-class to curb the worst excesses of industrial-
isn1, achieve humanitarian reforms, and democratize politics. But not 
everyone agreed with the critique of An1erican society in evidence 
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a1nong the progressives. George Santayana (1863-1952) said that the 
"ideal liberal" would say progress is "continued change for the better" 
in '\vhatever direction" a n1an wants to go. He notes, however, that the 
liberal would be displeased if people did not go toward "vast numbers, 
n1aterial complexity, 1noral unifonnity, and econo1nic interdependence" 
and he himself tried to turn the111 in that direction. 60 Santayana con-
tended that the liberal becon1es the refom1er who believes he knows 
what is best and right and allows no other authority to challenge him. 
The paradox of conten1porary liberalisn1, as foreseen by Santayana, is 
that it professes a faith in a "Will" which cannot allow any other source 
of authority, but at the san1e tirne denies the legiti1nacy of traditional 
institutions and beliefs in society. That is, the liberal is content with 
pluralisn1 so long as it does not challenge \.vhat he believes IS best and 
right. In the liberal scherne, the Institutions of society are usually the 
culprits inhibiting the just society. 
Santayana, a Harvard University professor of philosophy, said that a 
knowledge of the past, the arts, and hu1nan lin1itations were essential 
to produce proper individualisn1. The ind1vidualisn1 of n1ass society, he 
argued, is a false individuahsn1 ba()ed only upon economic incentives. 
Despite Santayana' critique of hberalisn1, he stood against many tradi-
tional values associated with conservatisn1. He criticized conservatives 
for "quashing free love" under linuts of ''vo\V " or "age" or "sex." He 
was also an atheist In religious belief. 61 
The Progressive Moven1ent \.Vas urban and n1iddle-class; the traditions 
and values of rural and snull-to\vn An1erica vvere scorned as backward 
and antiden1ocratic. In the n11ddle of all this "progress" a number of 
southerners vigorously defended their region. These included the self-
styled "Agrarians," an1ong then1 Allen Tate, Robert Penn Warren, and 
John Crowe Ranson1. The Agrarians, several of whon1 taught at Vander-
bilt University, denounced the corrosive effects of technology and mod-
ernism on the South. In I'll Take My Stand (1930) they asked their fellow 
southerners to take pride in the past and reject the onslaught of industri-
alism. The wellsprings of culture they argued, were local, and they re-
sented "culture poured in from the top. " 62 
The Libertarians 
Both Albert J. Nock (1870- 1945) and H. L. Mencken (1880-1956) 
contributed to conservative thought in An1erica. Mencken had what 
100 CHAPTER FIVE 
Ronald Lora calls a conservative "view of history." He did not trust man 
in "engineering a society compatible with human welfare."63 Mencken 
was critical of small-town values, and his philosophical base was more 
libertarian than conservative. Likewise Nock feared the threat of the 
state to the exercise of liberty. His book, Our Enemy the State, was a 
biting critique of the growth of government. "If we look beneath the 
surface of our public affairs," he maintained, "we can discern one funda-
mental fact, namely: a great redistribution of power between society 
and the State. " 64 Nock was an individualist who rejected any right of 
government to direct human affairs. 
While Nock and Mencken held conservative views about govern-
ment power, being wary of state planning, and desiring laissez-faire eco-
nomics, they clearly differed from traditional conservatism on important 
basic beliefs. Nock opposed the traditional conservative desire for order 
and held views of individual rights at odds with conservative views about 
responsibility to society. Mencken hated small-town, rural America, and 
once declared that the farmer did not belong to the human race and the 
South was ruled by "Baptist and Methodist barbarism. " 65 
What explains the glaring differences in the thought of these two men 
from that of traditional conservatism? Authoritarian conservatism begins 
with basic conservative beliefs-order, distrust of change, belief in tradi-
tional values-and branches in the direction of favoring state power to 
protect these beliefs. Libertarianism has an entirely different set of core 
beliefs which are based upon nineteenth-century liberalism. Those be-
liefs subordinate the order of a community to the desire for individuality 
and stress personal rights over personal responsibilities. Libertarians 
move away from state power to secure maximum liberty for the individ-
ual. Authoritarian conservatives are like traditional conservatives in their 
belief in established values, while libertarians are like traditional conser-
vatives in their desire for limited government. Traditional conservatives 
and libertarians, however, differ in the degree of their belief in limited 
government. Libertarians are extreme in their opposition to state power 
while traditional conservatives are more moderate in their opposition. 
Traditional conservatives are much more likely to accept some state 
power than are libertarians. 
Russell Kirk, in an article entitled "Libertarians: Chirping Sectaries," 
identifies practical areas where the libertarians' basic beliefs are opposed 
by traditional conservatives. He notes that libertarians want to reduce 
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the power of the state in all areas, including defense and police power. 66 
Because of their belief in "moral freedom" for the individual, libertarians 
see no problem with abortion. A true libertarian is not genuinely a con-
servative, as Kirk writes, although some conservatives n1ay use the name 
libertarian without full knowledge of its n1eaning. Indeed, libertarians 
see man as basically good-he needs to be free to achieve his goodness-
which is a belief of Rousseau and con1pletely contrary to traditional 
conservative canons. 67 
Miscellaneous Conservatit;e Critics 
The profound accornplishn1ents ofWestem civilization are the then1e 
of Agnes Repplier (1855-1950). Few writers could n1atch her insight 
into the nature of the differences between liberalistn and conservatisn1. A 
writer and critic over several decades, Reppher observed, "The sanguine 
assurance that n1en and nations can be legislated into goodness, that pres-
sure from without is equivalent to 1noral change frorn \Vithin, needs a 
strong backing of inexpenence. " 68 Repplier was not in1pressed with the 
hopes of the new century and <>aw the protnises of socialisrn as ernpty. 
Willian1 Graha1n Sun1ner (1840- 191 0) \Vas a contributor to the con-
servative cause who defied easy classification. Sun1ner was a disciple of 
Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. Spencer had introduced the con-
cept of evolution into political and social speculations, and held that the 
same basic law of growth and evolution pervaded the physical, anin1al 
and hun1an worlds. For hi1n, the state should not promote religion, reg-
ulate trade and commerce, encourage colonization, aid the poor, or en-
force sanitary conditions. Sun1ner defended the free n1arket from the 
perspective of individual liberty. He opposed interference by the gov-
ernment in the economy. He liked neither the welfare state nor the 
elitist state controlled by large corporations. 69 
Conclusion: The Middle Era 
The Progressive Moven1ent, with its en1phasis on governmental re-
form and pluralis1n, represents a nadir for conservative thought. Particu-
larly in the early years of the century, urbanization and immigration 
issues minimized the appeal of conservative solutions. Yet, there were 
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some noteworthy changes occurred in this rime period that are still being 
felt today. 
First, the era produced two new typec; of conservatives, the hun1anists, 
who accepted imperfect ideals, and the libertarians, who embraced indi-
vidualisnl. Second, the rise of libertarian thought Increased the tension 
between traditional conservatives and libertarians. Thtrd, the era pro-
duced some first-rate, 1flonely, voicec; In defense of conservatisn1. More, 
Godkin, Mencken and Babbitt \Vere ~1ble to conunand the attention 
of intellectuals and ebtec; Interested In dtfferent c;olut1ons to Arnerican 
problen1s. Fourth, rnuch of the wnting of the era was a reaction to the 
ascendance of bberahsn1 and progre stve tdeac;. The Adan1s brother and 
Godkin, to take just t\vo exan1ples, \Vere clearly \Vntlng as critics of the 
new values In society- ec;peCially the value of accepting governn1ent 
solutions to social problernc;. 
The Modern Era: The New Deal to the Present 
Industrialization follo\vtng the Civil War brought a n1ajor change in 
American conservarisn1. Conservatives etnbraced Lusc;ez-faire econonl-
ics, believing that an econon11c systen1 that operated free of government 
control was the only suitable alternative for Arnenca. In short, conserva-
tism became the ideology of the ncltlon's business clas ' and its views 
were dominant during the 1920s. But the Great l)epre s1on of the 1930s 
ended America's romance With conservatistn. It brought about the elec-
tion of Franklin Roosevelt and the beginning of the Nevv Deal with its 
numerous state welfare progran1s. 
Conservative values becarne inappropriate as the support for govern-
ment intervention in society increased through the New Deal, Fair Deal, 
New Frontier and Great Society. As the national government began to 
intervene in n1any areas previously left to local con1n1unities and as liber-
alism became an accepted part of An1erican life, conservatives responded 
with ideas critical of government policies. Gradually, as cracks appeared 
in the liberal assumptions guiding government expansion, conservative 
writers gained a wider and, by 1980, very substantial audience. The 
principal voices came from five types of conservatives: (1) traditionalists; 
(2) economic conservatives; (3) anticon1n1unist conservatives; ( 4) neo-
conservatives; and (5) classical conservatives. 
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Traditional Consen,ati11es 
The best known and n1ost Influential of the traditionalists are Russell 
Kirk and Peter Viereck, who pioneered the ree1nergence of traditional 
conservative thought. Kirk IS one of the 1nost, 1f not the n1ost, prolific 
writers of the 111oden1 era. Much of the kno\vledge of conservative 
thought is traceable to his pen. l-Ie IS the author of son1e t\vent:y books, 
several edited JOUrnals, and nun1erou" JOUrnal arttcleli. Trad1t1onal con-
servatisn1 as defined by Ktrk bknch econotntc, pohttcal, rehg:tous, and 
social conservattlinL 
George H. Na<:..h sav<:.. of Ktrk's The Consematiuc .\!111d that "here, at 
long last, vvas ;l geneologv of good n1en and valuable thoughts. " 70 The 
in1portance of Kirk's book LHH10t be overestirnated; It 15 no\v in its 
seventh edition and ha.., ..,en ed a.., a gut de for nuxnerous con<:..ervative 
writers and co1nn1entators. One of the n1a1n task. f.1ci ng con ... en·.lti:-;n1 's 
adherents dunng the decline of con..,erv.ltive thought \Va to den1onstr.1te 
a viable tradttion in An1enc.1n poltttcll histol) .1 ... an alternative vi -ion to 
a cendant hberal 1de.1s. Ktrk dtd tht.., 111 .1 convmCing way. 7 1 
I~ussell Kirk IS a true traditiorul con.serv.1ttve. He tr.1ce.s the root.., of 
con ervative thought to Ednnmd Burkt: and generally agrees \\ tth Burke 
on the fundan1entals of con<:..en'.ltisnL I nduded .1n1ong hts tenets .ue op-
position to pohncal centrahz.1t1on, the bchef th.lt d1 v1ne Intent rule\ soci-
ety, a distn1st of change, and the defcn5e of pnvate property . ., 
Peter Viereck, although not agreetng \Vlth Ktrk on all pomts, mu ... t 
generally be classtfied as a trachnonah t .1s \vdl. H1s de\Jre tor tr.1d1tton.1l 
values, en1phas1 on the need for education to "lin11t the 1nsnncts of 
behavior," and trong anticon1I11UI1I\t ..,t.1nd tn,nk hin1 \Ylth the traditiOn-
alist label.71 Viereck's Conscruatism Rer,zsited (1949) \Va one of the t\\ o 
or three n1ost 1n1portant consen'atlve books that <:..parked rene\ved Inter-
est in conservat1sn1. 
Where son1e conservatives part con1pany \Vith VIereck 1s 1n his atti-
tude toward liberalisn1. While son1e conservatives would vie\v liberal 
thought as dangerously near con1n1unisn1, Viereck believe that conser-
vatives and liberals should unite, despite their in1portant difference , 
against radicalisn1-defined as con1n1unisn1 and fascisn1. 7 1 Mutual self-
protection and a co1nn1on agreen1ent on the principles and procedures 
of American governn1ent pron1pt this proffered alliance. 
Viereck also leans toward the liberal view of governn1ent social action 
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and speaks harshly of laissez-faire econon1ics. He contends there is "no 
substantial n1oral objection'' to being against laissez-faire economics; he 
believes that hun1an co1npassion is a higher goal than the preference of 
n1ore to less. The problen1, as Viereck sees it, con1es when "reforms 
cross a line beyond vvh1ch \velfare lavvs are inflated into the welfare 
superstate. " 75 His acceptance of aspects of the \velf:1re state has resulted 
in criticisn1 ofViereck by son1e conservatives, but his ideas have had an 
important in1pact on postvvar con ervatisn1. A conten1porary writer who 
shares Viereck's ideas about the \velfare state is George F. Will. In State-
craft as Soulcrajt 1 Will argues that a certain an1ount of welfare is necessary 
for creating and 1naintaining social ham1ony and social stability.76 
Perhaps Viereck's crittque of 1nodem conscrvatisn1 is his most inter-
esting contribution, or at least the one that sparkc; the n1ost resistance. In 
an additional section of the 1962 edition of Conscn,atism Revisited, he 
clain1s that the n1ajor problen1 of the conten1porary conservative move-
ment is a "rootless nostalgJa for roots," and a "drean1 of aristocratic, 
agrarian restoration." Modern conservatives. he argue·, have "stereo-
typed" rather than "organically gro\vn '' values. He also blasts "Old 
Guard Republicans" as well as Russell Kirk and Barry Goldwater. Vier-
eck is angered by conservatives who n1ake people "feel ashan1ed of gen-
erous social in1pulses"; he is critical of Kirk for failing to oppose 
McCarthyisn1 and judges Gold\vater as an "enen1y of social reform. " 78 
The National Review, founded by Williaxn F. Buckley, Jr., has pub-
lished articles over the years by abnost every leading conservative regard-
less of type, including son1e with libertarian econon1ic tendencies, such 
as Frank Meyer and Frank Chodorov. While Buckley n1ay be more 
properly classified as a traditional conservative, his n1agazine has served 
the interests of trying to unite traditional, economic (including libertar-
ian), and anticomn1unist conservatives. Frank Meyer probably became 
the leading proponent of such an alliance when he published his book 
The Conservative Mainstream in 1969. 
As for Buckley himself, he has written on an array of conservative 
subjects that cross the traditionalist, economic, and anticommunist tend-
encies. For example, upon graduation from Yale he wrote God and Man 
at Yale: The Superstitutions of Academic Freedom (1951). He said the "phi-
losophy of free enterprise, private property, and limited government" 
was "dying at Yale, and without a fight." Buckley also lamented the loss 
of Yale's original concern with religious beliefs, as evidenced by the 
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book's title. This, his first book, set the c;tage for n1ost of his long list of 
books on conservatisn1. 79 
Buckley has becon1e a fixture on television and the An1erican cultural 
landscape through hts artJcles tn the National R£ t iew and his weekly tele-
vision show "Firing Line." Hts greatest serv1Ce to con<;crvatisn1 has been 
orchestrating a ntnnber of bnllant but diverse n11nds 1nto a coherent 
chorus of pohtlcal Ideas: "Through the force of his personality and his 
ability to find a \vorkablc center, Buckley helped to hold the n1ovctnent 
together and \Veld It into .1 fonnidablc 1nAuence in the national de-
bate. "~0 
Economrc Conseruati11cs 
Since pubbcat1on of r=nednch A. von Hayek's The Road to crfdonr 
(1944), econon11c con~erv,lt!ves have also lud Internal disagreetnent-;. 
Although pubhshed u1 Great Britain, Hayek's book received little atten-
tion because the "question of frccdo1n versus planning" \Vas already 
resolved there. Uut 1n the United tares, it :-~p.1rked t,rre. t interest s1nce 
enthusiasn1 for govcn1n1ent interventiOn in the econon1v \\ J\ the centr.1l 
~ . 
issue of pohttcal thsc.our;e. I-hs thesis that "pbnning leads to dictator-
ship" stirred tnuch Intere t and .1rouscd con~:~tderable ~:~upport in the 
United States." 
Hayek 1s one of a host of economist.;, a...,so<.i.1ted \Vith the "Au .... tnan 
School" of econotnic thought. Proponents of this school of thought 
usually c1te Lud\vlg von fv1I.;es (1 H81-l973) .1 .... a prophetic figure in their 
thinking. The Austrian\ hold that the econorny is not .1 n1achine \Vith 
predictable n1ov1ng parts, but a host of Ind1v1du.lls rnaking choices in 
n1arkets of uncertainty. They critique Keynesian econonnc by arguing 
that no centralized governnH?nt bureaucracy can h<n·e sufficient kno\vl-
edge to regulate the econon1y. Mt"e" \vas also a finn proponent of the 
gold standard and a stable n1oney supplv. 
Whether or not Hayek \Vas a hbertarian, like n1any in the Austrian 
School, is still debated, but the n1ove1nent h1s writing helped start could 
not avoid the debate about ho\v f..1r the conservative econon1ic position 
should be taken. The n1ore n1oder.1te conservative economic posttion i 
illustrated in the writings of such individuals as Milton Friedtnan and 
George Gilder. 82 Unlike the n1ore radical libertarians, Friedn1an and 
Gilder do not advocate the general cessation of govemrnent Involve-
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ment in the econon1y. l~ather, their argutnents concern the types of 
progran1s and policies that should be tnaintained. Friedrnan and the Chi-
cago School of econotnists are n1onetansts in econotnic policy. While 
they oppose tnany governtnent progran1s, their opposition is not neces-
sarily to governn1ent progran1s per se. 
The libertarian n1ove1nent O\ves sotne post\var respectability to Mur-
ray Rothbard, \vho criticized traditional conservatives for thetr rnoderate 
stands on con1n1unisn1. l~othbard advocated radical libertarian positions 
like private police departn1ents and a pnv,lte national defense as well as 
legalization of tnarijuana and abolition of VICt11nle"'s cnn1es. Rothbard 
took the position that "the U m ted States \vas )Olely at f.1ult In the Cold 
War, and R.uss1a \Vas the aggriev~d partY. "H 
Atzticommunisr Conscrua t i ucs 
Anticon1n1unist conscrvatisn1 deserves tnention here becau e of the 
significant role it played 1r1 the revival of conservative thought in the 
early 1980s. Many of the anticon1n1untst conservatives had actually been 
comn1un1sts or con1111Unist-syn1patluzcr\, but turned frotn con1n1unisrn 
when it produced the terror of J oscph Stalin tnstead of a more perfect 
society. For exan1ple, Jllnes Bun1han1 broke \VIth the Trotskyites and 
wrote The StrHc.(!J!.Ie for the f,Vorld (1954), 'Tire Comin.R Defeat of Communism 
(1950), and Containment or Libcratio11 (1953). 
One of the n1ost itnportant anttcon1n1un1st conservatives \vas Whitta-
ker Chatnbers, who was an editor \Vith Time n1agaztne. Chan1bers had 
dropped out of Colutnbia University before graduating to becon1e a 
radical, so1netin1es ron1antic social refonner. He joined the Comn1unist 
Party and becarne an underground agent. When news of the Stalin 
purges surfaced, Chan1bers turned Into ,1 governn1ent witness to nan1e 
comn1unist spies. His test1n1ony that State l)epartnlent official Alger Hiss 
was a comn1unist helped lead to the conviction of Hiss and the polariza-
tion of the nation as to the extent of con1n1unist involvernent in Atneri-
can affairs. President Trun1an and Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
supported Hiss, while an array of conservatives supported Chatnbers. 
Chambers's book Witness (1952) becarne the principal rallying cry of 
anticon1munist conservatives. Peter Viereck also contributed to the 
anticommunist literature with his Shame and Glory of Intellectuals (1953), 
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which indicted pron1inent thinkers for recogniztng the Nazi danger but 
ignoring the con1n1unist threat. 
The Senate con1111ittee hearings chaired by Joseph McCarthy greatly 
affected conservatisn1, In son1e ways polariztng the n1oven1ent with ref-
erence to different values. Wil1ian1 F. Buckley, Jr. and L. Brent Bozell 
supported McCarthy tn 1\fcCarthy and Hi~ Enemie5 (1954), but Peter 
Viereck satd McCarthy atdcd con1n1untsn1 by the n1anner of his attacks. 
Wilhan1 A. l~usher said the liberals used McCarthy as the target of a 
counterattack for the Htss case, but Will Herberg asserted that McCar-
thy's actions vvere those of "trre~ponstble tnass-den1occ1cy. " 8 ' Despite 
McCarthy and the diVISIOn he c1used, n1ost conservatives generally 
united in thetr oppos1t1on to con1tnumsn1 and its associated fon11s of 
socialist policy. 
Neoconscn,atism 
The baste charactensttc of those \Vho br.1nd then1selves as neoconser-
vatives IS thctr e,1rher belief in ltber.1l policies and even their support for 
con1n1untsn1. Daniel Patrick Movnihan. ,1 neoconservative, stated in a -
speech before the nation.1l board of Atnericans for Den1ocr.1tic Action 
in 1967 that "Ltberals n1ust see n1ore cle.1rlv that thetr essential Interest 
' 
is in the stability of the social order" and n1U'\t "divest then1seh-es of the 
notion that the natton ... cu1 be run fron1 agenCie~ In Washtngton. "H:, 
Other neoconservcltlves Include D.lniel Bell. Nathan Glazer. Jan1es Q. 
Wilson, and Ed\vard Banfield. Perh.1ps the best-kno\vn neocon~ervat1ve 
is Irving Knstol. \vho, \Vlth Daniel Uell. founded the highly regarded 
neoconservative JOurnal, The P11hl/( Interest. 
Russell Kirk considers neocon'-lervattvel\ to be conserv.lttves, but tnany 
neoconservatives reject the bbel. While they have trachnonal con~erva­
tive values, son1e neoconservatives still have old liberal ties. lrvtng Kri -
tol, to take the best-kno\vn exatnple, supports censorship to n1a1ntain 
the quality of life in society. 8(' He praises the laissez-faire idea of the 
Wealth of Nations because with the necessity of property ownership, "hb-
erty [is] practically inevitable. " 87 Knstol also criticizes the State l)epart-
ment for not placing a prin1ary itnportance upon protecting the national 
interest and speaks against the way the United States has allowed itself 
to be "blackmailed" by other countries. 88 The neoconservatives have 
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given a distinct and in1portant critique of Arnerican intellectual and so-
cial life. 
Classical Conservatives 
Although they hold n1any of the sarne beliefs as traditional conserva-
tives, classical conservative' look to a chfferent traditton as the fountain-
head of Western culture. Leo Strauss (1 899-1973) \vas the best-known 
proponent of c1assical conservatisn1, finc:ltng the values for culture in the 
writings of Plato and Anstotle. At the Urnverc;tty of Chicago Strauss 
taught n1any students the classical or ':>trausstan fonn of conservat1sn1. 
Strauss's affection for classical Gret: k pohncal phdosophy \vas the dis-
tinctive characteric;t1c of hrs \vork. The \Vritings of the anctents always 
sought to discover the right \vay of life. 1 he search for the good or best 
society based on tndtvidual character, "on rnent, on hun1an excellence, 
on 'virtue' " \Vas the n1ost laudable a<.;pcc t of Plato's \vriting. 8') Unlike 
the modern phtlosophtes of Marxisrn and even hberahsn1, classical phi-
losophy never accepted that evtl could be eradicated fron1 the face of 
the earth, so its n1ood \\aS one of an acceptance of reality as it pre ented 
itself. 
Eric Voegelin (1901-19H5) \Vas another stgruficant figure \vho found 
serious problems with the way pobtrcs \Va~ betng studted at the end of 
the twentieth century. In his cla sic \VOrk The [\leu' cience of Policies, 
Voegelin showed the inadequacy of the positivtst doctrines of the disci-
pline.90 He presented an alternative vte\v of the study of politics in his 
multivolume work Order a11d Histoty 'Jl 
Voegelin develops a theory of n1an as transcendental, that is, n1an 's 
humanity is defined by a love of and loyalty to transcendental values. 
For Voegelin, man's fundan1ental existence n1ay be known fron1 within. 
Any atten1pt to confine knowledge to an externaliztng perspective-to 
step outside existence and conten1plate it with neutrality as n1odern po-
litical science atte1npts- falsifies both knowledge and the reality known. 
Man is inevitably a limited knower and he can never know things with 
certainty; his only confidence con1es from faith-the trust that reality 
as a whole is transcendentally ordered. Voegelin's constant appeal is to 
experience, because hun1an experience is the only sure reality. 
In Voegelin's writings human beings constantly long for what they 
cannot have, something beyond the finite: "This is the experience that 
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Voegehn c.1lls the tenston of existence, a state of tending or longing 
tovv.1rd \Vhat ltes be) ond all the itnperfections of lirnited existence, be-
yond knowledge of p.lrtic ulars to\vard the tn1e a~ such, beyond particular 
enjoytnents toward the good ,1s such. " 9 ., M.1n 's desire for certainty is 
understandable, but his .lttr.lC t1on to utoptas which offer certainty or 
even a calculable probability of certainty ts dangerous. In Voegelin 's 
thought, f.11th, hope, and love are as basic to kno\ving as reason . The 
<;ean h for kno\vledge is really an t: nrichn1ent of the soul as it surrenders 
and h11ves Itself to the love of God. 
The n1~lJOr unport.ulCe of Voegelin's contribution is hi~ articulation of 
theoretical pnncipks .1nd his fr.llllC\Vork for ~ tudying politics. In 1nany 
\vay\ he defie" political classific.Hion \till, his attraction to order. tran-
scendence, and the li1nits of 111,111 1nake him .1 futH.i:11nental con. ervative 
scholar. 
Conclusion: The 1\ lodcm E111 
In a book-len~th biblio~raphy of t\tneric.1n con~erv.lttve thought. 
Gresron Wolfe li~t fiftv con~trvatives of the n1odern c.:r.1.93 \ . hile cer-o J 
tatnlv not an exhaustive list. Wolfe s is .u1 instructive list. ontent analv-
, J 
s1s of Wolfe\ verv brief biogr.1phical statt: tnenc c1bout the fifty 
conservatl\ es ) tdds the tollo\ving conclu ion" 
Ftr)t, tracbtlotul conservatives constitute b\ t~1r the large...,t bloc \Vith 
t\Vellty-etght proponent" Econotnic con~ervatives con...,tttute the next 
large...,t bloc \\ tth ten. Anttcon1n1unist conservatt\ e" ,ue next \Vith \IX. 
Neocon~ervattves and cl.bstcal con~erv.lttves ntunber three each. Of 
the~e fift\, alinost all have etther an .1c.1den11c or a JOUnl.lh\tlC back-
ground. Within thetr acadetnic backgroutH.h. the dt\CiplirH~..., represented 
are econon11cs, Engh .... h. ht...,torv, philo...,ophv. political science, Jnd sonol-
ogy. T\velve tnetnbers of the list .1re fanner conlnHHltsts. "ocialt...,h. or 
strong syn1path1zers \Vlth a leftist c1use 
The ideas of tradttton and continuit\' ,1s \vdl .1s rehgtous .luthont\ are 
in1portant to all these \Vnters. ~c.lttered .1n1ong the ltst are a stgn1ficant 
nun1ber of H .. on1an Catholics: Ore"te\ Bro\vnson, \vho \Vas a pron11nent 
conservative trl the years before the Ctvil War, and rnore recent tl11nkers 
like R.ussdl Kirk, Frank Meyer, and Willtnoore Kendall. There are .1ho 
a nun1ber of protninent Jews assoct,lted \Vtth conservat1sn1, espeCially 
atnong the neoconservatives, \Vlth Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer and 
110 CHAPTER FIVE 
Norman Podhoretz being perhap the best-known examples. Three in-
dividuals on the list represent the southern tradition. Generally omitted 
from Wolfe's biographical sun11naries are persons of the evangelical or 
conservative Protestant background. This is understandable, since only 
in recent years has n1uch effort been nude to articulate a conservative 
political position an1ong this group of Protestants. 
Second, of the five groups of conservatives we have discussed in the 
n1odem era, three repre<;ent ne\v additions to the evolution of conserva-
tive thought. They are the antlcon1n1unist, classical, and neoconservative 
categories. Such additions reflect the f:1ct that conservatisn1 is not a stag-
nant body of beliefs, divorced fron1 culture and the infusion of new 
blood. The triun1ph of conservative pohncians In the 1980s shows that 
the past ren1ains a v1 brant guide to the future. 
Third, conservatisn1, like n1ost n1oven1ent , produces ten ions. In the 
tnodem era, there have been )everal 1111portant clashes: ( 1) whether lib-
ertarianisn1 or son1e part of It n1:1y rightfully be considered as a legitimate 
part of the Atnerican conservative tradition: (2) \Vhether Senator Mc-
Carthy's tactics should be defended by the conservative rnovement; (3) 
whether neoconservatisn1 should be mcorporated Into the conservative 
tradition; and (4) \vhether sotne portion of the \velf:1re tate should be 
justified on the grounds that it enhances octal hannony and societal 
stability even though it also Increases the role of govemtnent in society. 
Fourth, within the tnodern conservative tradition, it i. probably safe 
to say that the anticon1n1un1 t elernent is no longer as strong as it once 
was, and that the evangelical and conservative Protestant cornponent is 
not as strong as it will becon1e. In recent years, there has emerged a 
populist conservatisrn of Protestants and Cathohcs united in their views 
of n1orality, school prayer, and abortion. The n1ore radical libertarian 
mode of conservatisn1 has n1oved outside the nuinstrean1 of conserva-
tism, while the 1nore n1oderate libertarians have ren1ained within it. 
Conservatisn1 began outside the n1ainstrean1 of An1erican thought 
during the modern era. While it very successfully penetrated public con-
sciousness in the political reahn, it still remains outside the mainstream 
of academic and scholarly thought. Conservatisn1 has developed its own 
publishing houses, magazines, and scholarly journals to compensate for 
being left out of mainstrean1 publications. Gregory Wolfe lists sixty con-
servative journals and periodicals, most of which have come into exis-
tence during the modern era.94 
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Conclusion 
Conservatisn1 played a major role during the founding period of the 
country. The Federalist en1phasis on the sanctity of private property and 
distn1st of unchecked popular rule gave rise to the two-party systein. 
With the expansion of the frontier and the adn1ission of new states to the 
union, strong den1ocratic and populist forces resulted 1n an expandtng 
electorate which, in tun1, led to a retreat fron1 conc;,ervative tdeals. 
The Civil War divorced southen1 tradtttonahsts fron1 the tnainc;trearn 
of American intellectual life , but the 1ndustnal revolution gave nse to 
the popularity of conservative tdcas like latc;scz-f:un: econotnics, indtvtd-
ualism, and social Darwinio;n1. Conservatives tdenttfied \Vith the govem-
n1ent role to promote a he<1lthy econon11c environxnent for n1arket 
exchanges during the tin1e of \Vl'St\vard expansion. Urban in1n1igranon 
gave rise to a growing hberal n1oven1ent of soC1al and economic refonn 
known as progres ivisrn. Progressive ..,upported goven11nent progran1s 
to ease the problen1s of mdustn.lhzatton, while conservatives fc1vored a 
restricted role for governtnent. 
Progressives achieved their IlltlJOr succe.:;ses 111 the early part of the 
twentieth century. Laisscz-f:·ure econon11cs \\as aga1n don11nant dunng 
the 1920s, but the Great Depresston ended the dorninJnce of con ... erva-
tism. Roosevelt's Ne\v De.1l took the concerns of populists and probrre5-
sives a tep further than they had ever unag1ned. In the post\var era 
conservatisn1 was characterized more by it anncon1n1un1st rhetoric than 
its economic agenda. The ratnpant inflation of the 1970s led to a d1stn1 t 
of established liberal solutions. R.onald R.eJgan \V,l\ the first genuinely 
conservative president since the 1920s. 
The conservatisn1 of the recent era 1s no longer u<;piciou of the 
masses. It accepts son1e governn1ent role 111 the econorny a· inevitable, 
but it still stresses private solutions and a <;trong defense policy. Con er-
vatives believe there should be reduced govemn1ent spending on sooal 
programs, revamped tax policies to encourage econon1ic growth, and 
limited action by govemn1ent to redress racial and gender inequalitie . 
The stress of conservatistn is the creation, not redistribution, of wealth. 
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CHAPTEI~ SIX 
The CompetinC Conservative 
Traditions 1n America 
All at Otla', nothitl<{! seemed certain i11 the mot•cmcnt,· c~( the 
spl1crcs. . . At the hcS;?innin.c.? cif the 1920s the belief h<:s;m1 
to rirmlatc, fiH tlzcjirst wnc at a populm let cl, tl11lt there were 
no lotl.{?Cr flll}' absolutes: c?.f time and spare, t{{!ood and cr11"/. 
of knowlcl{(!c, abot•e all cift•tzlllc. 
Pt\Ul JC II SON 
The begtnning of t\\ cntieth-century thinking, according to Paul Johnson in hi-; book 1\!odcm Ti111cs, i~ found in the phra~e "every-
thing IS relative and there are no absolutes." Albert Einstein's principle 
of relativity held that "the tot<1lity of phy ... t<..ll pheno1nena 1~ of such a 
character that 1t gtve'\ no ba\1\ for the Introduction of the concept of 
'absolute n1ot1on'; or, c;,horter but lee;.., pn..·u ... e: There Is no absolute rno-
tion. " 2 Frotn Einstein\ prenu ... e It \\ .1s .1rgucd tlut good .1nd ev1L nght 
and \vrong, and trad1t1on.ll nottons ot n1oral beh.1v1or ''ere a, rebtive 
and subject to Interpret.ltiOn a'\ the expan ... e of the physicll umverse. 
While Ein tein hunselfbeheYed pass1on.1teh m ab ... olute nght and \\Tong 
and detested the n1oral relatn I\111 .lttnbuted to his theory, the legacy 
of his scientific research \va-; that "alue should ch.1nge to fit cultural 
conventions. 3 
Soon the ideals of relativity becan1e a part of everyday life. Populariz-
ers mistakenly took the "relat1v1ty" of space, tirne and length 111 the 
natural realm, for "relativisn1" in n1oral la\V. The nineteenth century 
witnessed the clin1ax of the Judeo-Chn tian philo ophy of per anal re-
sponsibility-that each individual vva accountable for their action . In 
the twentieth century the individual conscience \vas eared; existential 
angst and personal despair characterized thinktng and the state began to 
swallow up the independence of the person. 
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The earlier confidence in tnan vanished on twentieth-century battle-
fields. Barbara Tuchn1an, in her book The Grms ~f August, describes a 
poet in Belgiun1 who, before 1914, vVa<; a dedicated socialist and human-
itarian, one whose artistic work ain1ed at erasing national differences in 
Europe. After witnessing the carnage of \Varin his native land, he pref-
aced his next volun1e of ver<;e \Vith the<ie '\VOrds: "He '\vho writes this 
book in which hate IS not htdden \Va~ fonnerly a pacifist ... for hin1 no 
disillusionn1ent was ever greater or n1ore sudden ... he dedicates these 
pages with en1otion, to the n1an he used to be.'' 1 The poignant testi-
nlony of this poet capture<; the n1ood of an ent1re generation, vvho wit-
nessed conferences on universal dtsann ~unent only to later see nations 
rnobilize n1ore than 58 tnillion troops for battle. T\ventieth-century 
hopelessnes could be dedic,lted- like the verse of the Belgian poet-to 
the ideals that used to be. 
With the en1ergence of n1ass destntction, the role of politiCs and be-
havior by the state exp.1nded, and a corresponding ~lith in the Individual 
diminic;;hed. In the t\ventieth century the follo\ving beliefs gatned n1uch 
currency: (1) that n1an evolved fron1 aninlals through natural processes; 
(2) that there IS no God; (3) that governtnental authonty nuy in1pose its 
will on the Individual; and (4) that there is no absolute nght and wrong. 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn in hts Harvard University conu11encen1ent ad-
dress said, "The West kept advanct ng sooally In accordance with its 
proclaimed intentions. And all of a sudden It found itself in its present 
state of weakness." The past was ignored, and the n1ention of ab clute 
values stamped one as uninfon11ed about the n1odern sttuation. Solzhen-
itsyn attributed the new thtnktng to the liberal ethtc, with its faith in 
reason and change. He tndtcted It for undennin1ng proven traditional 
values in three significant ways. 
First, an excess of freedon1 that has led to hutnan decadence and irre-
sponsibility, Including pornography and violence, is undennining such 
institutions as the family, home, school, neighborhood, and conu11unity 
upon which a democratic society depends for stability. Second, Solzhen-
itsyn argued, the demise of An1erican den1ocracy has occurred gradually; 
reformers and government officials erroneously think that refonning 
economic, political, and social systen1s and governn1ent policies will 
stem the tide of decay. Third, the early den1ocracies, such as An1erica, 
were based upon a religious value-n1an's accountability and responsi-
bility to God-which has been largely forgotten in recent years. 6 
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The unbounded den1ands of welfare-state liberahsn1 led to a freedom 
fron1 the restraints of con1n1un1ty, a halhnark of conservat1ve society and 
the glue that held assoCiatiOn<; together through fatnlly, neighborhood, 
and church. Western culture began \Vlth the tdea that each Individual 
in the society \vould lunit hi<; own behavior through the understood 
convention<; and restraint<; of conunun1ty. The law alone dtd not restrain 
people; rather, nlcinber..,htp in society n1eant that all understood \vhat 
could and could not be done. But \Vith the loss of a serious tnoral basis 
for society, the en1phas1s shtfted to a preoccupation with nghts and a 
dirn1nutton of responstbtlit1es 
Again<;t the thtnkmg of the ne\v age, conservatives call for an intin1ate 
kno\vledge of the past. The tradition of conservat1sn1 ts a re1ninder that 
the roots of a soe1ery nourish it~ vision of the future. Ko nation can 
retain a sen<.e of direction or kno\v ho\v ~u along the road tt has traveled 
\Vithout ren1etnbenng \Vhere it h,l<; been. The conflict in the West today 
ts bet\veen the tr.1ditional Judco-Christian heritage and the secular 
po\ver of the nc\v t~1ith in sciL·n ·e .1nd n1aterialtsn1. between a beltef in 
God and one 1n nwn. The schisn1 toda\ ts bet\veen t\vo Irreconcilable 
' 
conception" of n1an ,1s a creature n1.1dc: in the 11nage of hi\ Crc:ator or an 
independent per"'onality tr.1pped 111 ti1ne ,1nd "Pclce; bct\\·cen unity and 
reason In the costnos and chaos ruled by chance; and bet\veen a govern-
n1ent ruled by establt,hed values or one in J constant state of revtston to 
fit changing tunes. 
No better exan1ple of the clash bet\veen liberal tde.lh n1 and the con-
servative tradition t\ to be found than in the .1bortton debate, \Vhich 
galvanized the nation in the dec.1de of the 1980s. Liberals tnatntatned 
that the freedon1 and right of th~ n1other to choose \vhether or not to 
have an abortion ts fundatnental. I:teason, advance In n1ed1cal science, 
and the prospect of utoptan £u11ily planntng underbe their ca e for Indi-
vidual choice. Conservatives, rooted tn the rehgiou tradit1ons of the 
past, decry what they constder to be the casual approach to exuahty and 
the disregard for hutnan hfe in1plicit in the abortion decision. The li1nits 
of social planning and the acceptance of a dtvine order to things are the 
basis of their argutnents against abortion. All the utopian ideals and real 
world difficulties of 1nodern liberalisn1 are in evidence in the abortion 
discussion. For conservatives, an increase in child abuse, a deterioration 
in family stability, and the spread of disease are the legacy of the ne-vv 
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sexual license, a calan1ity created in the nan1e of in1proving family rela-
tions. 
In this chapter we revie\v the evidence for the conservative commit-
nlent to absolutes in the Inidst of relative thinking. The religious, politi-
cal, and econornic traditions of conser-vatl n1 are exan1ined. Con1mon to 
all of these traditions is a con1n1itn1ent to truth<; about n1an's condition 
and nature, be it the picture of 1nan as revealed 1n Scriptures or the 
desire of nun for 1natenal ga1n a) seen 1n classical econotnic texts . 
The Conservative Political Tradition 
Christian 1deas about n1an. c;ocH~ty, and divnH~ Intent are basic for conser-
vative thought. Con ervatives behev<..'. \Vith the Founders, that govem-
n1ent is at best a neces ary ev1l- and one rH~cessarily restrained by the 
Constitution. But the vle\v of 1ninirnal )t~1te Interference presupposes 
that n1en are elf-controlling, n1or.1l betnt,7$. In the t\ventieth century 
self-restraint has been in short supply. In 1ts ~1xtieth ann1vcrsary issue, the 
editors of Time n1agaz1nc charact<..'nzcd the years )ince its founding in 
1923 in ten11s of one value, frcedo1n: "An1cnca \Vas not 1nerely free; it 
was freed, unshackled . . . to be free \V.l\ to be n1odern~ to be modem 
was to take chances ... behind n1ost of these events lay the assun1ption, 
aln1ost a rnoraltn1perat1ve, that \vhat \Vac; not free ought to be free, that 
limits were intrinsic.11ly cvtl. "~ 
Accon1panying this expenincntation \vas a great politicization of 
thinking. Higher truths and traditional authonties over n1en decreased 
in i1nportance, and in their place political questions were increasingly 
resolved by governn1ental bodies. Today, An1ericans are inundated by 
politics; hardly a news iten1 appears that is not subject to government 
inquiry. When every problen1 becon1es political, the state is the only 
body available to find solutions. Conservatives always point out that 
An1erica was founded on a desire to litnit centralized political power. 
The colonists fought for their independence fron1 onerous taxes and 
government interference under the banner "Don't Tread on Me." In 
their view, politics was a problen1, not a solution. 
There is a direct parentage between the American religious tradition 
and the conservative political legacy. First, a biblical view of the nature 
of man helped determine the type of govemtnent the Founders estab-
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lished, one litnited by the checks and balancec; of power an1ong the 
several branches of governn1ent and one that protected the individual 
fron1 the capnnous exerCise of governn1ental po\ver through the Bill of 
Rights. Their dtstnist of rnan 's nature led to the creation of a govern-
I11ent in which the people d1rectly elected only the n1en1bers of the 
House ofReprcsentat1ves, \\itth the Serute, the courts, and the president 
being indirectly selected by other bodtes. Sun1n1an71ng this relationship 
between a conservative religious tr.1d1tion and the functioning of Anleri-
can governn1ent, Alexts de Tocqucvtllc sa1d: 
The greatest part of British Amenc.1 wc~s peopled by men. who having 
<;haken off the .Iuthority of the Pope. acknowledged no other religious 
supremacy. They brought wtth them into the ew World a fonn of 
ChnstJamty \\ hich I cannot better describe than by ~ryling it a democratic 
and republt<..an rdigion .9 
The strong en1phas1s on "the Fall of n1,1n" underscored the fact that 
every person \vas tndeed a sinner, .1nd th.H check. and balance \vere 
needed to restrau1 those in po\ver. 
Second, l.n\ and legal precedents \Ver<..' r<..'quired to be in .1ccordance 
with the rules gtven in criptures. In the I eclarJtion of Independence, 
the phrase ''the la\VIi of nature" \V,1S not .1 reference to the untver\e but 
to the d1vine Lnv of God. In eighteenth-century England and An1enc.1, 
this phrase enjoyed a cle.u .1nd consistent n1l'.1ning. It referred to the 
n1ajesry and \\Ill of God .1s reve.1led 1r1 the natural order of creation. 
Even John Locke, often ctted bY hber.1ls .1s a key philosopher for the 
An1erican expenence, decl.lrcd in h1"' ,cwnd Trcnttse on Gouem111e11t: 
"Thus the law of nature st.uH.h ,1\ an eternal rule of alln1en, legt l.1tors as 
well as others. The rule" that they rnake for other n1en 's actions, n1ust 
... be confonnable to the law of nature, t.l'., to the \Vlll of God ... . " 1 
In 1695, Locke \Vrote 1n h1s treatise The Rubolwhlencs_, of Chn.stinnity as 
Defmed in Tize Scriptures that "As Chnstians \Ve h,1ve J e us the Mes tah 
for our king, and are under the hnv revealed by Hin1 in the Gospel.'' 11 
William Blackstone, author of Commentaries on the Lati'S of Englmzd, 
which was the single n1ost popular influence on the foundation of the 
American legal systen1 and required reading by all student of the la\v 
throughout n1uch of American history, said: ''As nnn depends absolutely 
upon his Maker for everything, it is necessary that he should at all points 
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confonn to his Maker'c; \vill." Blackstone carefully differentiated natural 
law fron1 the la\v of nature by stattng, "The revealed law is of inftnitely 
n1ore authority than \vhat \Ve gener~dly call the nclturallaw. Because one 
is the la\v of nature, expre\sly declared to be by God hin1self; the other 
is only what, by the ,lc;c;istancc of hun1an rcac;on. \Ve inugine to be that 
1 "I"> a\v. -
In writing the I)cclaration of Independence, Jefferc;on and others for-
n1ulated their ca e on tnithc;, \VhH:h \Vcn: unch,lngtng and in1n1utable 
because they can1e fron1 the CrcJtor h1111\clf: "We hold these truths to 
be self-evtdent1 that Jll n1cn .1re cre.1ted equaL that they are endo\ved by 
thetr CreJtor \Vith certain inalienable rights .... " Man\ nghtc; do not 
con1e fro1n n1an. but tron1 Cod, and they are unchangeable. Man does 
not depend upon goven1n1ent for the staten1ent of rights, but for secur-
ing then1. Tht:> purpose of goYcn1n1ent, fron1 a conc;ervative point of 
\·ie\V, 1\ to protect God's ordained right . ri hts IS rd1ected in the l)eclara-
tiOn 'c; c;tatctnent, ''That to ecurc thec;e rights govcrmnent~ are Instituted 
an1ong rnen .... " The rights of n1an are pritnary, and the govern1nents 
instituted to ~ec ure those rights are -..ecorH.bry. 
Third, the tdea of CO\ enant, borrowed fron1 the con ervanve religious 
tradition, figured pron11nently in the role ot \Vntten la\V\ and agreetnents 
binding n1en together 111 solen1n J\\en1bh·. The Mayflo\ver Con1pact, 
for exatnple, reads: "We ... do by Pre-..ents, sole1nnly and n1utually In 
the Presence of God and one another, covenant and cotnbine ourselves 
together Into a ctvil Uody Politick.'' Go\·erntnent\ were to en1body the 
concept of a people covenanting under God to estabhsh a govemn1ent 
answerable to God and Hts la\v. Political scienn t l)aniel Elazar has con-
cluded that: 
The consotut10ns of the Ainerican states m the founding era were perhaps 
the greatest products of the A1nencan covenant traditlOn .... The creation 
of new states, even new towns, across the Umted tates throughout the 
19th century reflected the covenantmg impulse. 
For An1encans, covenant provided a means for a free people to fonn 
political con1Inunit1es without sacnftcing their essential freedom and 
without tnaking energetic government possible. 13 
In the J udeo-Christian tradition a constitution was a solemn agree-
ment between parties, a reflection of the divine covenant God made 
with his people throughout history. 
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Fourth, the Constitution created a fon11 of governn1ent that moder-
ates the rate of change. The conservative beheves that n1eaningful 
change is only possible Within the bounds of extsttng tnstttutions. Ed-
n1und Burke wrote, "A state \Vithout the tneans of on1e change is with-
out the n1eans of its conservation." 11 Change is necessary to conserve 
the essence of soctety's tradtttons and foundations, but raptd change or 
change which occurs outside of established tnstitutions threatens stability 
and the continuity of trad1t1on. 
The fact that change 1s not easy under the provisions of the Axnencan 
Constitution is one of the rea~ons hberals are fntstrated by tt. Rexford 
Guy Tugwell, a Ne\v l)eal econonust and prc<ildenttal advtser, once satd, 
"The intention of the etghteenth- and nmeteenth-century la\v \Vas to 
install and protect the pnnctple of conAict." Tu~vcll suggested 111 the 
1930s that large-scale bus1 ness enterpnses be federally mcorporated and 
directed by a tnpartite bod\' ofbustness, l.lbor. and consun1ers. He \\·ould 
later say of the delay 1n achtevtng hts econon11c refon11 th.lt "Organiza-
tion for these purposes \VJs \cry ineffiCient because they \Vere not ac-
kno-vvledged Intentions. Much of the L1gbring reluctance \Vas O\ved to 
the constantly reiterated tntentton that \Vhat \vas betng done \\as tn pur-
suit of the anns of the Constltutton." l (J 
For econon1ic, pohncal, and sOCic1l change to be tnade \Vlthtn the 
boundaries of the Constttunon, nun1erous hurdles n1ust be elect red. The 
decision-n1ak1ng rules 1n the docUinent protect nunonties at n1any 
points by creating a con1pltcated set of restr~11nts on quiCk .tenon by the 
majority. For exan1ple, a n11nonty of one-third plus one c.an prevent an 
a1nendn1ent frotn being proposed tn etther hou~;,e of the Congres and a 
n1inority of one-fourth plus one can prevent the necessary three-fourths 
of the states fron1 ratifying a constitutional <11nendn1ent. Only one of 
four units of the national governtnent- House. Senate, Supretne Court, 
and President-was a popularly elected body or person tn the original 
draft of the Constitution. Even no\v, \Vlth d1rect popular election of 
both the House and Senate, the doctrine of ·eparation of po\vers effec-
tively precludes quick action on n1ost legi lation. 
The doctrine of clivi ion of powers and It cotnplex allocation of povv-
ers between the national and state governtnents allo\vs for the national 
government to exercise son1e powers exclusively, the states to retain 
some exclusively, and both to retain son1e con1n1only. Throughout 
American political history, a heated debate has occurred bet\veen nation-
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alists and states rightists about the boundary line between the respective 
powers of the national and state govemtnents. 
Collectively, these constitutional doctnnes and concepts of govem-
n1ent lead to two central conclusiOn\ about econon1ic, political, and 
c;ocial change: (1) coinplexity and diver<;Ity 111 the dee1sion-n1aking proc-
ess make it difficult to achieve change quickly: and (2) a n1ultiplicity of 
decision-n1akers at the n,1t1onal and state levels of governn1ent, including 
local govemn1ent, ditnintsh opportunities for humed change. Hi<>tori-
cally, incren1entalisn1 or graduahsn1 is the pattern of An1erican eco-
noinic, pohncal, and soctal change. 
The pohttcal landsc1pe ts littered \Vith the debris of popular cn1sades 
that \Vere unable to con1plete the obstacle cour'e of po\ver In the Arneri-
can polittcal sy\ten1. The Equal H .. tghts AnH~ndn1ent \Vas quickly pro-
posed by ovef\vheln11ng In:l_)ontJe~ in both houses of Congre s and 
appeared to be heading tor qUJck r.ltification bv three-fourths of the state 
legislatures. but 1t \\'as stytnied by one-fourth of the state legtslatures, 
which fa1led to ratify. President Franklin J). R.OO\evdt chafed under the 
checks the Suprerne Court placed on the centerpieces of his Ne\v Deal 
prograrns. President l~onald I~eagan proposed legislation and constitu-
tional an1endn1ents that never a\v the light of day becauc;e of the ntuner-
ous congressional checks that preclude ha\ty action. Ironically, his 
conservative social and econotnic .1gencb had to be filtered through a 
conservative systern of restraint and entn:nched Interests that led to de-
feat at n1any points along the \vay. 
Change under a systen1 of dtvided governn1ent ts difficult to achieve. 
During his tenure In Washington, R.cxford G. Tugvvell helped devise 
an indirect way of speeding up the process; his proposal allowed for 
constitutional reinterpretation \Vithout arnending the Constitution. 
Conservatives opposed such revisrons, holding that It is Incun1bent upon 
the Supren1e Court to detennine the onginal intent of the Founders 
with regard to an issue. Failure to do so n1eans that there is no constitu-
tion in the true sense, since new n1eanings are constantly being poured 
into the tnold of old words, creating new powers and new rights. San1 
Ervin, fom1er senator fron1 North Carolina, once said, "Everyone will 
concede that the Constitution is written in words. If these words have 
no fixed n1eaning, they n1ake the Constitution confom1 to Mark 
Twain's description of the dictionary ... 'a wonderful vocabulary, but 
no plot., , 17 
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The n1ajor change in redefining the n1eaning of the Constitution 
began during the New Deal. Justice Felix Frankfurter, for exan1ple, said 
that words in the Constitution are "so restricted by their intrinsic n1ean-
ing or by their history or by tradition or by pnor decisions that they 
leave the individual justice free, if indeed they do not con1pel him, to 
gather n1eaning not fro1n reading the Constitution but fron1 reading 
life. " 18 Justice Oliver Wendell Holn1es said n1uch the same thing: 
"When we are deahng \Vith words that also are a constituent act, like 
the Constitution of the United tates, we n1ust realize that they have 
called into life a being the developn1ent of \vhich could not have been 
foreseen by the n1ost gifted of begetters." 1'1 Thts reasomng led to sub-
stantial changes In con tltutional interpretation, altering or revising the 
national govemtnent to foster more rapid econonuc, politicaL and social 
change. 
Gradually the tenns 111 the onc;;tttution assun1ed a relative n1eaning 
characteristic of tvventJeth-centuf) thought. In 1936, the upren1e 
Court declared that the "general \\ clf:1re '' clause of Arncle I, Section 8 
pennitted Congress to .1ppropnate funds for JUst about any purpose It 
chose ·without regard to lu111tattons on Congress found 111 the Constltu-
tion.20 In 1937, ''interstate con1n1erce" 111 Article I. ection 8 \Vas rede-
fined a anything that substantially arTect~ the Ao\v of inter tate business, 
regardless of \Vhether it cros">e"' state line'\ . ., 1 In 1942, the Court held that 
the national govermnent could regulJte a product even if the producer 
did not intend to sell 1t, becau">e the product could st1ll affect interstate 
con1n1erce. 22 More recently, the cbuses of the 14th A1nendn1ent guaran-
teeing ''equal protection of the la\v~" and "due proces of la\v" have 
been used to establish national regul.ltlon m n1atters dealing \Vith educa-
tion and crin1inal la\v. For over one hundred ~eventy-five year , the)e 
subjects were within the jurisdiction of the states, but through the ac-
tions of the court, without constitutional an1endn1ent, and through rein-
terpretation of the clauses, the national governrnent acquired significant 
power over these issues. 
The fear that a powerful national governn1ent would don1inate con-
stituent state governtnents and increase its pov.,rer relative to them -vvas 
apparent in The Federalist Papers. J a1nes Madison wrote: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal gov-
ernment are few and defined. The fanner will be exercised principally on 
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external objeCt'\, as war, peace, negotiation, and foretgn corntnerce, with 
which last the po·wer of taxatwn will, for the n1ost part, be connected. 
The powers resetTed to the several states will extend to all the objects 
wh1ch, m the ordinary cour<~e of aft:1Ir5, concen1 the ltvec;;, hbert1es, and 
properties of the people and the mten1al order, 1mprove1nent, and pros-
penty of the state . .,, 
Madison's assurances not\vithstanding, the po\ver of the national gov-
ernn1ent has outstnpped the ongtnal n1old established tn the Constitu-
tion. The Intention~ of the Founders have been reinterpreted. 
Structurally. An1encan govt:rntnent retains n1ost of tts cono;,ervative fea-
tures and tendenCJes that ob. truct r.1pid change. Conceptually, ho\vever, 
key constitutional doctrint:s ha\ e bet:n reinterpreted \Vtthout constitu-
tional atnendtnent: the subsequent change<; have been dran1atic. The 
conservative political tradJ tton 1s rooted in mdtYtdual responsibility, best 
sun1n1arized by Sanutel Eliot Morison: 
Puritanism was a cutting edge which hewed liberty. democracy, hlllnani-
tarianism. and univers. 1 educ.uion our of the black forest of feudal Europe 
and the American wildernes . 
Puritan doctrine taught each person to constder himself a signtficant, if 
smful, unit to whom God has givt:n .1 partie ular place and duty, and that 
he must help h1s fellow n1en . 
Puntamsm IS an An1l.·rican heritage to be grateful for and not to be 
sneered at because 1t requ1red everyone to attend dtvme worship and 
rnamtamed a stnct code of mor.ll ethtcs . ., , 
The conservative political tradition relies on a .;;et of fixed rules writ-
ten in the Constitutlon and on the hearts of its c1t1zens. The pohtical 
institutions operate w1th1n fixed para1neters: the ten11s of the original 
agreement cannot be altered to suit changing circun1stances. 
The Conservative Economic Tradition 
The conservative econon1ic thought of today was known in the last 
century as either "laissez-faire" econon1ics, classical econon1ics or eco-
nomic liberalisrn. Its central pren1ise, which was an innovation in a time 
of powerful nation-states, was a bias against the state. The publication of 
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John Locke's Second Treatise if Civil Government in 1690 introduced a 
theory of the state whtch substituted constitutionalisin and lin1ited gov-
erninent for absolute n1le and arbitrary po\ver. In Locke's state of nature, 
individuals were endo\ved With rights that denve frotn natural law; col-
lectively these rights were called "property" rights. The Lockean defi-
nition of property exceeds the purely econon1ic 11phere, and extends to 
the whole orbit of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." It is to 
enjoy this "property" that people Inutually contract to Institute a gov-
emn1ent. 
For Locke, the legitin1ate po\vers of governn1ent \Vere derived fron1 
that portion of a c1ti1en 's natural right" \vhich \verl' l'ntru\ted to Jt<; care, 
and its functions \Vere regulated by the rights retained by the cittzens. 
The scope of state actiVIty 11hould be confined to the hn11t~ set by the 
con1n1unity; if the state pas~e~~ out of bounds it becon1cs an Invader of a 
dotnain vvhere It has no nght to enter. In Locke·~ treatise, only the 
people have ngbts: ''The governn1cnt as tru tee has only dunes, \Vh1ch 
are defined by the tntcn~sts of the trustor .1nd beneficiary, (i.e .. the peo-
ple) and not by those of the tn1o;,tee (i.e., the goven1111ent). " 2" 
The next step in the proce s of ec..onotnic thought and lin11ted goven1-
ment was taken by a French o;,chool c.1lled the: "Phystocrats." Their phi-
losophy advocated econon11c and polit1c.1l govc:rnance "u1 keeping \vlth 
the laws 1n1planted 1n Nature by Prov1dence." The Phy)tocrat \vere 
influential in France dunng the 1760 ,1nd 1770 .... For then1 the prosper-
ity of agriculture \Vas the pnn1c Indicator of national \\'ealth, and the 
interests of lando\vners overrode tho-,e of tnerchants. The chool'11 key 
I 
postulate was that only the product1vc cla-.s culnvanng the bnd produced 
a net product: "Expansion of the econotny .1nd the population therefore 
depended upon expansion of the expenditure of the productive class and 
the resultant expansion of the net product," (i.e., prosperity in agricul-
ture). 26 The Physiocrats \Van ted to curb the influence of the tate and 
limit it within boundanes that left the agranan ccono1ny to the operation 
of "nature." Their specific cry of protest to the state was ''Laissez-
faire''-leave us alone. 
The final flowering of classical econon1ic principle took place in Brit-
ain and the United States in the last quarter of the eighteenth century 
and the early part of the nineteenth century. Adan1 Srnith's ~Vealth of 
Nations, published in 1776, set in n1otion a generation of work by En-
glish writers and econon1ists like David Ricardo (Principles of Political 
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Economy (1917)) and T. l~. Malthus. The pem1anent contribution of this 
cholarship \va to be found In Its general picture of ho\v a social order 
can best function. 
What \vas thi picture? The classical econon1Ic n1odel depicted the 
individual as the tnH~ unit, and society a<.; the arnfietal aggregate of indi-
viduals In .1SSOCiation. If all Indivtdu.lls des1re their self-Interest and each 
per on 1s the best judge of the rneans .1ppropnate to the goal of n1aterial 
enrichtnent, It follo\vS that the larger the sphere of action left to the 
initiative of pnvatc per\Ons the better. I ndivtduals pursuing rnaterial en-
nchinent reap the be'lt re\\ :trds for then1selves and for society as a \Vhole. 
If the econon1IC sy ten1 \\'ere left to oper:tte on Its O\Vn, the Interplay 
of con1pkx, hun1an exchange forces \Vould be 111 .1ccordance \VIth et, 
hannontous natur.1l Lnvs. Certain of these \Vere based on psychological 
assun1pt1ons of univer :tl hunun egotsnl .1nd the operation of physical 
factors rooted in nature. The anah sis of the11e la\V'I \VIth their absolute 
' 
Inferences about huinan behavior fonned the subst:tnce of econon1ic 
sc1ence. 
Where cbd the state fit into thi.., order of thinking? CLlssical econon1ic 
theory :tssuined a dichototny bet\veen nature, \Vith tts O\Vn la\VS of sup-
ply and den1and, and the artificial or rnan-rnade la\\.., of the state. Natural 
la\VS \Verc good; h lllnan Ia\\' '"ere hannful. The only beneftcial state 
policy \vas one that enlarged the sphere of pnvate enterprise, which \vas 
alwaY'.; deeincd supenor to the pu bite enterprise. In tlCt, classical theory 
placed on the ~tate the onus of pro\lng that its functions \Vere justified. 
There \vas a distinct bias against the state. 
Though the classical cconon1Ists asptred to be \Clcnttfic and Indepen-
dent of the particular soetal and pohtical circun1st.1nces of their tin1e, 
serious depressions in the English econon1y had the practical effect of 
discrediting their assutnptions. The behef that the natural order was in-
herently sin1ple, harn1ontous, benefiCient, and devoid of ethical attri-
butes was challenged by evtdence of social and class tensions. Behind the 
wall of "leave us alone," laisse7-faire industrialists in Btitain and the 
United States during the nineteenth century used underpaid, over-
worked, and underfed n1anpower in f.1ctones, n1ines, railroads, and other 
workplaces. This fact did not escape the notice of Karl Marx, who criti-
cized capitabsn1 and the industrialized econon1ies for their en1phasis on 
surplus accun1ulation over consun1ption and n1isallocation of wealth. 
The critique of Marxist economics and state interference in the econ-
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on1y was acco1nplished by a group of Gennan econon1ist<; who collec-
tively becan1e known as the " Austnan School." They expanded upon 
the classical assu1nptions to n1ake then1 appropnate for industnal capital-
isnl. The Austrians analyzed the origtn and usefulness of 1noney, con-
cluding that its value is in hclpmg to detern1me the d1stnbut1on of scarce 
goods an1ong con1pet1ng uses. unply put, people use n1oney to n1ake 
choice about \vhat thev \V,lnt. Spnng1ng fron1 this analysis in the 1870s 
i the logic of cho1ce , or the "econon11c calculus" of 1nodern econon1ic 
theory. 
It was just such a theory \vhich proved that Marxist econonues could 
not calculate econon1icallv, lacking as they d1d ,1 true price systen1 based 
on private owner h1p of produced goods. " It follO\\"S that sociahsn1 can-
not successfully plan and oper.lte a n1odern industnal econon1y," \vrote 
Ludwig von Mtse<~ 1n h1s 1922 cnt1que of 'IOC1Jhsn1 entitled ocialis111: 
An Ecotzomic and ono/ogtca! Jlnaly.\1-' . l'vhses\ Insights and theones \VerL' 
gradually used to articulate a consi'Itent vte\v of political econonry \vhich 
held that nothing \vas to be g.11ned fron1 variou" types of govemznent 
intervention m the econon1y. In opposition to the doctrine<:.. of l3ntish 
econotnist John Maynard Keyne . \vho .1rgued that 1t \V,lS necessary for 
social and poht1cal reasons tor governnKnt to n1aintain full e1nployn1ent 
and prevent extren1e fluctuations in the business cycle. M1'-~es held th,lt 
such interventiOn \vas un\\ ork.1ble. The disuplc" of the Austnan school 
emerged in the t\ventieth century J'\ the n1ost c.on~ 1 tent, uncon1pron11s-
ing defenders of la1 sez-f.11re. 
In the United tclte the art-,rtlnlent for n1inin1al go\·ermnent interfer-
ence in the econozny 1s earned b) the "public choice" school, of \vhonl 
1986 Nobel Prize winner jan1es Buch,1nan 1s a lead1ng proponent. Thts 
theory sees econonuc choices 111 the context of politics, \Vtth speclcll 
interest groups donunating the legJ.Idative process of the \\·elf.1re state and 
politicians responding to their reque ts \Vtth accon1n1od.1t1ng legislation. 
Since the 1930s, the n1odern detnocratic state ha h,1d an egalitanan 
impulse. Politicians seek reelection by n1akmg political calculations in 
accordance with a set of preferences destgned to grant f.1vors to so1ne 
groups while denying special treattnent to others. 
Central to conservative econon1ic theory s1nce the eighteenth century 
is the value of the individual in the n1arketplace. Such an actor n1akes 
consistent choices to better hin1self; such a person behaves rationally 
within a consistent value systen1. In econon1ic parlance, other things 
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being equal, people ahvays prefer n1ore to less. The conservative eco-
nomic position is that the state should not interfere \Vith individual free-
dom to n1ake decisions. 
The Conservative Religious Tradition 
Political scientist Kenneth W. Thon1pson has \Vntten that central to 
An1erica's founding and history IS a reltgiou<; tradition: 
At the core of [America\] foundin~ .md history is <l moral and pohttcal 
trad1t1on representing \\hat W,lltt:r Lippm.mn h,1s called "the forgotten 
foundat10ns of democracy." But if the tt1undations have been forgotten, 
they have never been lost ... as tht: brilliant columnist James Reston has 
pomted out, ''The hbt:rties which Jll the spokt:-..men ... talk about de-
fendmg today, after all. were est.1blished by that rt:markable group of eigh-
teenth century An1erican political leader-; who took their con(epnon of 
man fi·om the central religious tradition of Western civtbzauon. " ' 
Fron1 the colonial period to the recent past, the Christian faith \vas 
the greatest single influence on Atnerican public In\tltutlons and daily 
life. Sociologist I~obert N. Bellah ha, \vntten, "The Btble \vas the one 
book that literate Anu~ncans in the 17th, 1 Hth, and 19th centuries could 
be expected to know \veil. . . . Bibhc.1l 11nagery provided the basic 
fraine\vork for iinaginative thought In An1enca up until quite recent 
tin1es and, unconsCiously, Its control Is \ttll fon111d.1ble. " 2s 
No\vhere was the grip of Chnst1an 111orahty n1ore apparent than in 
the conception of the nature of n1an held by the original founders of the 
American republic. After acknowledging that religion had a pervasive 
influence on the Constitution, Atnencan political historian Richard 
Hofstadter concludes that the Founderc; adhered to the conservative no-
tion that n1an's nature was essentially evil: 
To them a human being was an atom of self-interest. They did not believe 
in man, but they did believe in the power of a good poli6cal constitution 
to control hitn .... Fron1 a humanistic standpoint there is a serious di-
lemma in the philosophy of the Fathers, which denves fron1 their concep-
tion of tnan. They thought 1nan was a creature of rapacious self-interest, 
yet they wanted him to be free-free, 1n essence, to contend to engage in 
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an urnptred 'itnfe. . . They had no hope and they offered none for any 
ultunate orgamc change 111 the way men conduct themselvec;. The result 
wa that while they thought self-interest the most dangerous and un-
breakable qualtty of man, they necec;sanly underwrote it in trying to con-
trol it. 2'~ 
Hofc;tadter's concluc;ton" are substantiated b¥ an e.xatnination of the 
J 
vie\vs of hll!nan nature held by the founders. Junes Madison spoke of 
the "degree of depravtt) in mankind \vhich requ1rec; a certain degree of 
c1rcun1spectton and distrust," the "cap nee and \Vtckedness of n1an," and 
the "1nfinn1tH.~~ and depr.1vitics ofhlllnan character. " 30 John Jay sa1d tnan 
\Vas goven1ed by "d1ct.1tes of per~on.1l interest," \vhile Alexander Hanlil-
ton c;poke of the "follv and \Vickedness of tnankind. '' 31 Even Thonns 
Jefferson bcheYed 111 the nether stde of htunan nature \vhcn he \vrote. 
"Free governtnent is founded on Jealousy. not in confidence; 1t 1s Jeal-
ousy and not confidence \vhich prescribes litnited constitutions, to b1nd 
tho~e \Ye clre oblig.lted to trust \Vith pO\Ver. In questtOT1\ of po\ver, let 
no n1ore be he.1rd of conticknce in nun but bmd hnn do\vn to rnischief 
by the chau1" of the constitution. " "'2 
The Judeo-Chnsnan conception of n1an 1-.. that he is a creature \Vith a 
dual nature, part bea"t .1nd part angel. J'vt1n \\a\ cast bY God 1n Hts 
itnage, yet fell into sm 111 the rebel how. \Vish to be ".l~ God." As a re\ult 
rnan wa estranged fr0111 the ( reator .1nd forever destmed. to be ton1 
bet\veen the dO\VIl\\ ard pull of hi-.. n1atenah\ttc, self-Indulgent, an1n1al-
self and his elev.1ted, creattve. and divine inuge. The object of education 
was to in1prove n1an by extolling the value\ central to h1s better nature. 
Michael Novak po1nts out that Harvard College, founded In 1636 to 
tra1n n1inisters, adopted as one of the rule\ and precepts for students that 
"everyone shall consider the n1a111 end of hts life and studies to kno\v 
God and Jesus Chn t, ,,,. hich 1s eternal hfe." " Yale \V,lS constituted 1n 
1701 in recognition of the f:1ct that the colonies had been establi hed 
"both to plant and under the Divine Blessing to propagate in this wilder-
ness, the blessed refom1ed Protestant religion, in the purity of its order 
and worship, not only to their posterity, but also to the barbarous na-
tives. " 34 
The Christian influence pervaded early education, and its object was 
the improven1ent of n1an. Alexis de Tocqueville, concluding that this 
tradition was don1inant in Atnerican society, said, ''Religion exercises 
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little influence upon the la\vs and upon the details of public opinion; but 
it directs the custon1s of the con1n1unity, and by regulating don1estic life, 
it regulates the state." h The ethic of the ti1ne e1nphasized service to a 
higher end, a desire to give God your best and enrich the society as a 
byproduct of such allegiance. De Tocqueville un1s up the experience 
this vvay: 
It was religion that ga\'C birth to the Fngh<~h colomes in Amenca. One 
n1ust never forget that. In the Umted <)r.tte'l rchgwn ts nungled w1th all 
the nanonal customs and all those feelmgs \\ hich the \\ ord evokes. For 
that reason 1t h,1s pecu!J.u power .... Christianity ha" kept a strong hold 
O\'er the minds of Americ.tns, .1nd . .. Its power 1s not Just that of a 
ph1losophy which has been ex:muncd , nd .lcceptcd, but that of a rehgion 
behe\'ed in without discussion. . . ( hnstl,Ultty itself is an cstabhshed and 
1rrestst1ble fact which seeks not to .1tuck or dcfcnd.36 
The Founding of a .\.arion 
No\vhere 1~ the religiou~ in1perative cle,lrer than in the n1otivations of 
those \Vho first founded the countrv and "let it ... \·tston for the future.r 
' 
Beginning \Vtth Queen Isabella's con1Ini"l"ltOn to Colun1bu , and contin-
uing over sever,1l centurit:s, the evidence reinforces the religious basis 
for colonization and exploration. Colun1bus recorded 1n his diary that 
his purpose in finL"hng "undtscovered \Vorld~" \Vas to "bring the Gospel 
of jesus Christ to the heathens.'' He \Vrote, ''It \Vas the Lord who put 
into tny n11nd ... the f:1ct that it \Vould be possible to sail fron1 here to 
the Indies ... I an1 the n1ost un\vorthy inner but I have cried out to 
the Lord of grace and 111ercy, tlnd they have covered n1e con1pletely ... 
no one should fear to undertake any task in the nan1e of the Saviour, if 
it is just and if the intention is purely for H1s holy service. " 38 
What follows is a recitation of dates and docu1nents which are largely, 
if not entirely, ignored in rnodern scholarship and textbook writing-
but which bear in11neasurably upon the establishn1ent of a conservative 
religious heritage in An1erica.19 
1606. Kingjames I in the Virginia Charter dedicates the founding of 
the colony "to the glory ofhis divine Majesty, in propagating the Chris-
tian religion to such people as yet live in ignorance of the true knowl-
edge and worship of God .... '' 
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1609. The second charter granted to Vtrginia states that "the pnnCipal 
effect which \Ve can expect or destre of thts action is the conversion and 
reduction of the people 111 those parts unto the tnte \vorshtp of God and 
the Christian reltgton." 
1620. The MayAO\\ er Con1p.1ct records the covenant "for the glory 
of God and the advancen1cnt of the Christian fatth." 
1629. The Ftr'>t Charter of M,l-;sachusetts states its intention that the 
citizens ''nuie \\·ynn and incite thL' N.1tives of Countv to the Kno\vledg 
and Obedience of the on lie true God ,1nd ~.1\'ior of M.1nkinde, and the 
Christian Fayth .... " 
1629. The tnlubitant.s o Exeter. Nt\V } Lllnpshire, "In the nan1e of 
Chnst and 111 the stght of ,od, cotnbine ourselves together to erect and 
set up atnong U"> ">llch goven1n1ent as sh.dl be, to our best dt\Ccrning. 
agreeable to the \Vtll of God." 
1638. The f-undan1ental Orders of onnecticut decl,ues that the peo-
ple entered ''u1to C01nbin.1tion .1nd Confeder.Hion togathcr to tnayn-
tayne tlnd pn.'">l'.li'Vl' the liberty clnd purity of the Gospell of our Lord 
Jesus, \Vhlch \\l' tJO\V profcsse ...... 
1644. The ch.1rter ot ~L·\v l-bven colony specifies " ... that the 
JUdiCial la\\s of God. as they \Vert delivered by !\ 1osL's ... be a n1le to 
all the court'l 111 th1s jurisdiction .... " 
1649. The M.1ryl.1nd Tolcr.uion Act .1nnounces th.1t .. o per~on or 
persons \Vh.ltsoever \ ithin this province .. profe'>"ln~ to believe 111 
J ec;us Chnst shall . . . hencl'forth be .111) \Vays troubled, rnole\ted (or 
dic;approved of) ... in respect of hi.s or her religion nor 111 the free 
exerctse thereof ... " 
1689. The Gre.lt L,l\\ of Pennsylv.1nia procL1in1'1, "Whereas the glory 
of Aln1ighty God .1nd the good of n1ankind is the re.1son .1nd the end of 
government ... therefore goven11nent Itself is a venerable orchnance of 
God .... " 
1752. Inscribed on the Ltberty Bell in Philadelphia are these \Vord 
fron1 Leviticus 25:1 0, "Proclaun liberty through all the Llnd and to all 
the inhabitants thereof." 
1774. Meeting in Phtladelph1a, the Continental Congt·es authonzes 
payn1ents to chaplains to open Its sessions \Vtth prayer. 
177 6. In appointing a day of fc1st1ng and prayer, the Congress in1plores 
that they might "by sincere repentance and an1endn1ent of life, appease 
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God's righteous displeasure, and through the merits and mediation of 
Jesus Christ, obtain His pardon and forgiveness." 
1776. The Virginia Bill of Right() asserts that "It is the n1utual duty 
of all to practice Chri tian forbearance, love and dignity towards each 
other." 
1777. T'venty thouc;and copie() of the Bible are authorized for pur-
cha e by the Continental Congress because the don1estic supply was 
short; the Congre s al o authonzes chaplains for the Continental Army. 
17 82. The Congress recon1n1ends to the people "the Holy Bible as 
printed by R.obert Aiken of Phdaddph1a' · as "a neat edition of the Holy 
Scriptures for the use of '\Chools." 
1 ~86. The VIrginia Statute of R.ehg1ou" Liberty declares that "Al-
tnighty God hath created the n1ind free: that all atten1pts to influence it 
by ten1poral pun1shn1ents or burckn\, or by civil incapacitations ... are 
a departure fron1 the plan of the I Ioly Author of our relig1on .... " 
17 87. The Northv.,·est Ordinance state\ that "No person, den1eaning 
hirnself In a peaceable and orderly 1nanner, shall ever be Inolested on 
account of h1s In ode of 'vorsh1pp1ng or rehgtous sentin1ents .... Reli-
gion, n1orahty, and kno,vledge betng nece()sary to good government and 
the happiness of nunktnd, -.,chooh and the rne,1ns of education shall be 
forever encouraged.'' 
17 88. Writing in Tlze Fedemli~t Papcn, Jatnes Madi on proclain1s that 
"We have staked the future ... upon the capacity of each and all of us 
to govern ourselves, to sustain ourselves, according to the Ten Cotn-
tnandments of God." 
1821. John Quincy Adan1s n1a1ntatns that "The highest glory of the 
American Revolution \vas tlus: it connected, in one indissoluble bond, 
the principles of civil governrnent with the principles of Christianity." 
Adan1s also said, "Fron1 the day of the l)eclaration ... they (the Atneri-
can people) were bound by the laws of God, which they all, and by the 
laws of The Gospel, which they nearly all, acknowledged as the rules of 
their conduct." 
1828. The first edition ofWebster's dictionary contains a large nun!-
ber of biblical definitions. Webster would subsequently write that "the 
religion which has introduced civil liberty, is the religion of Christ and 
his apostles . . . this is genuine Christianity, and to this we owe our 
free constitutions of governn1ent ... the moral principles and precepts 
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contained in the Scriptures ought to fonn the basis of all of our civil 
constitutions and laws." 
1836. In the fore\vord to the first edition of !'vfcGtiffey's Reader, wh1ch 
sold 122 n1illion copies betvveen 1836 and 1920, McGuffey says, "The 
Christian religion IS the reltgton of our country. Fron1 it are derived our 
prevalent notions of the Character of God, the great n1oral governor of 
the universe. On It doctrines are founded the peculiant1es of our free 
.. .. . ,, 
tnstltuttons. 
1841. Alex1s de Tocquevdle \Vntes 111 Dc111ocracy in America that "J n 
the United States of An1cnca the sovereign authonty 1s religious.'' He 
also notes that "there IS no countrv 1n the \vorld In \Vhich the Chn':Jtian , 
religion retains a greater influence over the souls of 1nen than in 
An1erica." 
1851. In hts Colltii!Cntanc<~ on the Constitutwn ~( tlzc United tate5, Su-
pren1e Court Justtce Joseph ~ton st.ltes: "Probably ,lt the t1n1e of the 
adoption of the Consntutton. and of the first atnendn1ent to It ... the 
general if not the untver\,11 sentin1ent in Amenca \vac;, that Chnstlantty 
ought to receive encouragetnent b) the state c;o f..1r as \Vas not mcon1pati-
ble with the pnvate nghts of consuence ,1nd the fi-eedon1 of religious 
\vorship. Any atten1pt to level ,1l1 rehgtons . • 1nd to n1.1ke It a n1atter of 
state policy to hold all1n utter inditTerence, \VOtild have created un1ver-;al 
disapprobation, If not univers,lltndignatton. '' 
1892. In Church ~(the Holy Tn111ty u. {_ 11/ttcd tate5, the upre1ne Court 
decides: "Our la\vS and our In ·tttutlon~ tnust necessanlv be based upon 
and embody the teach1ngs of the R.edeen1er of tnankmd. It IS in1po s1ble 
that it should be othenv1se; and 1n tht\ <;ense and to thtc; extent our 
civilizat1on and our 1nstitut1ons are en1pluttc.1lly Chn t1.1n." The court 
continues by saytng that "This is a religious people. This is hi toncally 
true. From the discovery of this continent to the pre ent hour, there IS a 
single voice tnaking this affin11at1on . .. \Ve find evef)'\vhere a clear 
recognition of the satne truth ... th1s is a Chnstian natton." 
This chronology of a Christian heritage, \vith its attendant absolute 
moral code, reveals two things. First, the original cultural values en1pha-
sized self-regulation and n1oral responsibilities rather than govemtnent 
rights and freedon1s. There \Vas not, and could never be, a barrier be-
tween the Christian religious heritage and the practice of den1ocracy. 
Instead, the founding of the new nation and its political institutions were 
largely a result of the religious enterprise. Cultural practices stressed 
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n1oral values in education, n1anner<i, and social behavior as being more 
in1portant than governn1ental activity. 
Christianity gave Atnencan culture the concept of the exalted indi-
vidual, en1phasizing ahnost lunttless respect for hun1an beings but vvari-
ness of society. The dignity and value of people was ensured by their 
destiny, \vhich \Vas bestO\\ ed 111 creation and restored and refon11ed in 
Christ. A Glenn Tinder has "ntten, "The nobthty granted in Chris-
tianity to even the n1ost degraded Inchviduah \\"Ould have been incom-
prehen Ible to the anoent Greeks," who ~nv the aun of all relationships 
as the cultivation and sharing of a virtuous life. The cultural value of the .. 
exalted Individual n1eans that governn1ent n1ust treat people \Vith care. 
13ecau e of the f.'lllen hutnan condition, the "just society" envisioned by 
Plato and ~ubsequent philosopher~ is not realizable. Ideal utopias are 
itnpossible, and "To pursue the H.-leal of perfect justice Is to Ignore our 
fallenness .. , Chrisnantty. therefore, taught a sub tttute less pure but more 
attamable _-tJ 
Second. by past and present stand,lrd , the Christian culture \Vas ex-
ceptionally tolerant of 1ninorities and <.h sent. Countless unn1igrants 
found a freedon1 fro111 per ecution on An1enc,1r1 shores \Vhich \vas un-
kno\vn in Europe. To be sure, there \Vas racial oppre'i ton and overt 
discrin1ination. StilL the Christian consCience conden1ned the excesses 
of slavery and \Vas responsibk for n1oderating and eventually elin1inating 
that institution. In the con1n1unittes of the ne\V An1erica, fundan1ental 
property and Citizenship nghts were available to all free Inen. The values 
of Chnstian love and forebearance had a sooal reahty \Vhich often toler-
ated even the n1ost odious outrage. 
Wnnng on this point, l:tabb1 Joshua 0. Habennan, fonner senior 
rabbi of the Washington Hebrcvv Congregation of refon11ed J udaisn1 and 
later vis1t1ng professor at Washington Theological Unton, offers several 
conclusions rooted in the prenuse that An1erica's conservative religious 
tradition is, and was, a safeguard fron1 the totalitarian1sn1 which he expe-
rienced as a young Jew in Vienna: 
The suspension of the Bible's tnoral "barriers" has n1ade possible all the 
atrocities of Hitler, Stalin and other totalitarian n1lers. 
The veneration of the Scnptures as supren1e law, superior to the laws 
of kings, potentates, or 111ag1strates, was the gen11 of the all-important 
political philosophy- the very heart of our den1ocracy- which recog-
nizes "a government of laws and not of n1en." 
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The B1ble gave our n.1tion its moral vision And todav America's Bible ' , ' 
belt 1s ou1 safety belt, the enduring gu.1r.mtee of fundament.d rights and 
fi·eedoms. ~~ 
The contribution Christianitv 1nade to the culture \Vas to set an abso-, 
lute \t,lndard, a\Ide fron1 the den1ocratic nl;tiority, by \vhich the rights 
and \"\TOnb" of govermnent could be judged. As R.abbi H,1bennan points 
out, the buhvark ag.1inst tot.1lit.1ri:1nism i the absolute standards given in 
the B1ble. While tnanv of tho e involved in the founding and develop-
Inent of the United ~tltts \Vere not believing Christians, they \Vere still 
operating on the consensu hri ti.1nity g,1ve to cultural values. The 
effect of thetr \Vork \Vas to cre,ltc institutions \vhich reflected that con-
c;;en\U'\. 
The tOI1'\ervative tradition cn1ph.1sizes ,1nd seeks to tnaintain this con-
\en\U"i Conservatives nl,l)' not .1grce .1bout ~pecitic religious doctrines, 
but the\ \vould agree that lnun.111 n.lture i constant and A.nvcd. There .. 
are certain funda1nent.1l ,1spccts )f ,1 hunt, n being th,H .1re unchanging 
and unch.u1ge.1bk rcg.1rdless of tin1e or pL1 c. Iv1odcrn 11\c:ln h.1 1nuch to 
learn about hin1 elf fi-on1 the \Vritings of Plato. the confe sions of Au-
gu'\tlne. and the values of hurchill. Bec.nt e conservatives belitve there 
111 .1n objective n1oral or kr of re.1l, in1n1utable. and etern, 1 truths by 
\Vl11c.h 111.111 nntst n1easure hi conduct. they oppose la\vs \Vhich lin1it or 
rec;tnc.t the practice of the ... hristianity. 2 
American Political 71u•olo.gy 
The dtn1en'\tOn\ of liber.llis111 ~1nd conservatisn1 along ideolot,ric.ll and 
theologtcal ltnes are '\hO\VIl in Figure n-1. The rebtionship bt.:t\Veen 
rehgtous con\ Ic.tlon and political ideology is clearly seen in George Me-
Govern·~~ autobtographtcal book Cm~~roof.\: 
The study of the'le men (Hegd .md M 1r.x) forced me to think senousl] 
about the politJc,ll process, but neithe1 of them captured mv interest \\ 1th 
anythmg approachmg the enthusi,lsm I e"Xpenenced 111 dtsCO\ enng "the 
sonal gospel." Thts effort to find in the Ne\\ Testament and the Hebre\\ 
prophets an ethical tmperative for a just soual order strongly .1ppe.1led to 
tne. To kno\v that long year" of £11nilianty \\ 1th the Btble .lnd the tde.lhsm 
nurtured m my pubhc chool ye.1r" \\ere resources that I could dtrect to 
hmnane pohttcal and economic ends \\as a satlsfytng dtsco\·en. Rebgwn 
138 CHAPTER SIX 
\vas rnore than a search for personal s.1lvatton, more than an instantaneous 
expresswn of God's grace; rt could be the esc;ennal moral underpinnmg 
for a life devoted to the serYICe of one'c; tune. Indeed, one's own salvatron 
depended upon servtce to others. 1 ' 
Figure 6-1 sho\vs ho\\ so1neone like fon11er enator Barry Goldwater 
and Senator Robert l)ole could both be considered Ideologically conser-
vative, but theologJ.cally liberal. Both con1e fron1 hberal, 1nainstrean1 
Protestant backgrounds tn the Eptscop.ll and Methodist churches, re-
spectively. Gold\vater openly oppo,ed the pohcy agenda of religious 
groups \Vho so zealou<;ly supported R.onald R.eagan. Dole's 1988 can1-
paign for the R.epubhcan presidential non1tnat1on \\',lS dan1aged because 
he did not cha1npton con'lervatlve religJOU'\ causes. George l3ush, unlike 
his son George W. Bush, \vas out11ide the conservative religious orbit 
until pragnntlc pohtlcll con~Iderations led hun to rnake peace w1th reli-
giou conservatiVe'~ skeptical ofhis allegiance to their cause. 
To develop Figure 6-1. each political per'lonality's background and 
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2-1 in Chapter Two. Personalities like Bill Clinton, Ton1 l)aschle, and 
Al Gore cotne fron1 liberal backgrounds, both ideologically and theo-
logically. Ed,vard M. Kennedy and Willian1 F. Buckley, Jr., illustrate the 
contrast between R.otnan Catholics of liberal and conservative per-
suasions, both ideologically and theologtcally. Fon11er Senator Mark 
Hatfield and 1980 presidential candidate John Anderson reflect a theo-
logically conservative but tdeologically liberal perspective. Hatfield and 
Anderson have advocated nun1erous liberal policy Initiatives in both do-
nlestic and foreign affairs; Anderson even left the Republican Party m 
1980 to run for president as an Independent, recetv1ng n1uch ofh1s sup-
port fron1 ideological hberal11, espeCially m the Je\vtsh con1n1umty. Yet 
both of these n1en claitncd to be orthodox theologtcal conservatives. 
Other politicians like John Ashcroft, George W. Bush, and Ronald 
Reagan are con<;erv,ltlvc 1Tl both .1n tdcolog1cal and theologtcal enc;e. 
One of President Jinllll) Jrter\ prob1en1\ \vas h1s app.uent \vaffitng 
atnong the quadrants on Ftgure 6-1. At one t11ne or another, he could 
have been das Ified 1n all four quadrants. He catnpatgned for the nonli-
nation as an ideolotPcal and theologtcal con crvanve, profes<;ing to be 
"born agatn" and oppo ed to b1g govern111ent in Washington. But dur-
ing his ad1nin1 tr.1t1on he pennitted liberal intere t groups acces to 
power, lost public support \Vlth h1" tgtung of the PanJnla Canal treaty, 
and failed to curtail the expan~1on of \vorld\vtde ov1et rnrlitary po\ver. 
George Herbert Walker Bush ts in n1any \vay the eprton1e of con er-
vative nobles e oblige. Born of a Brahn11n t11ndy on the Ea t Coa t, he 
attended the best schools and ~1tt,uned early \Vealth in the high-stake oil 
business. His public ~ervice has been n1arked by a concern for results and 
an unspoken acceptance of traditional value . In the 1988 presidential 
election Bush \Vas e1nbanassed by the con tant que tioning of his reli-
gious beliefs. His political theology is classically liberal Epi copalian, but 
in the crisis of the Iraq War Bush asked Billy Grahan1 to accon1pany hitn 
to Can1p David for a prayer service. His conservative theology is re-
flected in his call for a Day of Prayer on the Sunday before Operation 
Desert Storn1 was concluded. 
So often the n1.istake is 1nade of looking at great events, n1oven1ents, 
or personalities in isolation, failing to see then1 in context. Just as in a 
symphony the prelude announces the 1nain 1noven1ent, so too in politics 
religious debates foreshadow major events. Franklin D. Roosevelt's New 
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Deal \Vas not ne\v, 1t only stated the pnnc1ples vvh1ch had been discussed, 
debated, and decided everal decade" before the 1932 can1paign. The 
Methodic;t Social Creed of 1908, for ex~unple, etnbodted n1any of the 
Ne\v Deal's public policy pnnCiplec;, and 1t \Vas drafted when Roosevelt's 
n1uch older nan1e<;ake \Vas '>tlll pre<;H.ient. in1tlarly, R.onald Reagan's 
conservatin~ agenda \\a' not ne\\, It n1erdy reflected the htc;torical de-
velopnlent of con en anve tde.ls, n1any of \Vhtch \Vere rooted In the 
debates of Chnc;t1an denon1Inanonc; dunng the 1960 and 1970s. 
Conclusion 
In 1959 John Steinbeck \Vrotc a letter to Adlat Stevenson in \Vhich he 
said that Anu~ncans \Vt: re str.1ngdy afflicted. "havtng too n1any things 
they <;pend their hour' and n1oney on the couch \Carching for a soul. " 44 
The essence of the An1encan conservative tradttton 1s that the soul is the 
key to a redt\CO\Tf\' of An1crican uniqut nc..,c;. The nan on has a pecial 
tradition \Vlth econornic, politicaL and n:li6'10US root\. 
These tnparttte traditions do not conflict \VIth one another. The Bible 
teaches a f.1llen n1an; econo1nic theory hold, that such a per on c;eeks 
n1atenal gain \vhenever po,sible; and the poltttc.1l trad1non holds that 
governn1ental po\ver should be divtded to protect agatnst the exploita-
tion of the people by those in authority. Each of these conservative 
pren1Ises substantiates the other t\vo , but the Ideas of rehg~on are n1ost 
in1portant in defining the texture of a culture. 
These traditions have been overlooked by 111ainstrean1 acaden1ia. 71ze 
Tinus Literary SHpplement once latnented the entrusting of the Greco-
Ron1an, Judea-Christian inheritance to Intellectuals, because they were 
prone to appeal to inlaginary utopias. "The survival of intellectual, in-
deed of sp1ntual and ethtcal activity IS dependent on a refusal to accept 
political slogans that are not tested by the touchstone of historic experi-
ence. " 45 Paul Johnson is more pointed In his critique: "One of the prin-
cipal lessons of our tragic century, which has seen so n1any n1illions 
of innocent lives sacrificed in schen1es to itnprove the lot of humanity 
is-beware [of] intellectuals. Not n1erely should they be kept well away 
fron1 the levers of power, they should also be objects of particular suspi-
cion when they seek to offer collective advice. " 46 It con1es as no surprise 
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to discover that the ideas of conservatisn1 are disn1issed as unimportant 
in n1uch of the acaden1ic literature. 
While the conservative trad1t1on rernatns strong, its strength has been 
weakened through efforts, beginning 1n the New J)eal , to dismiss the 
religious base of the social order as unin1portant, redefine the meaning of 
the Constitution, and assert that governn1ent guidance of the econon1y is 
a desirable thing. Conservative solutions to the dilen1n1as of n1odern 
n1an tend to be anchored 111 absolute values and pnnCiples, and their 
view of the future lacks the co1npelhng VISIOn ofbberal rhetonc. Instead, 
conservatives offer the past a<;, prologue to future problen1s and solutions. 
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C H A PTE I~ S E V E N 
The Directions of Contemporary 
American Conservatism 
£(we achicl'c_(r t!l cmpiO)'IIl<'llf and ,i!rcatcr economic 
,(?Y<ltl 1tlt-if II 'C lwue c/tte of gold a11ti alabaster-but ow 
d11ldrcn ht11'C not /cawed ht>lll ft> fllalk i11 goodness.justicc awl 
mere}'. then the American expclime11t, 110 mattct how gilded, 
will hat •c_{cliled. 
WILl lA 1 BENNE IT 
I n epternber of 1863 Abr.1h.1111 incoln dL·dicated a cen1etery in Get-t)-..burg. Penns rlv.1nia, clnd .l ·ked: , , .H1 thi-; llcltion, or clll)' nation so 
conceived .tnd so dedicated. long endure?" Que tions .1bout the n:1tional 
ch.1r.1cter lie at the he.lrt of the future ot the Arnerican e'\.perirnent. 
Today, In any ob..,ervers believe that the nation's gre.Hest \Ve.lkneo.;se"\ are 
1n the civic. cultural. .1nd n1or.d don1.1in \Vhere govermnent Is often 
defiCient and un\vork.1ble. Jack Kemp has \VrittL'n: "A -..ociety that I'\ 
indifferent to its n1oral .1nd spiritu.1llife is indit1"l·rent to tts future. " 2 
Wilhan1 Bennett, under the .ntspiCL's of the Heritage Foundation, re-
leac;ed an "in de" of le.lthng cui tural indicators," in 199 3 It "\hO\'- ed that .. 
Since 1960 there had been c1 5()() percent increa-;L' in VIolent crune, a 
n1ore than 400 per(ent incre.1o.;e 111 illegitin1.1te birth.;,, a qu.1dn1pltng of 
divorces, a tnphng of the percent.lgL' of children hnng 111 -..mgle-parent 
hon1es, a rnore tlun 200 percent tncreao.;e In the teeruge suicide r.1te, and 
a drop of seventy-five potnts tn the AT '\COre-.. of htgh school ' tudent . 
The statiStic<; sho"\ved that 30 percent of all btrthc; n1 the Untted tatec;, 
and 68 percent of Black births, \Vere In f.1therless hotnes.' 
Public opinion confinns the cultural concerns sun1n1anzed by Ben-
nett, with tnuch of the blatne attnbuted to governtnent. hartly before 
the 1994 election .1 Tunec; Mtrror Center poll found that only 33 percent 
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of the public believed that elected officials care about their beliefs, and 
only -+ 1 percent believe govemn1ent benefits all of the people. Nearly 
70 percent said that deahng \Vlth the federal bureaucracy wasn't worth 
the trouble, and only 41 percent said govemtnent should help the 
needy.·1 Paradoxes abound. The pubhc \Vants their fellow citizens to live 
n1ore respon<\ibly but finds that the publtc <\chools f.-ul to teach children 
right frotn \Vrong. ociety \ ant<; to stop the sptral of 11legitin1ate births 
but recoils on leanung that school citspenc;,e condon1s n1ore than n1oral 
advice. Polls sho\v An1encans \\'.111t la\\ and order, but the crin1inal jus-
tice systen1 regular!) releases violent cnn11nals to the streets. 
What An1encans c;,een1 to \vant .1bove all el<\e IS CIVIC revitalization 
grounded 1n the precept" of Inoraliry. A cultural n.?na1ssance n1ust con1e 
fron1 local con1n1Unities, \Vhose strengths rest upon the pillars of f.1n1ily, 
neighborhood, church, and synagogue. for conservatives the "tripod of 
character, con1n1unttY .1nd culture'' ,1re central btnlding blocks of the 
conservative \vorldvie\v. 5 
Con ervatives behevc that governn1ent has It\ lin1itation and that 
there are tnany thin~ in life n1ore unportant than politiC , an1ong then1 
"religion, art, study, f.1tnily, fnends, tnus1c, fun, duty."& In the eyes of 
An1erican conservatives, the,e Intennedt.1I) Institutions, which stand be-
t\veen the Citizen and h1. governn1ent, are the \VOtnb of culture. Gov-
ernment should leave \vell enough .1lone and let these institutions 
nourish society. 
Conservatisn1 suffered n1ass1ve defeats during the 1960s and 1970s 
when governrnent progran1s began to Interfere \VIth the pillars of soci-
ety's strength, dan1aging the coherence and cohesion of con1n1unity. 
Events on public school and college can1puse dratnatically illustrate the 
impact on these intennedtary institutions. 
In 1983 a blue-ribbon govemn1ent cornn1iss1on studying the educa-
tional systen1 of the United States declared the country to be "a nation 
at risk." At a tin1e when conservative values were acceptable on can1pus, 
students were not studying the right subjects, working hard enough, or 
learning enough. Schools suffered fron1 slack and uneven standards, with 
teachers ill-prepared to teach even if their classroon1 n1aterials were ade-
quate-and n1ost were not. "If an unfriendly foreign power had at-
ten1pted to in1pose on An1erica the n1ediocre educational perfonnance 
that exists today," the panel said, "we n1ight well have viewed it as an 
act of war.' '7 
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Campus unrest was not a response to conservative principles: they 
were practically nonexistent atnong college faculties. Instead, the revolt 
was a reaction to the fntstrated a<ipirations of New l)ealliberalisn1. Allan 
Bloon1 \vrote about catnpus tum1otl that "universities were offering 
then1 [students] every concession other than education .... They [were] 
unified only in thetr relatiVISni and thetr allegtance to equality. "R The 
traditional en1phas1s in Atnerican education on values and n1oral knowl-
edge had din1inishcd to the vamc;hing point. 
In the 1 980 the situation \vas the reverse: studentc; exchanged politi-
cal activisn1 and protest for c1 bucnness suit of estabhshn1ent values. No 
alienation was greater m college clas~roon1s than that between leftist 
faculty n1en1bers and conservative students. 
Why has education £nled In the United tates? In 1852 John Henry 
Cardinal Newn1an analyzed the problen1 111 a ren1arkably prescient essay 
entitled "On the cope and Nature of University Education." Arguing 
that what was n11%1ng \Vas the umty bct\veen kno\vledge and religious 
conviction, Ne\vn1an asked, "1\ It logi ally consistent In a seat ofleaming 
to exclude theology fron1 the nutnber of 1ts studtes?" Theology, New-
n1an aid, "tneets us \Vlth a profc,ston and a proffer of the htghest truths 
of which the htunan 1111nd IS c1pable," and only a <;uperftctal approach 
to education could ignore the ethic.1l and religious foundations of cul-
ture.9 At the root of the educational cn~1s, say n1any con ervative critics, 
is the appalling loss of tradtoonal value\ In the cumculun1. 
Conservatives carefully point out that the problen1 of learning in 
schools is but a by-product of the dratnatic change 1n Arnerican f~11nily 
life and values. The baste ties of the f.1nuly are the heart of c;ociety, they 
argue, and the very nursery of nvic vtrtue. 1nce the 1960 divorce has 
been breaking up fan1ihes n1ore rapidly than death did in the early years 
of the twentieth century. An arttcle 1n Current Problems in Pediatn·cs con-
cluded that "the An1erican fanuly is in a period of crisi and transition." 10 
The alarm over education is but an aftershock of the dissolution of stabil-
ity in the hon1e. In the first study on the effects of divorce on 111en, 
women, and children a decade after divorce, the authors conclude that 
America is now "a world in which n1arriage is freely ten11inable at any 
time ... [and] we lack the psychological theory that we need to predict 
the consequences." 11 The evidence points to fewer n1arriages and more 
children unwilling or unable to make lasting con11nitments to one an-
other. The children of divorced parents and the parents of divorced 
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children often look to the state to supply baste needs such as housing, 
child care, education supplen1ents, and econonuc ,lsststance. 
For rnuch of their historv, Ainericans could count on other An1ericans 
' 
\Vho shared snnilar values, stand,1rds. and prinuples, but today soc1al 
Institution-; possess a (hvindli ng core of con11nonly accepted cultural val-
ues. lin possible to overlook in the tnodern lexicon of social research are 
such \vords as disot~S!cmizarion, disint£)!nltion, decline, insecurity, breakdown, 
i11stalnlrty, and dy~jimctio11al. The intrusion of governtnent progran1s and 
po\ver interfered \Vith tht: con1n1unity' intennediary institutions, lead-
ing to the collapse of tht tnoral order. ''The t~1111ily, religious association, 
and local cotnnlunity- these, the conservatives insist, cannot be re-
garded as the exterrul products of tnan 's thought and behavior; they are 
essential prior to the individu.1l and tht: indispt nsable supports of belief 
and conduct." 12 
Traditionally. relisrion provided the core value . syn1bols, stones, and 
language tor the lebritin1ation of the soci, 1 order. In Atnerica the J udeo-
Christian tradition \Va ~ the source of n1or.1l values in the souety; vanous 
legal concepts, accepted belieh about f:unily and educatton, and govem-
tnental ideas about shared po,ver and the naturt• of tnan \Vere all rooted 
in this heritage. There i ~ a venl:'rable pedihrree for this idea of a "ctvil 
religion., \vhich \Va best sun1n1ed up by R.obt rt Bellah in the 1960s. 1' 
The legacy of this broad religious tradition is seen in the use of God on 
the nation's coinage and invocations to the Altnighty in the last line of 
political spt:eches. Approxitnately 96 percent of the Atnencan people 
continue to believe in God, 72 percent believe in heaven, and 53 per-
cent believe in hdl. 14 
In the late 1980s, R.obert Wuthno\v of Princeton University argued 
that this underlying consensus for A1nerican uvil ltfe \Vas raptdly disin-
tegrating.15 The post\var expansion of the state into every corner of the 
society resulted, said Wuthno\v, in a liberal and conservative realignn1ent 
of religious con1n1unities \Vithout reg,ud to denonHnational distinctions. 
Two opposing can1ps have en1erged, whtch jan1cs Hunter called the 
"orthodox" and the "progressive," each gtvtng follo\vers the assurance 
that they represent the cause of authentic bibhcal rehgion. 16 
What is worrison1e tn any ptcture of the national future is that such 
issues as illegitin1ate btrths, abortion, prayer tn the public schools, and 
the regard given the syn1bols of An1encan culture such as the flag are 
really a battle over conflicting constructions of reality. In dispute are the 
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meaning of the world and God's relationship to it, the definition of 
hun1an nature, the basts of n1oral judgn1ents, and the dtvine purpose of 
history. Unfortunately, the ten11s liberal and co115ervative often fail to cap-
ture the depth of the differences between the two can1ps. What is sure, 
however, 1s the depth of dtsstnHlanty between the worldvtews of those 
who oppose one another on these cultural tssues. 
"Perhaps the n1ost rcinark.1ble non-event of n1oden1 tin1es," writes 
Paul Johnson, "is the f~1ilure of religious behe~ to disappear." 1 Gover-
nor John Winthrop of Massachusetts descnbed the original VISion of 
Atnerica In biblic.ll \VOrds ,1s a "ctty upon a hill, [\vith) the eyes of all 
people upon us. " 1\l Even the Atnerican R.evolution \V,lS, In the tninds of 
son1e, little n1ore than ,1 pohttcal expresqon of the religious revivals of 
the Great A\v,1kening. In the t\vcntteth century the secular \Vtnds of 
atheisn1 and agnosttctstn \vhich gradu::llly ren1oved the Refon11ation's 
heritage fron1 Europe .1re sweeptng Arnenca, .1nd replae1ng the notion 
of a transcendent personal god \\ rth one n1ade m the iznage of n1.1n. This 
cns1s, n1ore than .1ny other. ts causing the deep divi~tons \Vithin the 
nation. 
The prospect that su( h .1 ~ecubr legacy ha~ no\v split the nation into 
feudtng £1ct1on wtth alternative explan,Hions of re.1hty t\ not cotnfomng 
to conservatives fan1iliar \Vith the crvic culture that gutded the earlier 
An1encan expenence. They worry tlut the loss of guidtng values \Vtll 
pron1ote the grO\\th of governn1ent pO\\ ~r. What all this n1eans IS that 
diverse religious Gllnps \vill continue to \\'Jg~ \Var \Vtth one another for 
the spiritual soul of Arnenc111 hfe, \vhde the culture slides Into relattvi 111. 
The dark side of Arnenc.1n culture Is that 1t IS deodedly n1atenalistic. 
While church attendance ren1a1ns htgh, there has been a liberalizing 
trend in theology, wtth ProtestJnt clergyn1en fundtng revolut1onaf)' ter-
rorist groups and Cathohcs .ld\·ocanng hberatton theology vvhtle at-
tempting a dialogue wtth Marxist-Leninist rebels. Michael Novak states 
that any such behavior 1s a betr.1yal of the very foundations of Christian-
ity and endangers the church by 1naking it a political actor. 19 Glenn 
Tinder argued in the Atlrwtic !v!ontlzly that Christianity has played an 
important part in the defin1t1on of Western detnocracies: "The absorp-
tion of Americans in the pleasures of buying and consun1ing, of tnass 
entertainn1ent and sports, suggest [an] erosion of the grounds of political 
health and in1paim1ent of personal being." The Western religious belief 
in the provisions of God and the reliance of n1an on hin1 are being 
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replaced by a materialistic philosophy that makes xnan an evolutionary 
pawn buffeted by forces of a history and society that he can neither 
understand nor change. Tinder concluded, "If we tum away from tran-
scendence, froxn God, what will deliver us frotn a politically fatal fear 
and faintheartedness?"20 
Conservatives fear that the ways of thinking, living, and behaving 
have now changed the nation to the point where 1t has little of its origi-
nal comn1unity spirit and purpose. They argue that there n1ust be sotne 
concept of "the sacred" because the greatest of hutnan duties is "Thy 
will be done." It is in1p0<\sible to dil\cuss political and social duty unless 
there is an awarenes' of so1ne tnith to \Vhtch one is selfless and loyal. 
America possesses a great and w1dely dtstnbuted \vealth, as well as social 
n1obility and education on an unprecedented <;cale. For the tnost part, 
the \:vorld is at peace 1n ~;,p1te of deep pass1ons: yet, there can be no 
radiance or happiness until individual~\ and C\OCiety realize their purposes 
and duties. 
The conservative n1essage is that the deepest longtng of the hun1an 
heart is for transcendent tnith, to be able to gt ve oneself to a cause larger 
than the mornent. What the nation needs 1s sornething 1t has lost: a sense 
of the good and an a\:varenes of the pennanent things. Until this need 
is satisfied, any discussion of nghts, duties, and the hun1an spirit is point-
less. Is it possible in the tvventy-first century to recapture lost spiritual 
anchors? Or n1ust we say, with Lewis Carroll, that "all the king's horses 
and all the king's rnen couldn't put Hurnpty Dun1pty together again?" 
Rekindling the Democratic Spirit 
The renewal of den1ocracy begins with a realization that religious faith 
is more fundatnental to the good society than government action. As 
long as people are told that there are no absolutes and that they are not 
responsible for their own behavior, they will rely on the government to 
define what is wholesome and good. There has never been a case in 
history in which a society survived for long without a strong moral code, 
and that code has always been informed by a religious truth. 
In such books as Mere Christianity and The Abolitio11 of Man, the twen-
tieth-century British Christian apologist C. S. Lewis refuted Immanuel 
Kant and other secular writers who had worked to ren1ove God from 
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public dt<\course. Ht\ essay "Men Wtthout Chests" drew an analogy 
bet\veen the spiritual hfe and the body, \vhich he used to cnttque the 
rattonaltsnl of the Enlightemnent and the soul of Christianity. Lewis 
argues that the head of reason cannot control the stornach of pa<\sion 
without the chest -\vhich \Vas spirit- to restrain the base appetites of 
hutnan ben1~. ~on1n1enting on a society that had no sense of the spiri-
tual, Lewts \Vrote: "We tnake tnen \Vithout chests and \Ve expect of 
thern VIrtue and entervrise. w~ l.1ugh at honor and "\Ve are shocked to 
find traitors tn our tnidst. " 2 1 
A fir(\t pnnciple of national rene\v.ll tkrnands a ren1ernbrance of past 
Atnencan valut!\ . Forl'I110St cllllOilg such recollection is the realization 
that ft1ith. self:.control .1nd lirnited government undt:rgird dernocracy. 
The French Revolution in 17~<. sought not only libtrty. but also equal-
tty and fraternity. The J.lCobins esteetned human re.1son and equality. 
The french I eclar. tion of the Right of l'vLln and tttzen asserted 
R.ousse.lu·. b,lsic cl.Xiorn th.lt .lll Jlll'rl \Vere born equ.ll c nd held been sepa-
rated fron1 th.lt n,ltur,ll equ.1lity by ' ',trbitr.lry socializing institutions that 
were tn\"ested with arbitr,H"\' force . " 22 , 
The An1cnc.1n Revolution stood. in contr.1st to the French. for values 
rebrul.lted by thL~ rule o la\v. A tnt ric.1n colonists \V.Hlted to protect the 
traditional liberties th.lt \Vere theirs .1s Briti. h subjt:cts. Those libertte'> 
Included thl' rights to bring leg:1l c.1ses before tntly independent judge'\ 
rather than OI1l'\ ~;,ubordinate to the king: to be free of h.1ving Bnttsh 
troops quartt:red tn their hotnes; to engage in trade \Vtthout burden'\otne 
restnctions; and not to p.1y t.1xcs voted by the British p.1rltan1ent tn 
\vhich they had no representation. In stun, the bberttes for whiCh the 
colonists fought \vere based on treedon1 frotn .lrbttr,uy control by ,1 gov-
erntnent tn \vluc h thev h.H.i no voice. , 
These ltberttes \Vere \videly utH.ierstood .. HH.i there was .1gree1nent ,1'\ 
to the concept of equality. When the I·oundef\ satd "alltnen are created 
equal," they \Vere tnaking a staten1ent .1bout equahty of opportunity. not 
equality of result~. The An1enc.1n conLept chtfered frotn the French: the 
pride of colontal liberty \V,ls to .1llO\Y treedon1 \VIthtn the bounds ofla\v. 
Conservative thought holds that the essence of tlus ongtn.ll vision for 
the nation was a lin11ted, representative governtnent restrcuned by la\VS 
that were difficult to alter and nulhfy. A nation forged tn reactton to 
tyranny and arbitrary pov.;er wrote a Constitution to secure for its people 
every right wrested froin autocratic ktngs. pnest , and nobles in Europe. 
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History taught that a governtnent oflaws was the only insurance against 
arbitrary, uncertain and inconstant wtlls of in1patient tnen hungry for 
power. 
The conservative legacy etnphastze~ that the Founding Fathers framed 
and ratified a docutnent intended to last for the ages; they recognized 
and applied a truth derived fron1 years of European htstory. Sin1ply put, 
that rule "\vas: ''Freedon1 I\ political po\ver dtvtded tnto stnall frag-
rnents. " 2 ' The Atnencc1n tnterpretation of that n1ax1n1 \Vas separation of 
po,ver~ an1ong the three branches of goven11nent and federalis1n, the 
division of po\ver bet"\vccn the ~;,tate and national governn1ents. In con-
trast to England and n1ost European state , \\here political authority was 
centralized 111 the national go\·en1n1ent, the Atnencan systen1 diffused 
power. 
Avotding the concentration of po\ver is J centerpiece of conservative 
thought. The pnnCiplec:; of sep.uatton .1nd thvt~ton of po\ver;, the use of 
judtCial revte\v, and the hnntation' on governtnent authonty are funda-
n1ental to con~ervatlves. Dtsperston of goven11nental po\ver enables the 
tntennediarv tnstttutton~ to flourish . 
' 
Stnce the adoption of the onstitution, the\e pnnctple have been the 
object of debate over ho\v they should be unproved. The early part of 
this century found Atnerica heir to the cultural legacy ofBrita1n and the 
Western den1ocraC1es. 1 he bfe\tyle and v.1lues of the United States were 
exported abroad, and European tdea<; and nntnigrants flooded An1erican 
shores. Today the opposite ts the case. Higher education curricula em-
phastze n1ulttculturabsn1 and dtverstty, detnandtng the reduction and 
elimination of Eurocentric and patnarchal btases in the An1erican politi-
cal systen1. Limited representattve governn1ent retards participation by 
ethnic tninonttes, say 1nodern refon11er . They de1nand that there be less 
separation of powers, that the central governn1ent be given n1ore au-
thority at the expense of local govern1nents, and that judicial activistn be 
adopted as a remedy for con1pelling social problems. 
America, dorninated by Western European ancestry and culture, will 
be challenged in the twenty- first century when white Atnericans tnay 
becon1e a minority group. The question already asked is whether it is 
good to esteem such a history. At the college level the traditional canon 
of Greek, Latin, and Western European hun1anities has been challenged. 
Books once seen as classics of culture are now scorned as examples of 
racial in1perialism and ethnic oppression. 
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Conservatives argue that every society needs a set of universally ac-
cepted values and that in11nigrants should be willing to adopt then1. Such 
was the case until recent yearc;. Without thec;e traditional values and 
institutions to n1oderate and shape the dyndnnc energy of democratic 
govemn1ent, society tnay degenerate into tyranny. The n1odern empha-
sis, however, is on the rac1c;n1 and c;ex1sn1 of the past, tn contrast to the 
self-evident virtues of An1encan plurahsn1. A balkantzed society of cul-
tural groups, each objecting to the other and agreeing on no central 
values, will characterize the future unless the custon1s and traditions of 
America's pa t rektndle the den1ocratic sptnt. 
Restoring the Economic Spirit 
The Arnerican econon11c experin1cnt IS the n1ost glittering, n1ost aston-
ishing, n1ost mvent1ve, 1110\t orgamzed, and greatest \Vealth-producing 
enterprise the world has ever kno\vn. In n1atenal tcnns, cap1tahsrn \vorks 
well for n1ost people rnost of the tinu~. Year after year, individuals go 
into the tnarketplace and end up ncher at the end of the year than \vhen 
they began. Billions of pnvate deustons bv Ind1v1dudls and by finns to 
buy, sell, save, store, tnve\t, or c;crap gu1de the Invisible hand that Adan1 
Smith lauded t\vo centunes ago. 
L 
The rough and tun1ble of the c.1p1t(1hst rnarketplace IS the best way for 
lifting a country's population out of poverty, yet as the Western dernoc-
racies head into the t\vent) -fi~t century, persistent questions plague the 
conservative defense of unfettered free rnarkets. The conflict between 
econon1ic growth and environnu~ntal health i the tnost itnportant issue 
facing capitalisn1 in the next century. More and n1ore evidence sho·w 
that today's sn1oke and flllne will lead to cataclysn1ic ecological prob-
lems in the future. Conservatives, devoted f:1ns of free markets and un-
bridled capitalistic expansion, are often een as opposed to 
environn1ental controls. The ecologtcal crisis could tan1e the dynanusn1 
of capitalism and open the door for govemrnent regulation of the 
economy. 
The sheer size of the problen1 presents a challenge to any economic 
theory. In 1800 one billion hutnan beings lived on the planet; that num-
ber doubled by 1930 and doubled again by 1975. If current birthrates 
hold, the world's present population will double again shortly after the 
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tum of the centuty. 24 The Third World is envious of Western affluence, 
and the prospects of terroris1n for food increase as the gulf between rich 
and poor widens. Technological advances have upset nature's equilib-
rium. Sn1okestacks have disgorged gases into the atn1osphere, factories 
have dumped toxic wastes into rivers and strean1s, and automobiles have 
guzzled irreplaceable fos'lil fuels and fouled the air with their exhausts. 
Forests have been denuded, lakes poisoned, and pesticides dispensed 
without n1uch thought of the future. The fault for n1uch of this is laid at 
the doorsteps of the defenders of cap1talisn1. 
Conservatives argue that the nlclrket n1echani5n1s that stin1ulated capi-
talisn1 can be u5ed to n1ake ure prices reflect the c;ocial costs of energy 
and waste. They contend that governn1ent should enforce taxes and 
pem1its instead oflegt laong quotas and bans on production. 25 Conserva-
tive solution~ en1phas17e free-tnarket econon11e5 for health care and edu-
cation; it is reasonable to think that such n1arket devices could also 
ensure that econon1ic developtnent \vould be both clean and order1y.26 
Newt G1ngnch finnly believe\ that the lessons of An1erican history 
are the key to \Olving future challenges. We tern civilization is in the 
nudst of a transfonl1atiOI1, say5 Gtngnch, quoong \UCh futurists as Alvin 
and Heidi Toffier, fron1 an Induc;tnal Age to an Infon11ation Age. An1eri-
can innovation, a renev.;ed con1n11tn1ent to quality, and capitalistic free-
dom are the bt.11lding blocks for the next century. In the fi.1ture Gingrich 
sees political power devolving to citizens who are the building blocks of 
a new "semi-direct den1ocracy," Innovating on the local level and pass-
ing infon11ation around. The next century will see government con-
nected to citizens through the traditional n1ec1ns of political parties, 
voting, and the n1edia but also utilizing technology to tap resources on 
other planets and in cyberspace. 27 
The assun1ption is that govemn1ent should play a smaller role in the 
lives of citizens. Despite the intuitive appeal and proven record of ac-
complishment inherent in market alternatives, in the last half of the 
twentieth century such options have taken a backseat to calls for federal 
regulation and intervention. Polls regularly show that 1nost Americans 
want government to address a problem rather than allow the private 
market to offer a solution. As a result, growth in the public sector has 
been the rule during the past three decades. Public spending in the seven 
largest Western nations rose from 29 percent of the gross national prod-
uct in 1960 to about 39 percent in 1990.28 During much of this time, 
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especially the decade of the 1980s, these developed nations were led by 
conservative govemn1ents. 
Govemn1ent interference in free n1arkets quashes individual creativity 
and discovery. The spint of Invention and discovery that characterized 
An1erican capttahsrn has been rendered itnpotent by federal rules and 
regulations. 29 Cotnpared to its pre-1932 htstory, the An1encan national 
govemrnent has n1uch tnore po\ver In nun1erous areas of An1erican life, 
including increased influence over the aff.'lirs of Indtvidual entrepre-
neurs. 
Over tirne, the nationalization of politics found conservatives gener-
ally accepting an enlarged federal govemrnent With n11ntn1al protest as 
long as the governrnent ent1tlen1ents beneftted all classe of people. The 
higher incon1e people, \Vho n11ght have been expected to support con-
servative causes tn oppo\Itton to enlarged ~oCial \velf.1re n1easures, were 
thernselves coopted by prograrns -;uch as Medtcare, Medicaid, and the 
fann substdv ,11locatton that nude thern benefiCianes. Mtddle- and , 
upper-class people found that they hked thetr entitlen1ents to the na-
tional govemn1ent's l.1rgesse altno.;.t .1s n1uch a lower-clac;s people do. 
What 1111ght have been .1 natural con.;.ervatlYe con tituency In opposition 
to these entit1etnents dtd not emerge unt1l the entire )tructure faced 
bankruptcy. 
A fundan1ental hun1an dc-;trc for )Ccuritv enabled the natlonal govem-
n1ent to expand and provtde progran1s to tneet social needs. Health, 
safety, retiren1ent 1ncon1e, and savtngs protection spa\vned tnany other 
prograrns, reveahng that conservati 111 IS easter to o.,upport In the abstract 
than in the concrete. Ph!losophtcally, rnuch of today's bustne s elite i 
more con1fortable \vith wdf.'lre- tate liberahsn1 than \Vith the con1peti-
tive rawness of econon1tc free n1arket . 
The great den1ocranzation of Atnencan pohttcs that accon1panied the 
New Deal, Fair l)eal, New Frontier, and Great Sooety trengthened the 
role of the national govemn1ent in don1estic affair . The federal pro-
grams created an upper-class as well as a lo\ver-cla. s constituency, mak-
ing it difficult for elected leaders to resist public opinion. The result of 
these forces is that conservatives have generally accepted the social wel-
fare programs, even speaking at tirnes of a public policy of social welfare 
conservatism. Son1e conservatives were critical of the Reagan presidency 
for precisely this reason: despite rhetoric to the contrary, there was no 
shrinkage of the size and scope of government in any real sense. Robert 
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Nisbet charged that Reagan (1) had a n1ottvat10n n1ore tn keeping with 
the New Deal liberal l)etnocrat expenence than a.ny genuine conserva-
tive Republican era stnce he spoke frequently of revolution and quoted 
hberal l)en1ocrats, such as Fra.nkhn l). H .. oosevelt and John F. Kennedy, 
as precedents for ht<; acnons rnore th.1n he dtd conservative presidents; 
(2) had a. passion for crusades both dorneo;tH. and International, which led 
to a larger and n1ore po\\terful goven11nent; and (3) retained, rather than 
abohshed, the l)eparttnents of Education a.nd Energy and the National 
Endo\\rnents for the Arts and Hurnanities, a.ll e ·tablished under liberal 
l)en1ocratic presidents. ' 0 
By 1994 the chon1s for cha.nge at the national lcvt 1 gre\v into a ho\vl, 
but no consensus etncrged as to \Vhat should be elitninated. Efforts to 
shnnk the stze and scope of govermnent \Vere nH:t by entrenched con-
stituenCies decrytng the inhtunanity of cutting school lunch progran1s 
and reduong federa.l expenditures for the poor and elderly. After the 
election, the halls of ongress filled \Vith lobbyists, la\vyers, and career 
offici.1ls defending their pro~rr:uns against the threa.t of a federal carnng 
knife. 
The presence and popularity of social \vel fare con. ervat1sn1 rneans a.n 
acceptance of governn1ent intervention in the econornv even \vhen the 
canons of conservatisn1 argue othenvisc. Gtven the \Vide ... pread f.-uniliar-
tty and acceptance of greater public spending, another challenge for con-
servati'ill1 1s to balance econon11c b'TO\\ th \Vith a reduction of soctal 
progran1s to help those displaced by penodic econonuc reahgntnents. 
Unen1ployed steel \Vorkers, the hornelcss in urban settings, and racial 
mtnorities beset wtth poverty rnake regular detnands on the econonuc 
and political systern. 
In such an envtronrnent, conservatisn1 has proven to be both strong 
and weak. Its strength rests In the Ideas that even Its opponents accept as 
necesc;ary tf society 1s to be stable: re\pect for authonty, a reduced role 
for governn1ent, and a htgh regard for tradition. It.) weakness rests in the 
dtfficulty of populari71ng tdeas whose very existence dentes the pron1ises 
of econon1ic, political, and soCial progress en1bod1ed In the New l)eal, 
Fair l)eal, New Frontier, and Great Soctety. The fundatnental in1pulse 
of conservatism is toward restraint, even when cutting the size of estab-
lishment government. By contrast, hberahstn n1oves toward action. The 
needs of the urban poor and the unen1ployed are readily addressed by 
liberalism, where conservative solutions appear cold and aloof The lib-
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eral hour in An1erican politics can1c during the Great Depression, after 
President Hoover's conservative retnedies failed to provide the type and 
level of action people detnanded. Conservatives find their moment at 
the end of the century, as they f:1cc the fa1led solutions of central govem-
nlent. 
Conclusion 
"In Atnerica," \Vntes R.obert He1nen1an, "conservative thought has 
been a n1uch 111Isunder-;tood and heavily stereotyped fonn of intellectual 
activity.'' \I Even In tnurnph, conscrvatJSnl never ach1eved \Vtdespread 
popular support until the late 1970s and 1980s; yet, n1any of Its Ideas 
significantly influenced Arncrican societv throughout Its history. It has 
exercised this Influence becau e conservatn:c leader; found arenas of pol-
itics In \Vhtch to battle for the clChicvernent of their goals. Thts accon1-
plishn1ent is n1ore itnportant than the f:1ct that conservatisn1 \Vas 
n1isunderstood and never enjoyed \\ tdc ,lCceptance throughout society. 
The recent populanty of conscrvatt"tn ac; an econon11c, pohttcal, reli-
gious, and soci.1l n1oven1ent \V.ls rnadc posstblc by society's reaction to 
liberalisn1 n1orc than by .u1 undytng allegwnce to the conservative 
banner. 
While the breadth of conscn ati\111 1nay cncon1p.1ss differing chools 
of thought, that strength ts also a \Vcakness \vhen it cornes to nutntaining 
balance an1ong Its tdea and respect arnong Its advocates. These differ-
ences affect how the vanou advocates VIC\V the role of govemn1ent, 
religion, and speech. On the one hand, an econon11c conservative, espe-
cially one with hbertanan tendencies, \vants to have a very sn1all govern-
ment that interferes as bttle as pos tble in the lives of An1ericans; but 
such a person is unlikely to upport religious freedon1s. A traditional 
or religious conservative, on the other hand, n1ay appreciate a larger 
govemn1ent in order to protect n1oral values as the nom1 of societal 
behavior. Such differences are seen in the disagreen1ent between conser-
vative columnist Willian1 F. Buckley, Jr., and fon11er secretary of educa-
tion and drug czar Willian1 Bennett over solutions to the drug crisis in 
American cities. Buckley favors the libertarian solution of legalization, 
while Bennett advocates the more traditionally conservative argument 
of stiffer sentences and better enforcement. Both of these conservative 
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spokesn1en have impeccable ideological credentials, yet they see the so-
lution to the problen1 differently. 
The Republican Party of the 1990s reveals these divisions. Younger 
conservatives in their twenttes, attracted to the Republican Party in the 
years of the l{.eagan presidency, are Interested in the econon1ic aspects 
of conservat1sn1 and favor the tdeas of n11nin1al govemtnental restraints 
on the achieven1ent of econonuc \Uccess. Another strong group in the 
Republican Party con1pnses the reiigJous conservatives, who argue that 
governrnent tnuc;t stop abort1on and restore prayer and Bible reading in 
the pubhc schools. Mtd\vestern conservatives, uch as the late senators 
Robert Taft and Everett M. Dirk\en, fonner president Gerald Ford, and 
Senator Robert Dole, are pragn1atH .. conservanves. Unlike those who 
adhere to econon1ic and rehgiou" con.;;ervansn1, they are not sorely both-
ered by either governn1ent regulation or n1orality questions. Their prag-
nlatic positiOn seeks to prevent exces\e\ of governn1ent regulation and 
the gro\vth of govemn1er1t. 
Sttll another dtvtsion occurs \Vith the idea of the tnilitary and n1ilitary 
servJCe. hould n1ilitary service be \'Oluntary or conscnpttve? Ho\v large 
should the n1ilitary be? Staunch conservatives argue that the ftrst respon-
sibility of governn1cnt 1 the ... afety of unzens and that the rnihtary should 
be large 1n order to protect the nan on\ poltncal and econonuc interests 
around the \Vorld. This po..,ition rneanc; a larger goven1n1ent, tnore taxes, 
and higher spending. Conservclttves \vho value individual freedon1 op-
pose conscription while other strongly p.Hnotic conservatives do not. 
There are n1any vanetie.., of conservatives \vho collectively identify 
with the election and pre 1dency of H .. onald I~eagan and the subsequent 
triun1ph of conservative pohctes tn the early 1990s. Son1e of these loyal-
ists were motivated by the soCial and tnoral agenda of the religious right; 
others were moved by the convJCtlon that American foreign policy had 
weakened and foundered In the 1970s; still others can1e to the "Reagan 
Revolution" because they shared a passion to cut taxes and reduce the 
powers of the federal governn1ent. In the 1990s these refom1ers found 
themselves in power and at odds with one another. For n1uch of its 
history American conservatisn1 has been on the outside looking in; its 
viable policies were developed in opposition to liberal policies. Now the 
ideological shoe is on the other foot. 
The resolution of tensions within the ranks of conservatism is impor-
tant because conservatism has been prone to factionalism throughout its 
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history. After dominating presidential politics for most of the decades 
since 1950, the conservative n1onohth cracked following the election of 
George Bush in 1988. The return of a liberal to the White House in 
1992 signaled the end of the conc:;ervative resurgence to son1e. The basic 
division within the rnoven1cnt retnains between two strains: the mostly 
urban, ethnic, and econotnic frce-n1arket neoconservatives and the tra-
ditional, sn1all-town, agranan conservatives w ho stress cultural values 
over econornics. The fonner group was tnfluenttal 1n popularizing the 
econon1ic agenda of conc:;ervatt'\111 e.1rly 1n the Reagan adn1in1c:;tratton. 
The latter group, alanned by the secular drift of soCiety away frorn the 
native values of religion and con1n1unity, worked for the defeat ofhberal 
ideas tn the 1994 n11dten11 ckcn on. 
The Bush presidency \VJll be ren1etnbered as an exan1ple of pragn1a-
tisn1 over ideology. Irving Kn)tol \varned m the beginntng of the last 
decade of the twentieth century that "the Republican Party [\vas] a de-
fective vehicle for the n1obd17atton ot con)ervattve cnergtec:; and the for-
rnulation of even a rntn1n1ally coherent conservattve agenda." ' 2 He \vas 
right, and the future of conscn'tltlsn1 \Vii] hang on the ability of adherents 
to n1obihze and persuade thctr peers, absent parties and electtons. 
Western culture IS prcc:;ently gotng through a n1onun1ental change. A 
the world enter; the t\venty -fir;t centurv a ne\Y poc:;ttnodcn1 worldvte\v 
is gaining dorntnance tn Atnencan un1verstt1e and culture. Thtc:; unpulse 
en1phasizes Jndetenninacy, chance, arurchy, and the silence of tneamng 
and knowledge in the \vorld. Postn1odern1 t base thctr ne\v relativi 111 
on the view that all n1ean1ng 1s socwlly constructed on a particular con-
viction of language, so \Vordc:; c.1nnot render truth about the \vorld in 
any coherent way. n 
During the twentieth century Wec:;tern civilization h.1d to survive 
powerful assaults fron1 Without: c:;oCiahc:; Jn , fa cisn1, and ecular nihilisn1. 
In the next century the threat \Vtll con1e fron1 the very people who 
render the values and virtue to a free people. The postn1odem ethic is 
regnant in the n1edia and entertainrnent industries. In his acceptance 
speech of the Teznpleton Prize in 1994, Michael Novak described thi 
threat of postmodemisn1 as the n1ost " Insidious and invidious attack 
from within: There is no such thing as truth. . .. Truth is bondage, 
believe what seen1s right to you, there are as n1any truths as there are 
individuals. Follow your feelings, do as you please, get in touch with 
yourself [and] do what feels coznfortable. " 34 
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In the next century the belief in truth will be equated to acceptance 
of authoritarian control. The Amen can iinpulse is internal, for self-gov-
ernment, self-esteem, and self-actualized individuals with personal peace 
and affluence. In such an environn1ent no individual wants to bend to 
the dictates of church, con1n1unity, or tradition, especially when it can-
not be known if anything IS true. 
The future of conservattsn1 is tied to ho\v significant cultural values 
are related to the propagat1on of a poltttcal idea. Traditional conserva-
tives believe that religious and con1n1un1ty values are the bedrock of 
societal stability, arguing that there 1s a cau\al relationship between tradi-
tional Western, Judeo-Chnstlan values and the poht1cal order. Snll other 
conservatives einphasize the 1deas of econorn1c stability and pragmatic 
opposition to foretgn threats as be1ng n1ore 1111portant than native values. 
In the next century the 1norahty of a free soCiety will deten111ne its 
future. 
Conservat1 In's dtvergent factions allo\V it to reach to n1ore people, 
but such differences nuke the achteven1ent of con1n1on goals difficult. 
The conservative moven1ent n1ust luve tension to be successful, but 
respect needs to be n1a1nta1ned bet\veen Its con1pettng t~lCttons. Will the 
future find conservatisn1 broadening 1ts base of support or splintering 
into divergent factions In the stn1ggle to rule? To llnprove the nlarket-
ability of conservatisn1, It will need to attract Blacks and other rninorities. 
Roman Catholics and the South will also be cnJCial to the continued 
viability of the n1oven1ent. 
The values of the fan1ily, church, and neighborhood school are the 
major issues of political debate in the decade ahead. The !~eagan admin-
istration left a legacy of conservative concern for such institutions that 
was embraced by the new conservative tnajority 1n the nineties, but it 
remains to be seen whether cultural values will restore conservatism to 
its past glory. 
To sustain power in An1erica, an 1ndictn1ent of liberalisn1 is not 
enough. In the final analysis, regnant conservatisn1 requires those very 
qualities of the Western tradition that 1nake civilization possible. The 
American Revolution, unlike the French, stood for values rooted in the 
biblical experience. History teaches us that an age wrong about God is 
almost certain to be wrong about man. The French Revolution of 1789 
sought not only liberty, but also equality and fraternity. The French 
Revolution believed Rousseau's basic axion1 that men were born free 
THE DIRECTIONS OF CONSERVATISM 161 
and everywhere they were in chains. By the end of the century dictator-
ship crushed den1ocracy in France and much of Europe paid the price. 
The R ussian }~evolution in 1917 and the Chinese Revolution of 1949 
echoed the quest for equahty with the san1e result: the expansion of 
central govemn1ent power and the extinction of the Individual. 
Walter Lippn1ann recounts an evening in the days before America's 
entry into World War II, when the U.S. atnbassador to Bntain, Joseph 
P. Kennedy, opined that if \.Var catne, the Enghsh would be defeated. 
Such a prognosts stirred Winston Churchill to nugnificent oration, "I 
for one would willingly lay down n1y life In combat, rather than, in fear 
of defeat, surrender to the n1enaces of these n1ost sinister men." Church-
ill went on to constder the posstbihty of the unthinkable, a world with-
out British Influence: "It will then be for you, for the American<;, to 
preserve and n1a1nta1n the great hentage of the Enghsh-speaking peo-
ples." 15 Ainenca catne Into the t\.ventteth century as the youngest prod-
igy in the gro\.vn-up \vorld of Western culture: It ends it as the heir 
apparent to that lineage. The constant stn1ggle of free societtes IS to 
n1aintain three freedon1s: econonuc, poht1cal, and cultural. Of these 
three, the cultural stn1gglc, long neglected in the United States, 1s the 
place where the fate of free soCietH~S \Vtll rest 1n the t\.venty-first century. 
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vVhen words lose their mcat~in._e, peoples lose their liberty. 
-CO NFUC I US 
A n1ericans revere the po\ver of the pen. The I)ecl,lration of Inde-pendence, the Constitution, the Gettysburg Address, and other 
landmark documents, \Vhich capture the n1ean1ng of Amcnca, occupy 
exalted space in the An1encan pantheon of literary greatness. Th1s An1er-
ican reverence for the po\ver of the pen stands not alone, but as part 
of the flow of historical respect for great \Vntings. Fonvard frorn the 
manuscripts ofPlato and Anstotle, the pen has changed the contours and 
currents of hi tory. But today, the po\ver of the pen 1s 1n question, and 
with it, the future of ociety. 
Democracy's Downslide 
Language slides down a slippery slope in den1ocraoe a public op1nion 
and political realities destabilize the tneaning of words. 1 Over tin1e, 
words lose consistent and coherent rneantng, no longer erving as de-
pendable points of reference or anchor of stability. In 1948 Arnold 
Toynbee concluded in the ten volutnes of A Study of History that civiliza-
tions rarely collapse from conquest or invasion, but rather they con1nut 
cultural suicide, abandoning previous beliefs and casually accepting any-
thing new.2 In 1987 Allan Bloom put it this way in Tiu Closing of tlze 
American Mind: "In politics, in entertainment, in religion, everywhere, 
we find the language connected with Nietzsche's value revolution, a 
language necessitated by a new perspective on the things of n1ost con-
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cern to us. Word' '\UC h as rlzmisma, /if('- ·ryle, r(H/lmitmcnt, identity, and 
1nany other,, all of \vh1ch c.u1 ea ily be traced to ll't'l.schl', are no\v 
pr.1cncall) AtnL'ncan sl.1ng. "~ ultur.1ll ' nothing i n1ore i1nportant than 
\VOrds, \Vhich provi(k coherl.'nce and ohesion to s( ~iety. Words relatl' 
to one .lnothl'r, colkctivl·ly ~duping the i )"niti ~.1ncc of rL·ality .1nd defin-
ing the n1e.1ning of life. 
H ... d1ecting upon the ilnpott .. ll1( e l r l.lll u.u~c Ill i\menc.lll denlOCracy 
dunng the e.1rly 181 Os. Alt·xi de .. Iocqucvtllc ol c1 vc I that the dyn:unics 
of public opinion .111<.i pc l!uc.I rc.lht) 111. ke the redc 1111t1 H1 of \Vords: 
sunple. qu1ck. and e. '· le nung 1 nee ed t 
1 l'JlOrancc Itself c n m. kc ll e 1er. But H 111\'0h e 
m ke u e of H, nd 
)r the 
I. ngu.t~l'. In thu gtvmg. d ub1e me. mng tl one" r , lem ,cr.ttiC peo-
ples often m. k<? both the old, nd the ne\\ tgm 1 at1on mb1 lOU . .. !If] 
there 1 no accel ted JUd e, no pcnnancnt court t e 1 e the me mng o 
. word. the phra c: 1 left to '". nder fn::e 4 
Hut. not ju t the I hr. c.:: \\' ndcr . ultun.: \\ c n ers • \\ dl. 'T'hc gr, d-
ual n:definition o mor. 1 \Vord .md tenn 1 like t. km~ ~.h)\vn tht ~.1ils 
and rernoving the rudder. rh.l .1 bo. t. here rern. in~ no \V,lY 
to stl'er the boat in the riaht dtrc n Hl. Put n ther \V y, \vhcn the cul-
tural compa loses its nugnc llL r l'fer ence point, li r ecllons hecon1e rl'Ll-
tive. In tht:se circumst ... nee.:: llH>r<dlty 1 c OJnc .1 rll.lttc.::r o politic.1l 
assertion and \vill, not of .lccepted de lllltl )11s .m I t.uh.i.lrds. SeL·ing this 
vital link bet\Vct:n Ltnguagt: .1nd culture, on ucius s.1id: "\Vhen words 
lose their I11l':lning. peopll' lose their lib "It,_,. 
Ironically, ev<:n :1s dl'n1ocr.1cy depends upon Lm,'u.lgc· to lkfine right 
and wrong, it sitnultanl'OU!\ly subverts l.1nguage .1nd its mor.1l contL'llt. 
To avoid cultural chaos, participation by citi'Zl'Ils ent.1ils =tgreL'rncnt on 
v.;idely sharl.'d and accepted n1eaninbrs of right .1nd \Vrong. I l'Il10Lr:lc.:y 
could hardly function \Vlthout c1t17ens playing by the "ruks of the polit-
ical garne." Thus, in a Sl'nSl' language is the linchpin of stability in de-
n1ocracy. However, as \Vonh and tenns bl.'cornl' e111pty vessels vo1d of 
1noral content, pohtical candidate~ and public oHiu.1ls can define and 
redefine words and ten11s to su1t the1r poltncal purposes, t.ulonng their 
definitions of words to enhance their voter appl'al. 
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Postmodernism and Democracy 
Postmodemism, known as poststructuralism and deconstructionism in 
literature, frontally assaulted the meaning of words during the 1970s. 
Following the leadership of Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man, 5 this new 
theory of literary criticism, questions the historic understanding of lan-
guage. Now the title of a new cultural age, postmodemism belittles the 
importance of consistency and coherence in the meaning of words and 
fosters an increasingly relativistic, subjective, and fragmented society. 
Succinctly put, postmodemism puts a heavy foot on the accelerator of 
democracy's downslide. 
Contrasting modemisn1 and postn1odemism, John Louis Lucaites and 
Celeste Michelle Condit state that: "Modernism features a commitment 
to scientism, and objective, morally neutral, universal knowledge. In 
the modem worldview, the universe is a relatively simple, stable, highly 
ordered place, describable in and reducible to absolute formulas that 
hold across contexts. " 6 According to modernism, words serve as anchors 
of stability in society. Or like n1agnetic forces for the creation of unity 
and harmony, words help solve problems by drawing people together 
on the high ground of words expressed as principles and ideals. 
Modernism, however, is not without its faults. By emphasizing the 
rational and cerebral over the personal and emotional, modernism cre-
ates an imbalance between the head and the heart. Dominated by the 
head, modernism exalts rationality, scientific and technological progress, 
and material success. On its downside, modernism disparages the impor-
tance of individual experience and cultural change in defining words 
and developing language patterns. 
By contrast, postmodernism errs on the opposite side, placing exces-
sive emphasis on the personal and emotional over the rational and cere-
bral. Believing that truth is subjective and situational, not objective and 
universal, postmodernists contend that cultural change renders objective 
and universal truth nonexistent. Words do not shine as beacon lights on 
overarching ideals and principles, but rather they generate discord and 
disagreement in society, creating circumstances to be managed rather 
than conditions to be cured. Since societies construct meaning through 
language, dominant elites def1ne truth through power. As Lucaites and 
Condit state: "On this view, struggle, not consensus, is the defining 
168 EPII Oc.UF 
ch~r.lcteristic of soci.1l life: ,1c l)rdingl ', oci.1l discord is not a pathology 
to be cured but a condition to he productively 111,111.1g ·d. " 7 
Posttnodernisnl turn IlH?.llling 011 its hc.1d hy stripping \Vords of their 
denotation .1nd c<.. nnot.HJOll . Not unexpectnily the \Vords chcdlcn,gc, dc-
~' r,zhili:c. wult nnine . . uHi qi/Jt't 11 <.. l1.1r.tcten:ze po t1nodernisn1. As a hrroup 
tht:sc \vord tr.1n l.nc Into _pitl .1 de me I in ", spt·ci,ll point of vie\V, 
etnph. ,i , r interpret u n. ·· 1 Tnificantly, in kecptn:r \Vith postnlodcrn-
i~t intt: rpret.Hi n. ro spin 1nean ''to C\ olve. e. ·pre . r t:11 n ~.Ht by proc-
tsse of llltild or 1111. !ll1c tl n .. , Predl t ... bly, there ore, truth becon1C:-i cl 
subjective Interpretation , nd even . 
ontlc tinT tradJnonal n i 1 l tru tur. 1 fonn )f hterary criticisn1 
illustr.He th1 breakd \Vn 111 rne mn . I r. hu lllc llv rc. ie \\',lnted to 
~ 
kno\V \Vh,ll the . utht r • text HHen led, but po ~tnt<.. tur.tlisrn derides 
.1uth( n.tl intention. c rdtng t I t trtlCturalt 111, cultur.tl cc nvcntions 
l ind \\ ntei . 111akin :-r the Cl. I nte ·t of 111e. mn :-r 111 >re nnport,u1t th.u1 
the uth r' Hltcndc n1c. 11111 . I o t tru turall n1 cla11ll ''that tht:: \Vork-
Ings oflanguagc tne cal abl) undennnH:: JllC. run 111 the very process of 
Jllak1ng uch n1ean1n 1 1lle 1 d e th t e\ cry nH k: of discourse 
con truct or con ntute the VCl) t f truth th.lt It l IJllS to dis-
''1 } 1 " 11 cover. un1Jn n7.tn t 1e c n eqtH.-:nce o p tructtlr tsn1 , · 1. -1. 
Ab . n1 tate rh t, "In po t tructur .. l our e h.1 becorne a 
very pr n111 ent ten11, UJ plcn1ennn )Jlte .1 l'~ displ.lcing) 
'ttXt' cl the 11.lll1C for the Vel h,tJ 111 [Cit.d \V}llch I the prilll,lr)' C'Ol1Cl.'rT1 
of liter. ry critici 111 ... [po tn1 turah t ) n cive >f dtscoursL' ,ls ~ocial 
parlance r I. ngu gc-1n-u e. '' 11 A c rd1ng to f > tllHH.lcrnisnl, bnguagc 
no longt:r rc t on a firn1 found. non of lingui tic systenl." 
but i a byproduct of'' o 1al n huon , cl. tructur ~, .1nd po\vcr-
rdationship that ~dter in the cou1 e o h 1 t >ry.' 12 
''Reader Response "I heory, · .tnothcr for n1 of po~tn1odern literary 
criticis1n, hold th.lt Illl'aning rests cc tnpktdy \Vi thin tht' pl'rson doing 
the reading. Thus, .1 lt:Xt could conceivably have ,ts 111,111}' me,lnings .1s 1t 
has readers. Given that ont reading is as good as another, the text Itself 
loses tncaning. 
In a word, while tnodernisn1 believes that reason and ~Clence c,ln 
reveal objective truth, posttnodernisn1 contends that truth is subjeCtive. 
Belief in tnodernisn1 's vic\V of objective truth hdd sv:ay fi·orn the En-
ligbtenn1ent until the recent past \vhen postn1odernisn1 ushered 1n a ne\v 
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era. Now no longer serving as a pillar of stability, language fluctuates like 
the stock market. 
Conservatism in the Postmodern Era 
Both modernism and postmodemism strike at the heart of conservatism, 
but for different reasons. Modernism neglects experience, which conser-
vatives revere, while posttnodernism rejects objective, universal, and 
certain truth, which conservatives respect. In short, conservatism offers 
a balance between the two, harmonizing the cerebral or "head" empha-
sis of modernism with the experiential or "heart" emphasis of postmod-
erntsm. 
The ascendance of postmodemisn1 in today's America presents the 
greater challenge to conservatism. For if words no longer convey mean-
ing as postmodemists contend, then what guides political discourse? 
Nothing is more fundamental to political discourse than rhetoric and 
rhetorical symbols, especially in today' s technological and informational 
age where rhetoric extends into such vast new mediun1s as cable televi-
sion and the Internet, making infonnation rapidly accessible and instan-
taneous. 
In an era of rapid change driven by technology and influenced by 
postmodemism, conservatism serves as a stabilizing force. Despite the 
potential for rapid change, political discourse remains locked in slow-
moving dialogues along campaign trails, in courtroom clashes, and inside 
legislative chan1bers. These extended dialogues, which mirror and mold 
culture, allow conservatism significant opportunities to restrain inappro-
priate change. Characterized by traditional values and customs and a 
"go-slow" attitude toward change, conservatism can checkmate changes 
that would create instability in society. 
Both in belief and attitude, conservatisn1 opposes the poststructuralist 
view of language and the impact of relativism and subjectivity on con-
temporary culture. For exatnple, conservatives oppose the relativism and 
subjectivity inherent in Jacques Derrida's definition of language as "an 
unregulatable play of purely relational elements." 13 To Derrida, circum-
stance defines truth. 
American democracy, which evolved from long-held traditions and 
"self-evident" truths, carefully balances individual rights and majority 
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nile as \Veil as go\'ernn1L'Ilt p<.nver .1nd individual fn:cdon1. What hap-
pen<; \vhcn postJno<.krni 111 subverts these in1portant tr:1ditions and truth<; 
and dt ... rupts these essential b:1Llnces? At krH)\vled~ing the t\.vin threats of 
po nnodeinistn .111e.i ever-changin.r truth. Robert C.1se, Director ofthe 
World _Journ.1lisn1 J nstitute. ~.k·clares th.H: 
thts confhct of tnlth an I ngu.1ge (\\or d) h. s l ern tnten 1 ted mto an 
ourn,'ht ultur. I \\ ar .... In l n:vwu ge . OIH ept of tntth nd dtscourse 
comnmnH .. ted through \\ ord \\ ~ .. rc tht: .1~ tcptcd mcdlltlll of hum.m in-
tercourse. "I od ', ho\\ ever, thr n.llure o truth .m l tbr role o words .1n.: 
m th putc 14 
The de. th ( f t1 uth { nd t, 1 eh )d n ht . nd \Vn. n re1nove the rnoral .. 
.. nd t'tl11C.} Jotlnng l. ( \VOl d . ](', Vlll._' t he111 Ilclked lfl ,l 1-,'Teat cuJtur.ll 
\\',lr. \Vhc: re the) ervc . 1 ,l\Vns 111 the h.uH.h of the powerful. But \Vhat 
happen \Vhc: n I n rua e 1 c 1 Ill oral cl thmg? i\Ltunt e lurl.uH.i con-
clude : ·· h ul ,1 culture reach the l 111t \\here < n 1 tcnc t or re.lson-
.rtving .1re no I on 't r v. luet r ret o r11zed, r hC'tnn<.. \Vould be: trrekvant. 
Such a \\'OJ ld 1 to he rest ted he \VCVer, or tht.: .1bsence of rt'.lson and 
judb7111ent. rc the nurk o 
Vc:. hemcntl) oppo t l t u h ,1 rt.:tgn f ten or. c.. on crv.ltisnl tights to 
n1.1int:11n tnC,lning in \Vord .ls C.Hnt·r o truth ,1nd to ,1tlin11 objective 
.md certain truth. I .lnton Ltnker s.1ys th.H. dCCord tng to Art'itotle: "'Pol-
itics i , contest btt\VCL'f1 riv.tl p. rtits over \Vh.n vision t)f the good \Vtll 
guide our COJ11ll10n ltfe,' ., but .. there 1 n w.1y to spc.1k .1bout politic. 
\Vithout t.dkin r .lbout the good. ''JG )J1 erV.ltlSlll pursues truth < s Ans-
totlc's good \\•hdt' posuno lerrnsn1 c.m de 1nc.:: neither truth nor good. 
Postn1odernisn1 sutTers ti·om .1 selt:.i n tl ictc.!d nihilistic handKap . When 
truth vani he , f:1lsehood ce.1ses. Sitnuluneously .111 thinb"' becon1e tnH~, 
.md all things becoine f:d t. Like .1 hurric.1ne. postmodermsn1 leaves 
chaos in it \V:lke, \Vi ping out the referl'nce points of right and \\Tong, 
good and bad, and causing considcr:1bk hann to C'-lsential social mstttu-
tions. 
Family and Faith 
Two fundan1ental bulwarks of sooety, f:11ndy and faith, reveal the differ-
Ing in1pacts of postn1oden11Sn1 and conservatisn1 in shaping An1erican 
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politics and presidents. While postmodemism attacks the historic mean-
ing of both family and faith, conservatism seeks their restoration. 
Family 
Often called the foundation of society, the American family is now at 
risk. Postmodem language and life have contributed to the destabiliza-
tion of the American family as historically defined. Judith Stacey notes 
that in the postmodem era the family faces temporal and theoretical 
challenges: "no single-family structure or pattern is statistically domi-
nant, and therefore, domestic arrangements become increasingly di-
verse. " 17 These statistical data reveal a lack of" cultural consensus" about 
the definition of family. 18 
Contemporary Western family life is also postmodern in the theoretical 
sense that it represents a period of contest, atnbiguity, improvisation, and 
doubt .... The postmodern fa1nily ... is a condition of diversity and flux 
in which no single-family type represents the practice, or even the ideals, 
of the majority. 19 
Lacking an objective standard of truth and meaning, postmodernism 
has fabricated unforeseen consequences for the family and society. Stacey 
indicates that, "Under postmodern conditions, the social character of 
practices of gender, sexuality, parenting, and family life, which once ap-
peared to be natural and immutable, become visible and politically 
charged. " 2° Family, a longtime linchpin of American society, is no longer 
stable and predictable, but now shifting and volatile, adversely affecting 
the individual members of families and destabilizing society as a whole. 
During the 1990s Republicans gained an advantage in the debate 
about "family values" by arguing that the subversion of the traditional 
family, that is, father, mother, and children, undermines the stability of 
society.21 Objecting to the Republicans use of "family values," William 
Jefferson Clinton responded. 
I'm fed up with politicians in Washington lecturing Americans about 
"family values." Our fanUlies have values. Our government doesn't. I 
want an America where "family values" live in our actions, not just in 
our speeches. An America that includes every family. Every traditional 
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f.1mtl , and every extended a1nlly. Every t:\\ o-mc< me • mtly nd everv 
smgle-p rent f.muly. and every fiJ tcr fam1ly. 
FolJo,ving 1r. linton' le.Hi, lldl.u , R dh. 111 lint >11, 111 .1 speech to 
the 1 < l 6 Den1oc .1tic Convcnti< n, enl.tr"ed tq on the tr, dJtion.11l ' un-
d tood iefinition o the t: 1ndy . n c. Hcd for llC\\ .u1 I c:xp.HHicd n.l-
tional v<?nllnent l rohrr·ant r the ne'd) e:Xl , n le de lllition of 
t 1nil '· 23 B) century' end po tn1 den11 111 had re c I ned family. 
l·aith 
\Vh1le feeling the on cquen e o p tn1 erm 111' redcfimnon o 
the family. 1110 t Antcnc. n "n neither pulp tnt the 
ea t1 r 1 er e1vc nor cxpl. 111 H 1 lc effe ordin 
1ndt rb. the breakd \VB o the 11111) end hock\V,lVe thr u 1h OCI<.: ty 
reVIVIng rehgton nd rc:.: ffirn11n 7 l~c:.:Ctl\ c truth 111 ·n • n long or 
tab 1 h l) , n d n1 e m n 7 1 n the 1 r ll\ c . 
l·or de de , An1enc. n , rchg1 u , nd nonreh 1 u hke, h 'e been tclhn .. 
poll te th t the c urltl) 1 c 1 enencmg "mo . l n 1 , •• or. , t the vel) 
lea t, a ''m,~or n1oral problem," refie tc , the) , , 111 , de hnc o C1\ thty, 
re pect, re pon 1b1lny .• n m1ly t. btht . A 1 9 ,.II up ~ oll h. d 4< 
pcrcem ch ractcn7.Jng 1t en 1 , • nether 1 percent . m.~ r 1 roblem. 
a grand total of 9 pc rccnt- tln . t • tunc \\hen the e no my \\. Aour-
1 hmg nd en me and "el • rc h. d t lken a preC1JltOu lr p. It 1 th1 ense 
of moral en 1 or d1 . rray th. t m, ke Amcnc n , e\ en n nob en. nt ne , 
so ohcttou of rebg1on. 4 
Po tn1oder111 111 look upon rdig1on, not. , 1nnly held et > onvic-
tion about re.lll 'and nght .md \\ rong, but n1crely .1 preference .unong 
a orted vie\v . Lacking .tb olute truth on po tntodenlt nt's reli~rious 
n1orga bord, people nuy l hoo e \vh.H they lik<? \Vllhout Lon rete stan-
dards for detL'nnining the . oundness o tht·ir choicl:'s . Littlt \Vonder then 
that posunodernisn1' religiou ntorg.t bord features diversity .1nd toler-
ance:.:. In the po trnodern era, .1 ae thetic critt ria h.tve repLKed r.ttional 
criteria for n1aking choices front the lllOrg.lsbord, people are left \Vith a 
hunger for belief in objectivl' and univers.d truth. 
A1nericans understand ho\v religion bent fits a healthy society. Parent-
ing and the f<unily itnprove \Vhile critlle and rnaterialisn1 decline. Ger-
EPILOGUE 173 
trude Himn1elfarb discovered that: "a good many Americans believe 
that we would all be better off if n1ore of us became 'deeply religious': 
85 percent think that such parents would do a better job of raising their 
children, 79 percent that crin1e would decline, 69 percent that 'greed 
and materialistn' would decrease.25 
Unfortunately this desire for religious faith occurs in a postmodem 
environn1ent, which rejects objective truth, in contrast to classical Chris-
tianity, which affim1s the tnoral distinctiveness of opposites. Either God 
is or He is not. Either rniracles happen or they do not. Either sin exists 
or it does not. Either n1an is born into sin or he is not. Today, however, 
faith responds n1ore to feeling than to fact. Only a hazy line distinguishes 
those who believe fron1 those who do not. That is why Alan Wolfe 
argues that post1nodem1Sn1's subjectivity and relativity attack religion 
itself, undennining the very reasons why An1ericans tum to it in a time 
of uncertainty. Rather than serving as an avenue to objective truth, reli-
gion beco1nes but another pathway to postmodern atnbiguity and insta-
bility. 
Religious students are very tnuch hke nonreligious students in their efforts 
to personalize knowledge, to avOid difficult and controversial positions 
that nught cause anger m others, and to Insist that, 1f we just try hard 
enough, everyone can get along wtth everyone else .... Religion has 
returned to Atnerica, not as an alternative to the value of relativistn and 
personal seeking associated w1th the often quite secular 1960s, but as the 
logical extensiOn of the cultural revolut10n first glitnpsed at that titne. 26 
Like tem1ites, post1nodemisn1 and its literary con1ponents of post-
structuralisn1 and deconstructionisn1 create external change through in-
ternal subversion unseen by the naked eye, which in turn adversely 
affects the stability of two of society's prin1ary institutions, faith and 
family. Its in1pact, however, does not stop there. Not unexpectedly post-
modernisnl also plays a tnajor role on the stage of presidential politics. 
Clinton and Bush in the Postmodern Era 
While leading the nation in the cultural clin1ate of postn1odernisn1, Pres-
idents Willian1 Jefferson Clinton and George W. Bush used rhetoric to 
pursue their differing political ends, but postmodernisn1 affected then1 
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differently. In the tnain, posttnodern rhetoric Influenced Clinton, while 
conservative rhetonc in. ptred l3uc;h. Neither, hovvever, could com-
pletely escape the po\ver of the other'c; rhctonc. Conservatisrn restrained 
the an1bit1on of Clinton\ po5tn1oden1 leadership, \vhile postn1odernisn1 
lin1ited the potential reach of Bulih \ con\ervattve ac;ptrations. 
B!ftncatcd Culttoal Clinzc1fc 
Tod.1y' politici.1ns con1pete in a bifurcJted cultural clin1ate Influenced 
by both objective and subjective truth. Play,vright Arthur Mtller at the 
30th annual JetTer<;on Lecture in the Hurnanitie . in a speech titled "On 
Politic<; and the Art of Acting.,. said the ne\vs 111edia "have evolved into 
'disgt.u5ed theater critics,' en1phasizin~ perfon11ance O\'er 5ubstance.''27 
Su1nn1ing up Pre. ident Clinton\ perfonn.u1ce on stage for eight years, 
Gloria Borger s.1id: 
Bill Clinton w~s our fit sl c.1ble-ready president. If there was news. he was 
there . Anywhere. clil)'lllllt' . Congn: sion.ll joint St'\SJOI1? He <.ould \\'lng lt 
without the teleprompter. Funer,1ls? A gre,H eulogizer. Per\on.11ly einbar-
rassmg moment-.? Another opportunity to spm .md par<;e If the TV cr~l\vl 
had pictures. Clinton would be consr~mtly jogging :tlong the boctorn of 
your screen.2 
No president in A1nencan history left behind a \vorse record of rnoral 
scandal than Pre ident Clinton. 2' 1 l:.ven before \vtnn1ng the 1992 elec-
tion, he faced allegations of extratnantal affi11r and sexual 1111 conduct. 
The Lc\vtnsky scandal surf.'lced 1n 1998 \vhen Chnton testtfied under 
oath in a sexual harassn1ent la\vsuit brought agatnst h1n1 by Paula Corbin 
Jones, a fon11er Arkansas state ernployee. Jones' suit stem1ned from an 
incident in a Little Rock hotel roon1 tn 1991, when Clinton was gover-
nor of Arkansas. In his testi1nony Clinton dented having a sexual rela-
tionship \vith Monica Lewinsky, a fon11er White House intern. A 
subsequent investigation revealed that Clinton had, in £'let, had such a 
relationship, and in 1998 he adn1itted that he had engaged in a relation-
ship with Lewinsky. 
When asked under oath in grand jury testin1ony whether there was 
absolutely any "sex of any kind, in any n1anner, shape or fom1" between 
Mr. Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, the president gave an appropriate 
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postmodem answer. "It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' 
is." In the san1e testin1ony, he was asked if Ms. Lewinsky had ever been 
alone with hin1, and again the answer was linguistic, "it depends on how 
you define 'alone.'" The Clinton scandal was as much an outgrowth of 
the dran1atic change in n1orals as the misbehavior of one n1an in office. 
Questions about Clinton's conduct in office followed him until the 
end of his presidency. In January, 2001, just one day before leaving of-
fice, Bill Clinton agreed to a settlen1ent of all legal aspects of the scandal 
avoiding the possibility of crin1inal indictment. Under the settlement, 
Clinton admitted giving false staternents under oath about his relation-
ship with Lewinsky and agreed to give up his law license for five years. 
His legacy may be that as the first postn1odern president, he realized the 
implications of ruling a country where the only truth is private truth. 
Without a unified public truth he would never be condemned for any 
action as along as he denied knowledge or responsibility. Clinton's style 
and resiliency are his most lasting legacy. 
Putting Mr. Clinton in historical perspective, Michael Novak says 
that, "After years and years of substituting therapeutic language for n1oral 
language, 'well' for 'good,' 'ill' for 'evil,' Arnericans seen1 sick of ther-
apy. " 30 President Clinton left a legacy Novak believes in that An1ericans 
are now en1bracing the conservative rhetoncal tradition of assigrting 
meaning to language. 
President Bush, like President Reagan before hin1, has returned us to the 
n1oral fratnework of good and evil, where our founders began all their 
thinking. There is evil in the world, and It coagulates, 1t gathers forces, 
and if it bursts its bounds endangers everybody. 'Axis of evtl'? Yes, there 
can be such things. How could we ever have doubted it?" What drearns 
were we living in, what sort of nliSt, what fog?31 
Using September 11, 2001, as the turning point, Novak contends that 
the atrocities comnutted then shook the nation, causing An1ericans to 
question their lives and drean1s and in tum creating the reen1ergence of 
objective truth and meaning in language through a renewed con1n1it-
ment to neighbor, fan1ily, and country. Sun1marizing this change, Gloria 
Borger observes that: "after eight years of nothing but equivocation and 
spin, we seem to be getting son1ewhere ... . We're into sin1ple truth, 
which is not a bad thing. " 32 
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In a "trange and paradoxical way, epten1ber 11, 2001 , ushered the 
United tate\ 1nto a ne\v era. With a \Var raging agatnst terrorisn1 in the 
\hadO\\~ of a great tragedy on our "oil, the Arnencan people \vant their 
president to \peak clearly and platnly and to tnean what he c;ays. l)escrib-
tng the reaction of the pubhc to Bush's vvords, Borger reckons that: 
But for .1ll the eloquence of the prepared texts, it w:ts the unbound Bush 
'"'·ho bonded With the rution: 'I'm a loving guv . !but] :tlso someone 
who's got .1 job to do.' he s;ud, te.tring up .lt the Whne House And then, 
bullhon1 in h.1nd, .tnn .1round .1 Ne'' York firefighter at hrround zero, he 
pledged 'the people who knocked these butldinbTS do\\ n will hear from all 
of us soon.· Amencans w:1nred to believe l111n, and rhey did. 3 
While Mr. Chnton indulgcd hirnsl.'lfin thc cultural trend ofpostn1od-
ern1sn1 and It\ anything-goc~-attitudl.'. Mr. Bu\h found htn1selfliberated 
to rever e the trend. The incerity of Georgc W. Bu\h \tood out in bold 
relief against the backdrop of S,eptl.'tnbcr 11 and the pubhc's reaction to 
po tn1odern tnala1 L'. hdping to product.' for hm1 htgh approval ratin~. 
In the \VOr(h of Ann Me r=ea tter\: "Utlt one rl'.1SOI1 for Bu h' . ren1arkably 
high JOb approval ranng, beyond unitY ovl.'r the \Var effort, 1s that he 
carefully avotds being seen . s an extren11st and conle\ .1cro s as a centri t 
\Vho listens. even a he reassures consl.'rvatt\'l') he's reall\ on thetr side. " 14 
' 
He appe.1rs genutne ,1nd stable as he stays 1n tep \\lth Mtddle A1nerica. 
Mr. Bush's ability to convey stabtbty and stncenty anses fi-on1 his use of 
rhetonc and rhetoncal ytnbol . 
By contrast. relentless rhl'toncal sptn and revelations of per onal can-
dal dn11inished Mr. Clinton's chann, ch.1nsnu, and con~1derable politi-
cal skill. His n1orahty, or lack thereof, unden1uned h1s personal aplon1b 
and the po\ver of his rhetonc. Cotnpanng Mr. Chnton and Mr. Bush 
during thetr first year 1n office, Ran1esh Ponnuru says that: 
None of Bush's problems in h1s first year .1s president c01npare to those 
besettmg Bill Chnton at the same stage of h1s presidency. The Travelgate, 
Whitewater, and Troopergate stones all bloss01ned m 1993. Clinton's 
st1111ulus bill was defeated, as was his attetnpt to let open homosexuals 
serve In the n1ihtary. Time ran a cover tory on him as 'the Incredible 
shrinking president. ' 35 
The ti1nes often define opportunities for presidents. While broken 
promises and scandals plagued Mr. Clinton during his first year in office, 
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Mr. Bush found his first year filled with international conflicts, such as 
the downed plane in China and the events ofSeptember 11. Forced into 
the role of Commander in Chief, Mr. Bush comforted Americans as he 
led diplomatic and military actions around the world. Although Mr. 
Clinton did not face the same challenges and in turn experience the 
same opportunities for presidential greatness, the scandals of his personal 
life prevented him from ever achieving greatness. 
Mr. Bush's success sets up even more opportunities to use his rhetori-
cal skill and popular appeal. By expanding the agenda of his rhetorical 
slogan, "compassionate conservatisn1," he can craft a pragmatic and pro-
gressive conservatism: showcasing the benefits of democracy and capital-
ism to the world; expanding welfare reform; reforming expensive and 
expansive entitlement programs; and eliminating partial-birth abortion. 36 
A New Democrat and a Compassionate Conservative 
Just as Mr. Clinton used the rhetoric of a "New Democrat" to appeal 
to the heartland of America, Mr. Bush has used the rhetoric of" compas-
sionate conservatism" to resonate with the concerns and values of Mid-
dle America. Since Middle America perceived the Den1ocratic Party as 
too liberal and the Republican Party as too conservative, Messrs. Clinton 
and Bush had to lead their respective parties to the center. Compassionate 
Conservatism,37 the title of Marvin Olasky's book, provided the agenda 
for Mr. Bush's 2000 campaign. Reacting to the term, Bill Clinton said 
during the 2000 campaign that: 
This "compassionate conservatism" has a great ring to it, you know? It 
sounds so good. And as near as I can tell, here's what it means: "I like 
you, I really do. And I would like to be for the patients' bill of rights, and 
I'd like to be for closing the gun-show loophole I'd like to do these things, 
but I just can't, and I feel terrible about it. " 38 
Poking fun at Mr. Clinton's criticism of "compassionate conservatism," 
John O'Sullivan points out that: 
Mter the laughter, however, doubts creep in. It is Clinton, after all, who 
is famous for feeling other people's pain and even more famous for doing 
nothing about it (ask those few overt gays who want to join the military) 
or even piling on yet more pain, which he subsequently feels all the more 
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keenly (recall those nch people \vhose taxes he later admitted raising "too 
much"). After seven veal""" ofcompas-.ionatc hberahsm. the roster ofDen1-
ocratJC constituents that feel bctr:1yed by Chnton .1dds up to the entire 
p.trty, with the sole exccpt1on of fcmim ... ts, for whom he ha.;; reserved h1s 
smgle act of fldehty-keepmg lnf,ll1ticidc lcgJI. 9 
Mr. Chnton rocked the foundation of truth in language by daring and 
detgntng to deconstruct the n1e.1ning of one of the s11nplc)t words in 
the Engh<ih language. i.'. His in11nor.1l behavior in conj unctton \Vl th his 
anything-goes life .1tH.i hi no-consequences attitude di turbed n1any 
An1cncans. Although the t\VO catchy rhetorical phrases. "Ne\\" J)en1o-
crat .. and "Cornpassion;lte Conscrvatisn1" appealed to A n1cnca \ nlaln-
<itre~un. [\ 1r. Clinton subverted the n1e.1ning of language to attain his 
personal goals and jettisoned the :-il!Ccess of his Nc\v Democratic tdeas. 
Gotng a step further to explore the tug-of-\var over the tenn wmpas-
sion. John 0' ullivan .1ys th.H "Both p.1rtics arc nO\V 111aneuvcring to 
occupy the sarne political territory \vhilc denouncing each other .1s ex-
trernist. " 4& But cls to its origins, l)')ullivan credit~ President R.onald 
}~eagan and Bnnsh Prin1e Mini!iter 1\tbrgaret Th.ncher. 
After Reagan and Th.ncher forged .1 new post-sociali~t politics in the 
Eighties, the parties of the Ldi. .tcccpted c.tpit.llism ("Me too") but 
claimed they could run it more comp.1ssion:udy tlun the R.1ght. No·w 
the parties of the R.ight arc cl.timmg that they can run comp.l'>ston more 
effectively than the Left ("Mt: too too") . Ima~r1ne .1 dcb,tte conducted 
between two ventriloquist-. each of whose dummy is sitting on the other 
ventriloquist's knce. 41 
The Permanent Campa(Rn 
Besides the n1ynad nlanifestations of conlp.lssionate conservatisn1, 
Messrs. Chnton and Bush sh.1re another Idea, the pennanent catnpaign, 
wherein rhetoric plays an Increasingly pivotal part. As Bruce E. Gran-
beck notes: "Presidential elections serve a wide variety of practical, social 
and idiosyncratic functions, ultin1ately affecting the culture's routines, 
distribution of resources, and even conceptions of itself If these proposi-
tions have n1ore than validity, then the vvays we go about exan1ining 
campaign communications need to be rethought." 12 Son1etin1es looking 
more like a rock concert than a forun1 of political ideas, presidential 
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campaigns incorporate spectacle and the spectacular, requiring a new 
leadership style of presidential candidates. 
Mr. Clinton introduced the idea of leading by campaigning, which 
Mr. Bush adopted, although his advisors steadfastly maintained he would 
not. Ryan Lizzie points out that: "A month before Bush took office, 
Representative Rob Portman, a close advisor to the president, told the 
New York Tirrres, 'People have talked about the Clinton-Gore adminis-
tration as a permanent can1paign. That's not going to happen with 
George Bush.' " 43 Lizzie, however, found that Mr. Bush quickly capitu-
lated to the lure of Mr. Clinton's successful creation of the postmodern 
permanent can1paign, a sean1less gam1ent of campaigning and governing. 
In support of his conclusion, Lizzie quotes Thomas Mann of the Brook-
ings Institution, who said in his book, The Permanent Campaign and Its 
Future, that: "If ever a president has learned from his predecessor, it's 
George W. Bush. He is governing by catnpaigning. " 44 
Conclusion 
So, although Mr. Bush has naturally adopted Mr. Clinton's postmodem 
leadership model of the pem1anent campaign, he has cultivated conser-
vative rather than postmodern rhetoric. In both instances, however, the 
magnet of Middle America pulled them to the middle and away from 
extreme manifestations of liberalism and conservatism. Both are charm-
ing and charisn1atic leaders serving in an age of fragmentation and flux, 
but their rhetorical means and ends differ. While the postmodem rhetoric 
of Mr. Clinton questions the meaning of words and downgrades ulti-
mate truth, the conservative rhetoric of Mr. Bush upholds the integrity 
of language in the pursuit of objective and certain truth. But neither 
could escape the influence of the other's rhetorical model. Postmodem 
rhetoric molded Mr. Clinton's rhetorical style, but conservatism con-
fined him. Conservative rhetoric has motivated Mr. Bush, but postn1od-
emism has restrained him. By curbing Mr. Clinton's ambitions and 
bolstering Mr. Bush's aspirations, the conservative tradition in America 
continues as a formidable force in the postmodem era. 
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